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Abstract
Essays on the Economic Analysis of Transportation Systems
by
Hyoung Suk Shim
Adviser: Professor Jonathan R. Peters
This dissertation consists of four essays on the economic analysis of transportation
systems. In the first chapter, the conventional disaggregate travel demand model,
a probability model for the modeling of multiple modes, generally called random
utility maximization (RUM), is expanded to a model of count of mode choice. The
extended travel demand model is derived from general economic theory – maximizing
instantaneous utility on the time horizon, subject to a budget constraint – and can
capture the dynamic behavior of countable travel demand. Because the model is for
countable dependent variables, it has a more realistic set of assumptions to explain
travel demand then the RUM model. An empirical test of the theoretical model using
a toll facility user survey in the New York City area was performed. The results
show that the theoretical model explain more than 50 percent of the trip frequency
behavior observed in the New York City toll facility users. Travel demand for facility
users increase with respect to household employment, household vehicle count, and
employer payment for tolls and decrease with travel time, road pricing, travel distance
and mass transit access.
In the second chapter, we perform a statistical comparison of driving travel de-
mand on toll facilities between Electronic Toll Collection (ETC) users, as a treatment
group, and non users, as a control group, in order to examine the effect of ETC on
travel demand that uses toll facilities. The data that is used for the comparison is a
user survey of the ten toll bridges and tunnels in New York City, and the data con-
tains individual user’s travel attributes and demographic characteristics, as well as
the frequency of usage of the toll facilities so that the data thus allows us to examine
vthe difference in travel demand of E-ZPass, the Electronic Toll Collection System for
Northeastern United States’ highway ETC system and compare tag holders and non
tag holders. We find that the estimated difference of travel demand between E-ZPass
users and non-users is biased due to model misspecification and sampling selection,
and E-ZPass has no statistically significant effect on travel demand after controlling
for possible sources of biases.
In the third chapter, we develop a parallel sparse matrix-transpose-matrix mul-
tiplication algorithm using the outer product of row vectors. The outer product
algorithm works with the compressed sparse row (CSR) form matrix, and as such it
does not require a transposition operation prior to perform multiplication. In addi-
tion, since the outer product algorithm in the parallel implementation decomposes a
matrix by rows, it thus imposes no additional restrictions with respect to matrix size
and shape. We particularly focus on implementation of this technique on rectangular
matrices, which have a larger number of rows and smaller number or columns for per-
forming statistical analysis on large scale data. We test the outer product algorithm
for randomly generated matrices. We then apply it to compute descriptive statistics
of the New York City taxicab data, which is originally given by a 140.56 Gbytes file.
The performance measures of the test and application shows that the outer product
algorithm is effective and performed well on large-scale matrix multiplication in a
parallel computing environment.
In the last chapter, I develop a taxi market mechanism design model that demon-
strates the role of a regulated taxi fare system on taxi drivers’ route choice behavior.
In this model, a fare system is imposed by a taxi market authority with the recogni-
tion of asymmetric information, which in this case is about road network and traffic
conditions, between passengers and drivers, and taxi trip demand is different and un-
certain at its origin and destination. I derive a prediction from the model that shows
the drivers have an incentive to make trip longer than optimal if they have passengers
vi
whose trip origin has more taxi demand than the trip’s destination area, and the fare
rule is a metered fare, which is non-negotiable. If the passengers’ trip destination has
more demand than its origin and the fare rule is negotiable, on the other hand, then
the drivers have an incentive to minimize the trip time and distance. I then perform
large scale generalized methods of moment (GMM) estimations and find from the es-
timation that the theoretical prediction is consistent with empirical foundations from
the GMM estimation results using 378,532,118 New York City taxicab trip records
from 2008 to 2010.
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1. TRAVEL DEMAND MODEL 2
1.1 Introduction
In 2009, the National Academies released a document that identified nine critical
transportation issues facing the United States in the first decade of the 21st century:
congestion, energy, infrastructure maintenance, finances, equity, emergency prepared-
ness, safety, inadequate institutions, and inadequate human intellectual capital.
Although the National Academies report focused on the transportation needs of
the United States, countries around the world face these same critical transportation
issues. To address two of these critical issues (congestion and finances), the Federal
Highway Administration and many state and local governments have considered ad-
ditional forms of taxation and road pricing. Pricing has the advantage in many cases
of both lowering demand for a particular segment of highway or facility and providing
revenue for road investment or other purposes. There are a variety of ways to apply
pricing to road systems, and these include simple tolls, time of day pricing, congestion
pricing zones, dynamic pricing systems and vehicle miles traveled charging systems.
As such, there is a need to study the impact of road pricing on travel behavior and
demand structure, as well as the interaction effect of pricing and mass transit services
on mode choice through the use of advanced travel demand modeling.
To better understand why people travel more or less, the development of an ap-
propriate theory of travel demand is a priority research task. Numerous papers on
travel demand have been developed over the past 40 years to better understand em-
pirical and theoretical concerns. Most of the travel demand literature has examined
empirical and theoretical analysis simultaneously, rather than independently, because
travel demand analysis has some potential pitfalls that are difficult to justify in prac-
tice–such as limited data sources, inappropriate model selection, and so forth–so the
appropriateness of conduction empirical or theoretical analysis independently cannot
be guaranteed.
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1.1.1 Literature Review
The simultaneous consideration of empirical and theoretical analysis requires the de-
velopment of a model specification from relevant theory and the empirical testing
of that model. Choosing an appropriate model specification and combination of at-
tributes is necessary to estimate a model consistently without bias. Quandt (1970)
argued that an empirical travel demand study should be estimated by using a cor-
rectly chosen functional form, a relevant set of attributes, and an appropriate set of
statistical inference methods; if at least one of these considerations is not upheld,
then the analysis contains a serious bias problem.
In microeconomics, the correct functional form of demand can be chosen by solving
the consumer’s utility maximization, subject to their budget constraints. Because the
demand is derived from the utility maximization, which contains information about
each individual’s preferences, the demand captures general consumption behavior.
The use of utility maximization ensures that the explanatory variables are chosen
from the consumer optimization. After the model has been developed under the
appropriate theoretical constructs, the choice of statistical methods should be the
next step.
The explanatory study of travel demand data is one of the two primary ways
that the travel demand literature has developed; however, the literature is generally
based on the idea that travel demand has an independent decision process, separated
from the other usual economic decisions, such as consumption, and the labor-leisure
choice. So, the functional form, and the set of attributes can be chosen in an empirical
way. In other words, it is possible to set the functional form and attributes without
theoretical verification of whether the model is correctly specified. The result of
explanatory studies for travel demand, therefore, might have a serious bias because
of absence of an appropriate theoretical model.
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The most widely known model of transit demand is a mode choice type model
derived from Random Utility Maximization (RUM). RUM is a theoretical framework
of consumer choice used to analyze a particular type of consumer who has a discrete
choice of modes of travel. The consumer in RUM has a known probability of choosing
a particular mode that is associated with the mode’s attributes. The econometric
estimation of RUM can be performed by multinomial logit (MNL), sometimes called
the conditional logit model because the mechanics of RUM are to assign probabilities
to each mode choice. The probability of each mode being chosen is treated as a
function of the mode’s attributes. McFadden (1974) proposed a travel demand system
for the mode choice of travel. The specification of individual choice is that, individuals
are rational, and, therefore, users choose the optimal mode of travel to minimize the
level of deprivation caused by the travel.
Since McFadden (1974) was published, much of the literature on travel demand
has used RUM concepts of mode choice. McFadden (1978), Williams (1977), Daly
and Zachary (1979) and Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1979) conducted RUM specification
of travel demand and estimate using nested MultiNomial Logit (MNL). Ben-Akiva et
al. (1987) use a combined model of two different specification: the first for revealed
preference and, the second using stated preference data in a single model specification
under the RUM concept. Morikawa (1989) used this model to analyze travel demand
in Netherland. Because data for travel demand have collected, in many cases, in
either a revealed preference or stated preference form, travel demand literature, espe-
cially empirical research, has utilized the available data. Morikawa (1989), Ben-Akiva
and Morikawa (1990), Ben-Akiva and Yamada(1991), Hensher and Bradley (1993),
Louviere (1993, 1999), and Hensher et al. (1989), Brownstone and Train (1999) all
analysed and tested RUM specification models using stated, and revealed preference
data. After 2000, almost all travel demand research that considered individual choice
behavior was conducted using the RUM specification, whether the research interest
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was empirical analysis or theoretical modeling. This recent trend has also affected
the development of commercial software for analysis of transportation system, such
as TransCAD.
In McFadden’s model, the RUM specification of consumer optimization for travel
demand assumes that travel demand is not associated with general economic decision
of the household but has independent decision-making process, which means that
individuals or households decide to travel for travel itself, not to support general
economic activities, such as consuming goods and services, working, and undertaking
leisure activities. For this reason, it is hard to find theoretical consistency with
the RUM model specification and general microeconomic literature. With the RUM
specification, it is difficult to explain the functional purpose of travel, as travel itself
might provide utility for some reason. The functional purpose of travel can be either
work, leisure, or the buying or selling of goods and services. Utility is not directly
created by travel in these cases; it is created by performing the other activities through
travel. In addition, the mode-choice model is a probabilistic choice analysis that
implies how much possibility an individual has for choosing a particular mode, not how
many times the individual is willing to choose the particular mode. The probabilistic
choice analysis is therefore hard to extend its physical demand for travel, such as
the number of trips in a given mode (driving, for example) in a given period. In
addition, not knowing the quantity of travel demanded in a given period creates an
additional challenge, because it is difficult to draw policy implications from the results
for transportation planning purposes.
This paper provides an extended travel demand model for trip frequency, based
on the household lifetime utility maximization problem, subject to budget and time
constraints. Travel events, in the extended model, are treated as supplements to
support the general economic activities of consumption, labor, and leisure. As the
household faces uncertainty in travel time for future travel, the household selects the
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number of travel events for each period, and the process considers the uncertainty by
updating travel time information. Thus, the model captures the dynamic behavior of
countable travel demand associated with the attributes of that demand.
In the next section, the extended model for travel demand is outlined. The the-
oretical model is then tested through the use of a toll facility user survey from the
New York City area. A description of the data used for the empirical analysis, and its
characteristics, is then presented. Finally, the paper discusses the empirical analysis
results and the study conclusions.
1.2 The Travel Demand Model
In this section, we consider a model of a household’s optimization behavior is
presented in which the household chooses consumption and leisure to maximize its
lifetime utility, subject to budget and time constraints; these choices are used to derive
travel demand. The background concept of the household travel choice behavior is
that the household decide on travel events for economic activities (consumption and
leisure). In other words, travel is an instrument to support the household’s economic
activities; it is not undertaken for the sake of travel itself. In addition, to analyze
dynamic choice behavior, lifetime discounted utility maximization is considered in
which the household chooses a quantity of consumption and leisure time to maximize
the household’s utility over its lifetime. There are two distinguishing features of the
model in this study, as compared with McFadden (1974). One is the role of travel;
the other is a mechanism to assign levels of utility to choices. McFadden (1974)
modeled travel demand under the disutility specification in which individual’s travel
choice behavior depends on deprivation levels created by the travel. So the travel did
not play a role as an instrument to help general economic activities, and utility were
assigned directly to travel itself. This is somewhat paradoxical feature because, in his
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paper, McFadden argued that travel is concomitant of other economic activities, such
as work, shopping and recreation, not an objective itself. The model in McFadden,
however, assigns utility directly to the deprivation level of a particular travel mode,
so it implies that an individual chooses travel to minimize disutility from travel itself,
not to promote economic activities. To treat travel as an instrument for the economic
activities, therefore, travel is evaluated in the current study based on the household
time and budget constraints, not on the utility function. Thus, the demand from the
model will reflect travel as an instrument to support general economic activities.
1.2.1 The Framework of Household Choice Behavior
Consider N identical households, each of which has a certain preference level over
time, given by the utility function; each household is endowed with one unit of time,
which can be allocated between work and leisure. The level of utility at each period
depends on the amount of goods and services consumption and leisure time in that
period. In other words, each household’s utility is a function of consumption and
leisure, which can be maximized by the choice of consumption and leisure. Let pt · d
be the cost of travel, where pt is a unit price of the travel per a distance d at time
t, and let ht be the travel time. Because each household’s chooses the amount of
consumption ct and leisure lt for a given budget and time, the household’s feasible
amounts of consumption and leisure are ct−pt ·d, lt−ht respectively. This implies that
the households allocate time for labor and leisure within a particular period of time
so that lt takes value between 0 and 1, and the allocation of labor is automatically
determined as 1 − lt. Under these consideration, the instantaneous utility function
for a representative household can be written as u(ct−ptd, lt−ht). It is assumed that
the function u(·, ·) is strictly increasing, strictly concave in each argument, and twice
differentiable.1
1The discounted lifetime, consumption-leisure utility has been developed to analyze the business
cycle of an economy. The Real Business Cycle model uses the utility function to keep their ag-
1. TRAVEL DEMAND MODEL 8
The representative household faces time and budget constraints when it chooses
the amount of consumption and leisure. The household’s budget is determined by
labor and capital income, and the labor income is determined by the household’s
choice of work hours. Let wt be a rental price per unit labor, rt be a unit rental price
of capital; wt and rt can be thought of as the household’s hourly wage and interest rate,
which are evaluated at competitive market equilibrium. The household has limited
hours for work, which can be treated as labor supply and calculated as the total unit
of time minus the fraction of leisure. Because the travel time should be excluded from
the amount of feasible leisure, the household income is w∗t (1 − lt + ht) + rtkt, where
w∗t is the wage earned by travel and kt is the amount of capital the household has at
time t; w∗t is equal to wt when the user is working, otherwise it is zero.
To consider choice of travel under uncertainty, it is assumed that travel time is
determined by travel distance d, and transit (in the general sense of time in motion)
conditions2, which are randomly given3. This assumption comes from the notion
that travelers face uncertainty in their travel time caused by, for example, traffic
congestion or the failure of mass transit equipment. So the travelers’ choices depend
on uncertain travel times, based on their previous experiences. This notion leads to
a prediction rule for uncertain travel time based on information that is given by a
traveler’s previous experience. Assume that the next period’s travel time is given
only by the current period’s transit condition so that the previous transit condition
does not affect the next period’s travel time. This can be described by the first-order
gregate macroeconomic analysis consistent with microeconomic foundations. Conducting the time
discounted consumption leisure utility has advantages, the household optimization problem can con-
sider two main economic activities of, consumption expenditure and labor supply, simultaneously,
and solving the household optimization problem yields the dynamics of consumption, leisure, and
labor choices. Hence, the travel demand model, derived from the optimization problem with time
discounted utility is consistent with general economic activity because the solution will determine
consumption, labor, and travel demand simultaneously, and reflect how the household update the
given information to decide future demand.
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autoregressive function as
ht+1 = f(ht, d, zt), (1.1)
where zt is stochastic shock on travel time, drawn according to a stationary transition
function Q. As ht+1 is a forecasted travel time based on information from previous
period ht and zt, not the expected travel time of the next period. Since ht and d are
exogenously given at time t, and zt is a stationary process, the evolution of travel time
can be described by probability transition density Q. We assume that the function
f(·, d, ·) ∈ Γ is strictly increasing in each argument, Γ is a non-empty set.
1.2.2 The Household Optimization under Uncertainty
If the household is rational and there is uncertainty about the future, the household
chooses the optimal amount of consumption and leisure time to maximize the house-
hold’s expected utility over its lifetime. The household discounted expected lifetime
utility maximization problem, therefore, can be written as
maxU = E
[ ∞∑
t=0
βtu(ct − ptd, lt − ht)
]
s.t. ct − ptd ≤ w∗t (1− lt + ht) + rtkt
ht+1 = f(ht, d, zt),
where β is a discount factor. Suppose the forecasting rule ht+1 = f(ht, d, zt) is
additively separable, then ht = g(ht+1, d, zt), where g(·, d, zt) is a unique inverse
function of f(·, d, zt)4. Because the household is rational, it spends all of its budget
3the term transit is generalized in this case to mean time in travel.
3The assumption, travel time is a function of travel distance with randomly given transit condition
implies any transit for travel cannot arrive the exactly on time to the final destination even though
the traveler knows the distance of travel. It depends on transit conditions such as traffic jams for
auto transits, unexpected delays due to the failure of mass transit equipment and other unknown
conditions. This is the reason why a traveler chooses transit based on a calculated expected travel
time for each mode of transit.
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and time so that inequality constraint of budget is binding. To reduce the equation
to two constraints, ht is substituted into the budget equation, which gives
ct − ptd = w∗t [1− lt + g(ht+1, d, zt)] + rtkt. (1.2)
Substituting (1.2) into the objective function of the maximization problem yields a
reduced form of the objective function. This equation is the household utility, a
function of ht, ht+1, and zt, because w∗t , rt, and zt do not change due to the choice of
travel mode.
The objective function of the problem is denoted as F (ht, ht+1, zt). Under the
above specification, the optimization problem can be solved by stochastic dynamic
programming. Let h′ ∈ Γ(h, d, z) and let it be an endogenous state variable (i.e.,
a traveler’s forecasted travel time). Further, let z, z′ ∈ Q, and let them be distinct
stochastic processes that are identically distributed. The endogenous state variable
h′ and the exogenous state variable z′ can be thought of as the future travel time and
transit condition, respectively, which gives h′ = ht+1 and z′ = zt+1. By assuming that
zt is the first-order Markov process, the time subscript can be droped, and a dynamic
programming solution can be applied for any time. By the principles of optimality,
the solution of the stochastic dynamic programming is the same as the solution of a
functional equation
v(h, z) = max
[
F (h, h′, z) + β
∫
v(h′, z′)
]
Q(z, dz′), (1.3)
where ν is a function that represents the solution to the dynamic optimization prob-
lem.
Suppose the household determines its consumption and leisure from a different
4Suppose that, for example, the travel time forecasting rule has it’s functional form as AR(1).
That is ht+1 = d+ ρht + zt. In this case, the unique inverse function of ht+1 = f(ht, d, zt) is
ht = g(ht+1, d, zt) =
1
ρ (ht+1 − d− zt).
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optimization process. Let v(ht, zt) be the solution of (1.3) for all t, then (1.3) can be
rewritten as
v(ht, zt) = F (ht, ht+1, zt) + βEt [v(ht+1, zt+1)] , ∀t and zt ∈ Q, (1.4)
where Et[·, ·] is the expectation operator. From (1.4), this can be interpreted as the
expected benefit given by the future travel. Here, the household decides on travel
based on this expected value of future travel so the expectation can be treated as
a reference function of the household for the next period’s travel decision. In other
words, the household chooses the mode and an amount of travel to maximize its
utility, and the decision rule of the household can be summarized by the expectation
Et[v(ht+1, zt+1)].
1.2.3 Mode Choice and Countable Travel Demand Model
Suppose that the individual has i = 1, . . . , J feasible transit modes. Let v(hit, zit) be
a maximized Bellman equation under the choice of the mode i; then the expected
reference function for mode i is
Et[v(h
i
t+1, z
i
t+1)] =
1
β
[
v(hit, z
i
t)− F (hit, zit)
]
, (1.5)
where F (hit, zit) is obtained by inserting hit+1 = f(hit, d, zit) into the objective function.
It is assumed that the choice of mode satisfies the Independence from Irrelevant
Alternatives(IIA)5. The assumption implies that the relative probability of mode i,
as it relates to the other modes, does not change. Therefore, the frequency of a
specific mode i is a function of its own attributes only. Let yit be a count of which the
household chooses the mode i at t, which is treated as a countable travel demand.
Further, let xt be a vector of attributes. Assume that yit, ∀t is drawn according to a
poisson distribution in which the mean is the expected benefit (1.4). Thus, yit has a
1. TRAVEL DEMAND MODEL 12
conditional pdf of:
f(yit|xt) = exp[−E{v(hit+1, zit+1)} ]
E{v(hit+1, zit+1)} yit
yit!
, yit = 0, 1, . . . (1.6)
Therefore, the future demand for travel of a particular mode imeasured as a countable
random variable, is a function of the current period’s travel time ht and experienced
stochastic travel condition zt, which are given by the choice of mode i in the cur-
rent period. The other attributes, w∗t , rtkt, d and lt, affect the entire set of modes
simultaneously because they are determined by the exogenous optimization process.
In short, the household first determines its consumption and leisure to maximize its
utility, then it decides on the mode and number of travel events that are necessary to
achieve this optimum.
1.2.4 Characteristics of Travel Demand
In this section, the characteristics of trip frequency yit, which is a countable demand
model of travel mode i, are examined by using general properties of functional equa-
tions to show how yit responds to each attribute of travel. Because the realization
yit is drawn according to a poisson distribution with mean Et[v(hit+1, zit+1)], the char-
acteristic of Et[v(hit+1, zit+1)] will govern the stochastic behavior of yit itself. Recall
that the instantaneous utility function u(·, ·), which is used as the objective function
for a household maximization problem, is strictly increasing, strictly concave in each
argument, and twice differentiable. From the given specification of the optimization
problem and the general properties of functional equation (1.3) come the character-
5IIA assumption is the relative probability of mode i as it relates to the other mode does not
change if the additional modes are considered so that the probability affected only on attributes
of mode i, not the other mode’s attributes. This assumption support the idea that the count of a
specific mode i is a function of it’s own attributes. See Wooldridge (2002)
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istics of (1.4) realization of yit, described by the following proposition:
Proposition 1.2.4.1. The expectation Et[v(hit+1, zit+1)] is increasing in wage w∗t , fi-
nancial return rt, kt, and decreasing in travel time of mode i hit, travel distance d,
and the share of leisure lt.
The proof of the proposition is straight forward. Substituting the two arguments
of the utility function of the maximization problem into the constraints yields the
reduced form objective function u[{w∗t [1− lt + g(ht+1, d, zt)] + rtkt}, lt − ht)]. This is
the actual form of the objective function F (ht, ht+1, zt) because the other attributes
w∗t , rt, lt and kt, d are exogenously given. It is clear that the objective function F is
strictly increasing and concave in each argument of u(·, ·). Since u is increasing in
w∗t , rt, and kt, F is increasing in w∗t , rt, and kt, and since u is decreasing in hit, d, and
lt so is F . By the Contract Mapping Theorem, the Bellman equation v(·, ·) is also
increasing in w∗t , rt, kt, and decreasing in hit, d, lt.
In this next step, it is shown how travelers make decisions based on given informa-
tion. The following proposition shows that the characteristic of yit can be established
by examining the relationship between yit and Et[v(hit+1, zit+1)].
Proposition 1.2.4.2. Consider the other attribute vector x˜t = [w˜∗t , r˜t, k˜t, h˜it, d˜, l˜t],
and the associated probability distribution f(yit+1|x˜t). f(yit+1|xt) is second order stochas-
tically dominates f(yit+1|x˜t) if one of the following inequalities holds:
(1) w˜∗t ≥ w∗t , r˜t ≥ rt, k˜∗t ≥ kt
f(yit|x˜t) is second order stochastically dominated by f(yit|x˜t) if one of the following
inequalities holds:
(2) h˜it ≥ hit, d˜ ≥ d, l˜t ≥ lt.
5In general, utility function is strictly increasing, and strictly concave in each argument. Note
that, concavity assumption implies diminishing marginal utility.
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The inequalities (1) and (2) imply that the attribute vector x˜t is greater than
xt. From proposition 1.2.4.1, the greater attributes w∗t , rt, kt yield the greater
expected value Et[v(hit+1, zit+1)], and the greater attributes hit, d, lt yield the less
expected value. In vector form, x˜t  xt if one of inequalities (1) holds, than
Et[v(h
i
t+1, z
i
t+1)|x˜t] ≥ Et[v(hit+1, zit+1)|xt]. By definition of second order stochastic
dominance, hence, the probability distribution f(yit|x˜t) second order stochastically
dominates f(yit|x˜t). Conversely, x˜t  xt if one of inequalities (2) holds, that yields
Et[v(h
i
t+1, z
i
t+1)|x˜t] ≤ Et[v(hit+1, zit+1)|xt] so that f(yit|x˜t) is second order stochastically
dominated by f(yit|x˜t). Therefore, proposition 1.2.4.2 is proven. This proposition can
be interpreted as follows: the greater value of y˜it, which is drawn according to the
probability distribution with attributes x˜t, occurs more frequently than yit from a
distribution with xt when at least one of w∗t , rt, kt in x˜t is greater than those in xt.
Similarly, the lesser value of y˜it occurs more frequently than yit when at least one of
hit, d, lt in x˜t is greater than those in xt. Together, the two propositions imply that,
yit, the frequency of trip, is increasing in w∗t , rt, kt, and decreasing in hit, d, lt.
1.3 Empirical Analysis
In this section, an empirical analysis for the count travel demand model is proposed
to test whether the theoretical model is consistent with observed patterns of travel
demand. Previous empirical studies on travel demand have focused largely on mode
choice. From an econometric perspective, the mode-choice can estimates the prob-
ability of each mode as a function of the same set of attributes. The probability of
choosing a particular mode only implies how much possibility of use of a given mode
an individual has; it does not imply how many times the individual will choose the
mode. This point makes the probabilistic choice model argument hard to extend
to the physical quantity demanded for a travel mode, such as the number of driving
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trips or mass transit rides per period. Furthermore, the absence of quantity demanded
makes mode choice hard to use in policy decisions. To derive an appropriate empirical
analysis, it is necessary to have an appropriate functional form of an empirical model
for travel demand. As a theoretical model for a countable number of trips has been
derived the demand for travel is better represented by frequency than by discrete
choices; thus, possible empirical specifications that can be used to test this theory
are examined, as opposed to mode-choice analysis. The number of occurrences of a
particular event from binary choice can be modeled as a Poisson distribution so that
the number of travel events in a given period can be estimated by Poisson regression
analysis. Thus, three models are considered: the linear model, the Poisson model,
and the negative binomial model. The results are compared to examined whether
each of these models is theoretically well specified.
1.3.1 Empirical Model Specification
It is proposed that the model of travel demand be estimated by three different meth-
ods: ordinary least squares(OLS) under linear model specification, poisson, and the
negative binomial model under a count data model specification. If the dependent
variable of travel demand, trip frequency is given as real numbers, linear model speci-
fication is available to estimate the theoretical finding as outlined in section 2 without
serious violations of statistical inference theory. The linear model for travel demand
is given as
yi = β0 + β1hi + β2d+ β3(r · k) + β4w∗ + i, (1.7)
where yi is travel demand for mode i on (−∞,∞), hi is travel time of mode i, d
is distance of travel, r · k is disposable income, w∗ is wage given by travel, and i
is error term. The parameters directly imply the marginal effect of each attribute
on travel demand and can be estimated through OLS estimation under the classical
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linear regression model(CLRM) assumptions.
Poisson, and negative binomial model are the models most frequently used for
a count data model. The count data model begins with the assumption that the
dependent variable is drawn according to poisson distribution, given as
Pr[yi = k|xi] = e
−µµyi
yi!
, (1.8)
where yi is positive integer, k is number of event occurring. The count data model
assumes µ the expected value of yi is a linear function of it’s attributes, as µ = xiβ.
This model is estimated numerically through maximum likelihood estimation because
the parameter vector β has no analytical solution. This is called the poisson regres-
sion model. One of the properties of a Poisson distribution is that the expected value
and the variance of yi are the same. That is E[yi] = V ar[yi] = µ. Therefore, if the
assumption is not satisfied, for example, in the overdispersion casev (or heteroskedas-
ticity), E[yi] ≤ V ar[yi], it is hard to say that the model is correctly specified In
that case, negative binomial estimation can provide a solution because it can control
the case E[yi] ≤ V ar[yi] and estimate the parameter vector. The negative binomial
model represents the most suitable model estimation technique for the purpose of the
current analysis.
1.3.2 Data Source
This study requires a source of data that would allow the frequency of travel demand
for a given mode to be estimated. With the high level of interest in road pricing, the
possibility of examining toll facility use is explored, specifically, an origin-destination
survey conducted in New York City. The Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority
(TBTA) – also know as Metropolitan Transportation Authority Bridges & Tunnels,
conducted an origin-destination survey in October 2004. The authority traditionally
conduct this type of survey roughly every 8 to 10 years. In 2004, the TBTA dis-
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Figure 1.1: Toll Burdens per Capita
tributed 304,000 surveys at Cash toll lanes and mailed survey to 329,000 electronic
toll collection (ETC) system customers6. The survey contained 61,201 observations
of passenger car usage on the nine TBTA facilities in New York City. Further expla-
nation of the data source is provided in Peters and Kramer (2009). Table 1.1 provides
an overview of the descriptive statistics of the data.
In addition, the survey had a number of user characteristics reported that allows us
to estimate more fully our travel demand models using the survey data. In particular,
the survey reported information on frequency of use of the facility, household auto
ownership rates, self reported household income, travel time, number of employer in a
6See Spitz, Lobb, Jacobs & Bennion (2008) and Jacobs(2008) for a further description of the
data. We acknowledge that these data are possibly subject to self-selection and, as a result, may
yield biased estimates as it is not a survey of randomly selected members of the population.
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Table 1.1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Observations Mean Standard Deviation Minimum value Maximum value
Trip Frequency 40765 2.1138 2.1401 0 5
Toll price 41132 3.1602 1.5388 0 8
Travel time 41132 97.7882 118.2886 1 1350
Distance 41132 35.2099 60.4574 1.0538 2937.847
(Miles)
Household Income 37723 100644 59252.83 12500 200000
Number of bus lines 20284 10.4912 13.1144 1 236
(Origin area)
Number of bus lines 21373 10.4219 12.8826 1 236
(Destination area)
Number of subway stops 13840 7.8066 5.4900 1 26
(Origin area)
Number of subway stops 14372 7.8336 5.5083 1 26
(Destination area)
Number of employed 40451 1.7397 1.0035 0 5
(Household)
Number of household vehicles 40639 1.9508 0.9502 0 5
household, and other demographic variables.7 A pricing algorithm was created in this
study based on the direction of travel, payment method, pricing plan participation
(resident plans) and facility used. This allowed the impact of price on demadn for
the facility to be estimated, which was not in the initial data survey. The distance
of travel for each trip over the toll facilities was calculated based on the stated origin
and destination ZIP Codes. In addition, knowing the facility used, two forms of
travel distances are able to be predicted. The first was an estimate of the crow-flies
distance, based on the shortest route from the origin zip to the facility used and then
a second estimate from the facility used to the final destination zip. A linear estimate
of these distances was measured based on longitude and latitude of the ZIP Codes
and facilities.
To consider the effects of mass transit modes on the model estimate, a set of
density of mass transit service variables was created utilizing data from the New
York City Transit Authority. The variables were the number of local and express bus
lines per ZIP Codes and the number of subway stations per ZIP Code for the ZIP
7Note that the household income is currently utilized in the model as a 10category metric. We
are aware of the possibility that this categorized income variable may cause a measurement error
in model estimation. We thus are consider utilizing a work dummy variable as a proxy variable for
labor income in future work, and will estimate a model with the two income variables together.
1. TRAVEL DEMAND MODEL 19
Codes within the borders of New York City that have both facilities.
Each record in the sample had both an origin and a destination ZIP Code. As
such, it was possible to study the impact of high or low transit density on both ends of
a particular trip. It was expected that a trip that originated in a low transit density
ZIP Code would have a higher frequency of trips on a toll facility compared with a
trip that originates in a high transit density ZIP Code. A similar effect was posited
for the destination ZIP Codes; that is, high mass transit density would predict a lower
frequency of toll facility use.
In addition, the survey contained a number of user characteristics that allowed
the travel demand models to be more fully estimated using the survey data. In
particular, the survey reported information on the frequency of use of the facility,
household auto ownership rates, self-reported household income, travel time, number
of employed people in a household, and other demographic variables.
1.3.3 Results
This project represents an opportunity to examine the discrete choices of toll facility
users understand their motivation for toll facility use. Figure 1.2 shows a tree diagram
of the possible mode choices. In this study, the toll auto choice branch was examined.
A number of model specifications were tested with regard to the general structural
relationships. The robustness of the models was tested using the alternative model
specifications outlined in the section 1.3.1.
The results of these model estimates are reported in Table 1.2. Model 1, 2 and 3
provide the results for the model using standard OLS estimation and with alternative
specification that either included or excluded the availability of mass transit services.
Models 4, 5 and 6 utilized the same explanatory variables, however, these models
are estimated using a Poisson specification. in Models 7, 8 and 9, we estimate the
model using the same explanatory variables, but the coefficients were estimated using
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Figure 1.2: Feasible Mode for Travel
1. TRAVEL DEMAND MODEL 21
a Negative Binomial model specification.
The results were robust in terms of model specification, as well as the variables,
which generally exhibited the correct signs and were for the most part, statistically
significant. In addition, the models had a good level of explanatory power and con-
sistently explained about 50 % of the variation in the frequency of toll facility use.
Given that this is a cross sectional data set, this represents a generally good level of
explonatory power. In particular, the coefficients indicate that the model design is
appropriate. The overall observations are discussed below.
Each user in this survey was asked about the frequency of trip that was examined
by the survey. Users self reported data using frequency classes that ranged from “five
or more trips per week” to “less than monthly”. These trip rates were converted into a
weekly frequency of use based on the class marks of the individual class groups. The
heavy users (five or more trips per week) tended to be located geographically closer to
the facilities used than lower frequency users (one or less trips per week). Alternative
groupings of frequency classes were examined to test the robustness of the model
specification. We found that the model specification was robust across alternative
groupings of frequency (three, four or five class groups). That is coefficients are
minimally changed by alternative specifications of the trip frequency.
Alternative panels of explanatory variables were then examined to evaluate their
impact on model explanatory power as well as to test the impact of individual co-
efficients. Poisson and Negative Binomial models were fit via maximum likelihood
estimation using STATA. In some cases, the model did not converge so we were
unable to obtain results on certain model specifications. The explanatory variables
were selected based upon our prior discussion of their theoretical models related to
transportation as a contributor to lifecycle utility maximization.
· Price of trip (toll paid). The observed coefficient is consistently negative and is
highly statistically significant in most cases. With a range of 0.00to8.00 per trip in
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terms of the toll price in this data series, there is considerable variation in pricing
that is observed between users and facility. An additional improvement to the model
would be to estimate the total trip cost based upon miles traveled and an expected
cost per mile. Given the high level of tolls and the short average trip length in general,
it is highly likely that the toll cost represents a significant portion of the variable costs
of these trips. The results, related to travel time indicate a consistent, significant,
and negative relationship as related to trip frequency. This is consistent with our
theoretical expectations and the concept that users seek to minimize their time use
in travel due to the negative value of travel time (minimizing the level of deprivation
over their life cycle).
·Distance. This observed coefficient was found to be negative and statistically
significant with longer trips tending to be less frequent than trips that are shorter in
length. This is again consistent with our theoretical expectations, as consumers are
expected to attempt in general to minimize their own time input into transportation
services. As such, we expect longer trips to occur with less frequency, than shorter
ones with the same fundamental characteristics.
·Work Purpose. Trips that were taken for work purposes were much more frequent
than other trips (primarily recreational trips). The impact of work travel was found
to be a significant and dominating factor in the decision to use a toll facility in New
York City. This is in alignment with our expected model, as a consumer traveling
for work purposes should be earning wage wi per hour or be gaining some other
compensation for their work effort. Given that the trip time, purpose and destination
may have been dictated by the employer for these trips, it is not surprising that the
decision to travel is largely determined by the work purposes. Coefficients had the
expected positive sign and were generally very significant across specifications.
·Income. This variable is observed to exhibit a counterintuitive negative sign
counter to our posited relationship. It is highly probable that there exists a high
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level of multicollinearity between income and other explanatory variables. Income
variables in a well specified model may have somewhat confusing signs, as it may
mix in demand components as well as supply issues in the coefficient. As such, it
has been reported on Table 4, and 5 that this variable may exhibit coefficients with
counterintuitive signs. Further analysis of this relationship may be warranted.
·Household employment and household vehicle count. These variables both ex-
hibited positive and statistically significant relationships as related to the frequency
of toll facility use. Given that the number of workers in a household should increase
the amount of travel for work purposes as well as increase household income, it is not
surprising that additional employed members of the household would increase toll
facility use. Correspondingly, increases in household vehicle ownership increased the
frequency of toll facility usage.
·Transit density variables. These variables were mixed in terms of their explana-
tory power with the exception of having a subway stop in the destination ZIP Code.
Clearly, access to the subway system at the destination ZIP Code is a key determinant
in the decision to use toll facilities in New York City. Users with high quality (heavy
rail metro mass transit) at their destination have a lower frequency of trip than users
with other forms of mass transit. In some model specifications, the density of bus
lines at the destination ZIP Code also decreased the frequency of toll facility use,
however, the coefficient, while having a consistent sign, tended to be weaker in terms
of explanatory power than the Subway density variable.
Table 1.6 presents the results of our estimation of the negative binomial models for
a number of alternative sets of variables. The negative binomial models are considered
to represent the best and most effective estimates of traveler frequency of toll facility
use. We segmented the data to examine the impact of employer payment of toll
facility use. The basic model of frequency of use in column 1 indicated a consistent
and significant negative impact for toll (price of facility), travel time and distance of
1. TRAVEL DEMAND MODEL 24
trip. The work trip variable had a strong and significant positive coefficient as did the
number of people employed in the household. The number of vehicles in the household
had a positive impact on frequency of trips, however the relationship was somewhat
weaker statistically. In column 2, adding the variables that are related to payer type
had minimal impact on the overall explanatory power of the model. Columns 3 and
4 splits the data by payer type (self pay versus employer pay/ reimburse) and also
adds the transit density (bus lines and subway stops) at trip origin. Columns 5 and
6 add the transit density variable at the destination ZIP Code as well as splits the
data again by payer type.
Dividing the sample into self pay and employer pay provided some very interesting
results. In columns 3 to 6, we explore the impact of transit density at the origin zip
and destination zip as well as employer versus self pay. First and most significantly,
when employers are paying the toll for a given user, the price effect becomes statisti-
cally insignificant as a predictor of use, while self payers retain a negative and very
statistically significant price coefficient (p<0.01). Interestingly, travel time becomes
statistically insignificant for users who have employers pay their tolls, but remains
statistically strong and negative for self-payers. Household employment and vehicle
counts are both positive and significant for self payers. In some part, the lower sig-
nificance of the employer pay results may be related to the much smaller sample size
of the employer pay data.
Finally, the availability of mass transit services at the destination ZIP Code–subway
services in particular–caused a significant reduction in the frequency of toll facility
use for self payers. Origin ZIP Code transit availability had no statistically signifi-
cant impact on frequency of use for both employer pay and self pay users. Transit
availability had no impact on users with employer paid tolls, but destination ZIP
Code transit availability had an important negative impact on self payers use of toll
facilities. The policy impacts of these results are intriguing. Toll facility users with
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employer payment are unaffected by both the price of the toll, travel time and also
the availability of mass transit - they have a very high tendency to drive. Self payers
on the other hand are the majority of users on these facilities and they are sensitive to
the supply of mass transit at the destination ZIP Code, travel time, distance as well
as the price of the facility. Given that these user are responsive to these variables,
the opportunity exists to manage facility demand based upon these variables.
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Table 1.6: Negative Binomial Estimation
Mass transit (Beginning) Mass transit (Terminal)
(1) (2) Employer pay Self pay Employer pay Self pay
Toll -0.0217∗∗∗ -0.0212∗∗∗ 0.0240 -0.0153∗∗∗ -0.0320 -0.0290∗∗∗
[0.00274] [0.00274] [0.0257] [0.00437] [0.0280] [0.00465]
Travel time -0.0718∗∗∗ -0.0705∗∗∗ -0.0302 -0.0274∗∗ -0.0707 -0.00431
(Log scale) [0.00675] [0.00674] [0.0799] [0.0130] [0.0659] [0.0120]
Distance mile -0.207∗∗∗ -0.206∗∗∗ -0.131∗ -0.242∗∗∗ -0.0618 -0.212∗∗∗
(Log scale) [0.00575] [0.00575] [0.0705] [0.0127] [0.0618] [0.0116]
Trip purpose 1.262∗∗∗ 1.264∗∗∗ 1.050∗∗∗ 1.156∗∗∗ 1.091∗∗∗ 1.140∗∗∗
(Working dummy) [0.00875] [0.00879] [0.100] [0.0164] [0.0987] [0.0156]
Income -0.0896∗∗∗ -0.0853∗∗∗ -0.0413 -0.0995∗∗∗ -0.156∗∗ -0.0828∗∗∗
(Log scale) [0.00621] [0.00622] [0.0729] [0.0122] [0.0695] [0.0113]
Employment 0.0398∗∗∗ 0.0394∗∗∗ 0.0489 0.0452∗∗∗ 0.0641 0.0374∗∗∗
(Household) [0.00467] [0.00466] [0.0503] [0.00912] [0.0494] [0.00841]
Vehicle 0.0344∗∗∗ 0.0353∗∗∗ 0.0356 0.0815∗∗∗ 0.0240 0.0585∗∗∗
(Household) [0.00498] [0.00497] [0.0508] [0.0100] [0.0460] [0.00920]
Payer -0.0601∗∗∗
(Employer) [0.0189]
Payer -0.144∗∗∗
(Self) [0.0213]
Bus access 0.00152 -0.00157
(Beginning area) [0.00850] [0.00163]
Subway access 0.00408 -0.000854
(Beginning area) [0.00705] [0.00149]
Bus access 0.00249 -0.00476∗∗∗
(Terminal area) [0.00784] [0.00154]
Subway access -0.0110 -0.00542∗∗∗
(Terminal area) [0.00699] [0.00143]
Constant 1.189∗∗∗ 1.076∗∗∗ 0.429 1.247∗∗∗ 0.965∗ 1.111∗∗∗
[0.0507] [0.0547] [0.414] [0.0858] [0.392] [0.0820]
Observations 36756 36703 773 10085 829 10663
R2 0.5072 0.5088 0.4216 0.4331 0.4327 0.4389
# Heteroskedasticity Robust Standard Errors are reported in square brackets. The symbols, ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate respectively that the estimated
coefficient is statistically significant under 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels.
## Because Maximum Likelihood Estimation does not provide sum of squared error and sum of squared regression, unlikely to Ordinary Least Squares,
Coefficient of Determinations, called R2, plays no longer role as a measure of explanatory power. We calculate, thus, Pseudo R2 which is calculated
Corr(y, yˆ)2, where yˆ is fitted value of dependent variable.
1 The estimates have a dependent variable trip frequency with 5 categories, which are 0 if respondent drive a car once or less then once a week, 1 if twice
a week, 2 if three, four, or five times per week, 3 if four times, 4 if five times or more per week.
2 The Poisson regressions and the negative binomial regression are all applied right censored regression model estimation.
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1.4 Conclusion
This study found that a model based on household choice behavior was consistent
with the observed behavior of toll facility users in New York City in model estimation
in which a model of count (frequency of use) of mode choices was used to analyze
the behavior of toll facility users. By using the New York City toll facility user
survey, it is found that the empirical estimation of lifecycle-based frequency models
produced consistent results and had structural relationships that were stable across
model specification. Although the behavior of toll facility users may be somewhat
different than the users of other modes of travel, in that these users tend to be
more automobile dependent as well as generally have significantly higher income as
compared to the average resident of the communities that surround these facilities,
the interest in utilizing pricing as a tool to manage demand on transportation facilities
makes their behavior of significant interest. In addition, the models specified in this
work can be logically extended to explore the behavior of other modes of travel (transit
users, bicycle users and walkers).
A key component of our analysis was the ability to separate the behavior of self-
paying users who had their road fees reimbursed. In fact, the structural relationships
identified indicated a wide amount of variation in consumer demand depending on
whether the user had to self-pay or had an employer who paid the toll.
Transit service availability was an important determinant of toll facility use in
New York City. In particular, mass transit facility availability at the destination
ZIP Code significantly reduced the frequency of toll facility use. The majority of the
trips in this sample originate at the home ZIP Code of the user. As such, it is likely
that the transit availability at the destination ZIP Code is more important than the
origin ZIP Code as commercial locations may be more able to cluster around transit
facilities as well as use a higher density land use pattern than residential areas. As
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such, destination ZIP Code transit availability is a key variable in the mode decisions.
The theoretical extension of the literature contained in this work, coupled with
the fact that the statistical fit the theoretical models have high explanatory power,
further analysis of additional regions and toll facilities is warranted. Models that
include regional commuter rail service in addition to urban metro and local bus service
would be an interesting extensions of this work.
2 Electronic Toll Collection Systems and Travel
Demand: A Field Experiment of Toll Facilities
in New York City
with Jonathan R. Peters
Reprinted with permission from
Journal of Regional Studies & Development, 20, 407-438, (2011).
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2.1 Introduction
Installing a toll facility on road networks has been utilized for a long period time in
the United States for funding transportation systems. Since locations of those toll
facilities and toll prices vary over toll facilities, even for the same facilities within
the same area, transportation authorities seem to have expanded the purpose of toll
collection in that, it is not only for maintaining and operating road networks, but
also for reducing congestion and some other environmental problems which might
be caused by congestion and traffic overflow. In fact, the transportation authorities’
public press announcements and demand research indicates that their toll pricing
and planning aim to address both issues. Congestion is rapidly becoming the most
important concern for highway planning because of rapidly increasing social cost of
congestion.
According to various transportation expert reports, total miles traveled (VMT)
in the United States has seen a 111 percent increase in urban areas, and traffic
congestion due to these same VMT increases wastes approximately 2.3 billion gallons
of gasoline and causes 3.7 billion hours of delay each year. This tremendous amount
of wasted resources has created a significant social cost of congestion that was valued
at about $87.2 billion in 2007.1 To reduce the congestion problem, toll facilities in
some cases have charged different prices to users in different locations to use prices
as an economic control on demand. From a user’s perspective, however, toll facilities
are a different form of taxation in that takes their disposable income so that it may
also reduce consumer welfare and creates deadweight loss, which is another social
cost. Hence, toll payment price structures designed as price control for congestion
becomes sensitive political issues because of the tradeoff between reducing congestion
1 We quote these transportation statistics from Currie and Walker (2011), Vera and Preziosi
(2011). Those two papers are well summarizing congestion facts and sources of the information
in their introduction. See Currie and Walker (2011), and Vera and Preziosi (2011) for further
information.
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and losing social welfare.
To reduce the social costs of tolling, a number of researchers argue that an Elec-
tronic Toll Collection system is an effective alternative to deal with problems caused
by congestion and delay in collecting tolls. The electronic toll collection system makes
toll facilities more productive by reducing travel time and the time spent the toll pay-
ment process. The net effect is the same as reducing congestion without increasing
toll price. For this reason, the effect of electronic toll collection system on travel de-
mand has become an active research field and there are a large number of papers that
investigate the effectiveness of electronic toll collection system on the various aspects
of road prices. From the user perspective, Vera and Preziosi (2011) investigated what
causes travelers to become electronic toll collection users. They perform empirical
analysis of a E-ZPASS user survey, the name of electronic toll collection system used
by U.S. Northeastern region, at the toll facilities operated by the Port Authority of
New York and New Jersey to find a causal relationship between user satisfaction level
and covariates that includes travel attributes and socio-economic status. Vera and
Preziosi (2011) also found that reduced travel time by using E-ZPASS does not effect
the probability of becoming a user, but the financial benefit, from E-ZPASS price has
a significant effect on this same probability.
From environmental perspective, Currie and Walker (2011) performed a field ex-
periment that investigates the relationship between traffic congestion and residents’
health condition around toll facilities. They perform a comparison study of the frac-
tion of lower birth weight babies, and premature birth between the treatment group
who are the residents within a 2 kilometer radius boundary of a toll plaza, and a con-
trol group who live close to highways but not in 2 km boundary, using Vital Statistics
Natality records of Pennsylvania and New Jersey residents. They find a statistically
significant positive effect of E-ZPASS for the residents in 2 km boundaries of toll
plazas on infant health conditions and their analysis indicates that the the result is
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due to reducing congestion at toll plazas and this makes the air pollution problems
better around these same toll facilities.
On the taxation and social welfare perspective, Finkelstein (2009) argues that
electronic toll collection system makes users less sensitive to the price of toll as com-
pares to cash users. Their paper uses the toll facility usage data from 123 facilities,
operated by 49 different authorities in 22 states for 20 years, from 1985 to 2005 to
perform an empirical analysis that explore causal relationship between toll price and
electronic toll collection use. Its empirical results show that toll facilities with elec-
tronic toll collection system tended to have greater price increases than the other
facilities because electronic toll collection system makes toll price, as a salience of
tax, less visible to users, and thus the users become less elastic to changes in toll
price. Consequently the toll facilities can increase prices without losing demand.
Since the implementation of the electronic toll collection on transportation facil-
ities broadly has been done mostly in the last two decades, those of studies depend
highly on the empirical evidence they found because of absence of rigorous economic
theory, and thus must consider the possibility to that their statistical inferences are
biased and inconsistent. Most of them use linear model estimation to investigate
differences of some variables of interest between the users and non-user or electronic
tolling, called a difference in difference estimator, and it is well known fact that there
are several sources of bias that can cause inconsistent estimation of difference-in-
difference models. These include sample selection, failure to satisfy the exogeneity
assumption, and model misspecification. The most frequently ignored source of bias
that field experimental researchers miss out of three, is model misspecification. Even
though it seems obvious that electronic toll collection systems would have an effect
on is travel demand, it is hard to find empirical analysis that carefully examine travel
demand in a baseline model that looks to estimate the effect consistently.
The absence of concern about theory may lead to the model being incorrectly
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specified, thuys, causing not only inconsistent estimation, but also yileding scientifi-
cally meaningless implications. As Deaton (2010) points out, criticisms of the strong
dependency of development economics on Randomized Controlled Trials, a economet-
ric method to estimate differences in differences parameter by collecting randomized
samples, or manipulating data as randomized sample from non or quasi random sam-
ple, “experiment itself have no special ability to produce more credible knowledge
than other methods”. In other words, Randomized Controlled Trials of types of fully
empirical studies are subject to issues when we generalize out of the sample it uses
because it depends too much on inductive reasoning that has to come up with a
perfectly controlled situation that would need to be replicated again. Otherwise, the
argument, given by the studies, will be isolated into their sample, or perfectly similar
objects.2
Thus, we examine all possible sources of bias in measuring the effect of electronic
toll collection system on travel demand, then we discuss the consequence of the es-
timation under identification problems then of this bias as fully as we can. We use
Triborough Bridges and Tunnel Authority’s user survey in 2004 to estimate the ef-
fect of E-ZPASS on travel demand of New York City metropolitan toll bridges and
tunnel users, as explored in Chapter 1. We then design an experiment that cap-
tures differences in travel demand between EZ-PASS users and non-users based on
a trip frequency travel demand model, As given by Chapter 1, it can be treated as
a field experiment on the New York City toll facilities. From this experiment, we
find serious upward bias given by misspecification, such as omitted variables, linear
model specification problems. We find that the statistical significance of the estimate
2 The papers, Deaton (2010) and Imbens (2010) argue about the controversial issue as to whether
Randomized Controlled Trials can provide scientifically meaningful implication or not. Deaton
(2010) criticizes the modern trend in development economic literature that highly depends on ex-
perimental result given by statistical inference without considering the economic theory that helps
to find the essential mechanism that produces the outcome. Standing for the opposite side of Deaton
(2010), Imbens (2010) argues that, because Randomized Controlled Trials concern a lot about sta-
tistical theory, it deserves reasonable consideration to provide to scientific implications, although
economic theory does not play a role in that argument.
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Figure 2.1: Locations of TBTA Toll Facilities
is thus eliminated by controlling for the sources of bias. In section 2, we introduce
New York City toll facilities as a field test of our experiment, using the Metropolitan
Transportation Authority’s (MTA) toll pricing policy and the consequence of those
prices on user behavior. In section 3, we review a theoretical travel demand model to
design an experiment that are representative of our methods.
2.2 Toll Facilities of New York City: A Field Exper-
iment
In this section, we introduce the characteristics of electronic toll collection systems in
the United States. In particular, E-ZPass, the name of the electronic toll collection
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Table 2.1: Toll Price of MTA bridges and Tunnels)
General Residents
Facilities E-ZPass Cash E-ZPass Cash
Bronx-Whitestone $4.80 $ 6.50
Brooklyn-Battery Park $ 4.80 $6.50
Cross Bay Veterans $1.80 $3.25 $1.19 $1.62
Henry Hudson $2.20 $4.00
Marine Parkway-Gil Hodges $1.80 $3.25 $1.19 $1.62
Queens Midtown $4.80 $6.50
Throgs Neck $4.80 $6.50
Triborough, Bronx $4.80 $6.50
Triborough, Manhattan $4.80 $6.50
Verrazano Narrow $9.60 $13.00 $5.76 $7.72
Notes: The official name of Triborough Bridge is Robert F. Kennedy
Bridge. The resident discount of Cross Bay, and Marine Parkway
bridges are given to Rockaway, Queens’s resident. The Verrazano Nar-
row Bridge’s discount is for Staten Island resident. The toll prices are
for 2-axle passenger vehicles under 7,000 lbs maximum gross weight,
effective from December 30, 2010.
system utilizes in the northeastern states in U.S. is commonly studied. Then we
discuss in particular the location and pricing of the toll bridges and tunnels, operated
by the Triborough Bridges and Tunnels Authority that we use as a field experiments,
and then we examine what are the consequences of the authority’s toll pricing on the
residents of New York City. Lastly, we also discuss about why toll facilities within
the New York City metropolitan area provide an appropriate location to perform a
field experiment for transportation policy evaluation and planning.
2.2.1 Electronic Toll Collection System in the United States
Electronic Toll Collection (ETC) systems are automatic toll payment systems that
electronically debits via radio transponder a certain amount of toll costs from users’
account when the users are passing through an ETC toll plaza when the vehicle is
equipped with payment equipment in their vehicles. ETC system are designed for two
purposes, First, to reduce delay at toll plazas, and second to allow a toll authority
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to price differently over users based on their individual characteristics. Because ETC
system can identify user characteristic and charge a certain amount of toll based
on these characteristics, transportation authorities are thus able to charge different
amounts of toll for different users in terms of residence area, vehicle types and so
on. Thus, transportation authorities all over the world have been installed ETC toll
plazas not only for engineering purpose of improving travel flow in that eliminate time
delay at toll plazas but also for the economic purpose that they can charge different
toll price to different users. The authorities’ prices are normally aiming to reduce
congestion in a particular area that can be managed by passing through their toll
facilities. ETC system in the U.S. takes several different names in different group of
states, and on different highway systems. EZ-Pass is deployed in the for Northeastern
states including New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and is also usable on other
systems such as Fast Lane on Massachusetts, I-PASS for Illinois, i-Zoom in Indiana
and FasTrak in California.
2.2.2 E-ZPass in Detail
E-ZPass is the name of the ETC system installed on toll facilities operated by the
transportation agencies who are members of partiners of E-ZPass Interagency Group
(IAG). E-ZPass was developed by the New York State Thruway Authority (NYSTA)
and was first installed along the highways, operated by NYSTA. In 1991, IAG,
consisted of seven independent toll agencies—The Port Authority of New York and
New Jersey, The New Jersey Turnpike Authority, The New Jersey Highway Authority
(operator of the Garden State Parkway at the time), the New York Metropolitan
Transportation Authority, the New York State Thruway Authority, The Pennsylvania
Turnpike Commission, and the South Jersey Transportation Authority (operator of
the Atlantic City Expressway formed an operational consortium) Since the first E-
ZPass was installed at the Spring Valley toll plaza in August 3, 1993, the system
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has become the most well-known ETC system in the United States and it covers the
widest ranges of highways over the United States. The toll facilities of MTA toll
bridges and tunnels, that we are considering to perform an experiment, have also
implemented the E-ZPass system and have used it for more than 10 years.
2.2.3 Toll Prices of MTA Bridges and Tunnels
There are 8 bridges and 2 tunnels are operated by Triborough Bridges and Tunnel
Authority as toll facilities in New York Metropolitan area. Those are all located
in the the 5 boroughs in the New York City. Six bridges, the Bronx-Whitestone,
Cross Bay, Henry Hudson, Marine Parkway, the two Triborough Bridges, and Queens
Midtown tunnel all started to collect cash tolls by the end of 1930. The electronic
tolling followed with the Verrazano Narrow Bridge implemented E-ZPass in 1995, and
the rest of the toll plazas implementing ETC in 1996. The prices of tolls vary over
facilities, and vary also by residence area, and vehicle types. Table 2.1 summarizes toll
prices of MTA bridges and tunnels. As we seen, Verrazano Narrow Bridge charges the
greatest amount of toll for all types of users, and there is also controvercial that the
toll price of Verrazano Narrow Bridge takes a significant amount of consumer surplus
from residents of Staten Island, one of five boroughs in New York City, because the
bridge has no alternative routes which are toll free, and mass transit access is relatively
poor compare with the other New York City boroughs.3
3Note that Verrazano Narrow Bridge is one way toll that charges the vehicles that across the
bridge from Kings county (Brooklyn) to Richmond county (Staten Island).
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2.3 Theory of Travel Demand and Experimental De-
sign
In this section, we discuss the econometric methods we look to use to demonstrate the
effect of electronic toll collection system on the demand for driving. Since our experi-
mental design is based on the question as to whether people tend to travel more when
they are electronic toll collection system users, the method has to be an appropriate
comparison study between treatment and control group. To find consistent estima-
tion of an effect of a policy intervention, a number of empirical research methods in
general have been developed not only in economics, but in social science and in other
areas. And each of which has faced controversy about validity of the method from
the perspective of statistical inference, for a number of reasons. First, the necessity
of having a randomized sample, which is well collected without sampling bias, had
turned out to be an issue since Lalonde (1986) shows that a well-controlled set of
experimental data can yield accurate estimation even though it’s number of observa-
tions are relatively small as compared to than non-experimental data. Endogenously
assigned treatment and control groups are also a problematic point that may cause
inconsistent estimation of a comparison study. The other issue is the existence of
implicit categories that a given sample can fall into but are also not observable.4
Endogenous assignment happens when individuals in an experiment can select their
status whether to be in treatment group or control group, and implicit categories
happen when the individual can decide their status to always be in treatment group,
4This is well known issue on comparison study by the name selection bias due to counterfactual
outcomes. If the assignment of unobservable groups, to be “Always taker” or “Never taker”, has been
done endogenously, then the assignment effects on estimation of average treatment effect. In other
words, if individuals in an experiment can decide their status to be in unobservable groups, then the
estimate of average treatment effect will be biased. We can consider two counterfactual groups in
this study, a group of individuals who have electronic toll collection equipment but pay toll by cash,
and individuals who have no equipment but pay by the equipment. We assume over this study that,
however, no counterfactual groups since the second group is not possibly exist and the toll users
have no incentive to be in the first group.
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Figure 2.2: Diagram of Travel Modes
called “always taker”, or to be in control group, called “never taker”. Those are the
issues that we need to consider on our analysis as a comparison study between elec-
tronic toll collecting system users and non-users. We review in this section the travel
demand model, proposed by Chapter 1, and design an experiment to perform an em-
pirical comparison of travel demand between ETC users and non ETC users, then we
look to develop an appropriate econometric method for the empirical comparison.
2.3.1 Travel Demand: Review
For the purpose of this study, when we are comparing travel demand between users
and non-users, it is very important to use a correctly specified demand model for
travel even though this study is more focused on empirical observation rather than
theoretical concreteness. The most widely used demand model for travel is the mode
choice model, proposed by McFadden (1974), which is based on the Random Utility
Model. McFadden’s travel mode choice model assigns probabilities that are associated
with the attributes to each travel mode such as walking, driving or mass transit. The
assigned probabilities in the model implies how much an individual is willing to take
a particular mode, given by a certain value of attributes. Because the mode choice
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model takes probabilistic approach, it is better specified to analyze individual travelers
decisions to choose a mode. But for the decision problem that choose number of travel
events via a particular mode, these types of choices could not be captured by the mode
choice model because it does not provide the number of travel events directly from the
model.5 To design a field experiment that compares the demand for driving between
electronic toll users and non-users, it is better to observe the number of travel demand
events, rather than the probability of having a trip occur because driving demand
events are actually countable numbers within a certain period of time, since being an
electronic toll collection user is not a decision that is made for a one-shot event, thus
we are looking at multiple consumption events. It is rate for travelers to purchase
electronic toll collection equipment for a single trip. Travel demand modeled as a
frequency of trip was proposed by Chapter 1. The model modifies the mode choice
model to a frequency of trip on a particular mode by isolating multiple travel modes,
given by Random Utility Maximization, into a single mode. Because the model is
derived from a household’s lifetime consumption-leisure utility maximization, travel
demand in the model implies the optimal number of trip via a particular travel mode
that supports general economic activities such as consumption, leisure, and labor at
a time period. For those of reasons, we expect that applying the trip frequency model
to perform better for this comparison study as compare to the mode choice model.
The trip frequency model, given by Chapter 1, is poisson random variable that is
drawn according to a conditional probability distribution function that is associated
with a vector of attribute x = [w∗, r, k, hi, d, l], where the elements are wage given
by trip, unit return on capital, capital, travel time of mode i, distance of travel, and
5Probability approach of demand analysis provides how much an individual has willingness to
choose a mode, out of several alternatives because the demand for each mode is represented by prob-
ability that is associated with its covariates. But the question that how many times the individual
will choose that mode again in a period of time such as per week, per year, is lying on a different
dimension. The individual’s decision might be changed if she knows that she will face the same
mode choice again on a certain time interval. In travel demand, for example, one shot decision of
travel mode for sightseeing and repeated decision for work can never be treated as the same. This
is the reason why we consider travel demand as frequency rather than probability.
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leisure time respectively. The conditional pdf is:
f(yi |x) = exp [−E {ν (h′i, z′i)}]
E {ν (h′i, z′i)}yi
yi!
, yi = 0, 1, . . . (2.1)
where yi is trip frequency in the current period, h′i, z′i are travel time and stochastic
shock on travel time respectively when the household takes a travel mode i.6 We can
thus apply the travel demand model to analyze the effect of electronic toll collection
system on driving demand by taking a mode i as the driving mode on a toll road.
2.3.2 Average Treatment Effect on Travel Demand via Driving
Suppose that individuals in the model are assigned into treatment and control group.
Let y1i be travel demand of driving events by treatment group which is for electronic
toll collection users, and let y0i be a travel demand for non-users.7 Define a category
variable Di that takes value 1 if an individual i is included treatment group, 0 if i
is in control group. Now we have the average treatment effect on the demand for
driving as:
δ = E
[
y1i |Di = 1
]− E [y0i |Di = 0] . (2.2)
By considering travel model for trip frequency which we discussed in the previous
section, we thus have the average treatment effect with correctly specified form of
expectation:
δATE = E
[
y1i |xi, Di = 1
]− E [y0i |xi, Di = 0] , (2.3)
6ν(·, ·) is the functional equation that maximize a stochastic dynamic programming. Note that
the stochastic dynamic programming is given by household maximization problem. See chapter 1.
7The subscript i, all over this section, implies an individual i in the experiment, not a particular
travel mode.
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where x is a vector of attributes. Since y1i , y0i are drawn according to the identical
probability distribution (2.1) which is a conditional poisson distribution, we can have
the estimates of E [y1i |xi, Di ] via a count variable model such as a poisson regression
or negative binomial regression, and the coefficient of category variable Di is the
estimate of the average treatment effect δATE itself.
Because y1i , y0i are normally unobservable which thus implies that we cannot pre-
dict when a particular individual i is an electronic toll collection user and when she is
a non ETC user, however, δATE cannot be estimated directly unless we observe each
individual’s travel demand behavior twice once when they are non-users and once
when they turn to be ETC users. In general, data for this type of experiment con-
sists of a treatment and a control group which are completely non-overlapped along
individuals. Let yi be an observed trip frequency via driving. Then we redefine the
average treatment effect with the frequency as:
δATE = E [yi |xi, Di = 1]− E [yi |xi, Di = 0] , (2.4)
and δATE is able to be estimated by performing a count variable model estimation of
E [yi |xi, Di ].
2.3.3 Propensity Score Matching
The next issue is how to estimate δATE consistently. As Lalonde (1986) shows, sim-
ple model estimation is able to achieve consistency if the data is collected under a
randomize experiment. Non-experimental data can be treated as experimental data,
even if the given data is collected under non-randomized, or quasi randomized exper-
iment, only when the condition that the treatment and control group assignment is
independent of the outcome, is satisfied. In other words, individuals in the experi-
ment are assigned randomly into one of the two groups, treatment or control, that is
{y1i , y0i⊥Di} ∨ x. This assumption is hard to accept in our experiment, however, be-
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cause of an obvious fact that individuals who are frequent traveler would have higher
willingness to be electronic toll collection users and low demand users are likely to
be cash payers. This assignment Di is thus not independent of frequency of travel,
given travel attributes. In addition, the assignment Di is a function of attributes
because individuals are able to determine their status whether to be users or non-
users, based on x. Hence we can say that the estimate of average treatment effect,
without considering selection bias due to the effect of counterfactual outcome, is a
biased estimator.
Dehejia and Wahba (1999) developed the propensity score matching method that
is able to estimate an average treatment effect consistently even though the assign-
ment Di is not exogenous and independent of outcome variable yi. The propensity
score matching method is basically designed to compute an average difference of out-
come variable yi between an individual in treatment group and outcome variable yi of
the individual who has the closest propensity score, the estimated probability to be
in the treatment, in the control group. The computed average difference of matched
sample is therefore a consistent estimate of average treatment effect if the condition
{y1i , y0i⊥Di} ∨ xi holds.8 And if p(xi) is the correctly specified propensity score, then
the distribution of attribute across treatment and control groups are identical. The
two conditions are the reason why we need to match up the sample from treatment
to control which share closed propensity score. By using matched samples that share
similar propensity scores, the estimated probability distribution of attributes will
satisfy the independent of assignment to treatment category so that its calculated
average is the consistent estimator of δATE .
8Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) shows that the independent assignment assumption, conditional
on propensity score satisfies for all sample if the independent assignment assumption, conditional
on attribute variables x. That is: {y1i , y0i⊥Di} ∨ xi ⇒ {y1i , y0i⊥Di} ∨ p(xi),∀i = 1, . . ., N . Dehejia
and Wahba (1999) applies the above proposition to the average treatment effect that is associated
with propensity score. The average treatment effect can consistently be estimated with observable
outcome variable yi by conditioning propensity score, rather than the attribute vector itself. See
Dehejia and Wahba (1999).
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The procedure to calculate the propensity matched average treatment effect is
as follows. First, create strata for both the treatment and control groups based
on the estimated propensity scores. The propensity score p(xi) is then obtained
by estimating a discrete choice model: Pr [Di = 1 |xi ] = G(x′iβ), where G(·) is link
function that can be either logistic or probit.9 Second, eliminate observations in
the control group, that are located outside treatment group’s the support range of
propensity score.10 Then we compute the difference in mean of treatment and control
outcomes within each stratum, weighted by the number of treatment samples in the
stratum.
2.4 Empirical Analysis
So far we have reviewed the econometric methods that can be used to estimate the av-
erage treatment effect of travel demand between electronic toll collecting system users
and non-users. We present, in this section, results from various ways to estimate the
average treatment effect of the electronic toll collection using The Triborough Bridge
and Tunnel Authority user survey, the same data as chapter 1 used to test the the-
oretical travel demand model, they derived, empirically. The results show that the
simple differences in differences estimations of the average treatment effect by adding
a user dummy in the travel demand model, given by chapter 1, are statistically signif-
icant in overall, but the signs are dramatically changed when different combinations
of attributes, and independent variables are considered. In addition, propensity score
matching yield insignificant estimates of the average treatment effect for any combi-
9Notice that the propensity score is a measure of willingness to be in treatment group, so that it
can be obtained the estimate of probabilistic choice model Pr [Di = 1 |xi ], where dependent variable
is a dummy for treatment group. In this study, Di is dummy variable for electronic toll collection
users, and the propensity score is the measure of willingness to be an electronic toll collection user.
10Since the main focus is to match the samples in the treatment group to the samples in the
control groups that belong to the same strata of the propensity score, the samples in the control
group that are out of the treatment group’s propensity score’s interval are useless. Stata provides
the propensity score matching procedure as an external module with the name “psmatch2”.
2. ETC SYSTEM AND TRAVEL DEMAND 49
(a) ZIP Code Polygon (b) ZIP Code Polygons and its centroids
(c) ZIP Code Polygon (d) ZIP Code Polygons and its centroids
Figure 2.3: GIS Characteristics of New York State Transportation System
nations of attributes. Therefore, we can conclude that the toll payment method does
not have an effect on travel demand but that users are affected solely by the difference
in toll price between cash and ETC payment.
2.4.1 Data
The data that we use in this study is based on chapter 1 travel demand data. The
paper used the Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority (TBTA) user survey. The
TBTA operates 10 bridge and tunnel facilities around the New York City metropolitan
area. The survey contains detailed addresses of origin and destination area, a number
of self reported socio-economic status variable, origin-destination based travel time,
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type of toll payment, frequency of trip per week, and so on. In the same way as
chapter 1, we use the number of bus lines and the subway stations within a zip code
area as measures of mass transit access in a particular area. We also use toll price for
each users by considering resident plans, direction of travel, payment method.
To obtain a more accurate measure of distance, we then calculate network distance
of each origin-destination area. The top-left panel of Figure 2.3 represents the ZIP
Code polygons of New York State, and top-right panel represent centroid points of
these same polygons. The distance in miles that we use in this study thus is the
measure of the distance between a centroid of the origin ZIP Code polygon and the
centroid of the destination ZIP Code polygon. The two panels at the bottom in
Figure 2.3 show road and highway network in New York State and New York City
respectively. We utilize the GIS maps of the U.S. roads and highway network, given
by National Transportation Atlas Database (NTAD) to compute network distance
along the U.S. road network between the origin and destination points of all zip code
centroids in the data.11
2.4.2 Simple Difference in Difference Estimates
To estimate the simple differences in differences estimator of toll payment, we then
perform regression analysis with a linear model, and negative binomial as the count
model specifications. The dependent variable of the regressions are trip frequency per
week. The first row of Table 2.2 presents estimates of the differences in differences
of toll payment type with different combinations of travel attributes. Notice that
regression coefficient of a categorical variable for the treatment group, without con-
sidering the other control variables yields a naïve estimator of the average treatment
11Typical GIS software can trace this road network as a line layer and calculate the trajectory,
which is drawn on the way between origin and destination zip code centroids, but it cannot take the
shortest route when there are more than two routes on the way. So we use Transcad, a commercial
software for analyzing transportation network, to take the optimal route by the shortest path finder
module we then compute the optimal distance along the road and highway network.
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effect δATE . The first five columns, in the left panel of the table, are from the linear
model and remaining five columns in the right panel of the table, are from the neg-
ative binomial regression model. These model specifications were chosen by chapter
1’s theoretical travel demand model for a particular travel mode, and thus allow us
to explore possible biases from various sources such as omitted variables and model
misspecification. As the estimates in the first row show, there is an upward bias in the
naïve estimator and it changes dramatically by controlling for the other attributes of
travel demand. The naïve estimator from the negative binomial model specification
in the first column of right panel is slightly less than that of the linear model’s one.
This difference can be thought as model selection bias due to model misspecification
because the trip frequency is drawn from poisson distribution, as chapter 1 showed.
The second column of each panel present estimates of δATE with adjustment for travel
attributes such time, distance and so on. The estimates are approximately a quarter
of the unadjusted δATE from the first column; even those are all statistically signifi-
cant. It shows that the omitted variable bias due to the differences in travel attributes
is about three times greater than the adjusted estimates. The estimates of δATE with
bus access in third column, are not significant and take negative values, and in the
fourth columns, controlling for subway access, the coefficients are both significant and
negative. The last column in both panels, presents a model where we controlling for
bus and subway access in this case the models are not similar to each other, unlike to
the other columns. In addition, negative Binomial regression with controls for mass
transit yields a significant coefficient of δATE , while the linear regression specification
does not.
From the differences in differences estimation for the average treatment effect of
electronic toll collection usage on travel demand, we found the evidences that there
are significant impacts of bias from omitted variables and model misspecification. As
we have seen, the unadjusted estimates are upwardly biased and the test statistics
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are large enough to conclude it is significant amount of bias. In addition, all of
the average treatment effects δATE estimations in left panel, linear regression model,
report greater values than δATE in right panel, negative Binomial regression. This
difference can be defined as bias due to model misspecification because of two reasons.
First, the dependent variable is a number of travel events per week so that it is
precisely a positive integer not a real number to be treated as continuous random
variable. Second, as chapter 1pointed out, in theory, travel demand has to be treated
as a positive integer because the number of travel events is definitely limited by a
households time constraints. From the econometric perspective, a linear regression
model would yield biased estimation of the parameters as dependent variable is a
countable, positive integer; and thus it is censored at 0 because negative values are
infeasible.
2.4.3 Propensity Score Matching
Since the data that we use is the collection of all MTA bridges and tunnel users,
not only New York City residents or residents of New York state, but users from the
other states as well, the sample for the second column covers entire sample of users,
and thus is unlikely have the same sample characteristics as for the other columns.
The samples for the parameter estimate while controlling for mass transit access
thus eliminate users from outside of New York City because the bus and subway are
available only inside the city borders. Other form of mass transit are available outside
of the city border but theri prices and service characteristics are much more complex
than the services within the city borders. Hence, the differences between the model
estimate with and without mass transit might come from sample selection bias. For
this reason, in this section, we investigate the possible bias from sample section and
try to perform a remedial measure of the average treatment effect using propensity
score matching, and discuss about the consequence of the remedial measure technique.
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(a) Unmatched Sample: Cash User (c) Unmatched Sample: EZ PASS User
(b) Matched Sample: Cash User (d) Matched Sample: EZ PASS User
Figure 2.4: Histograms of Propensity Score: With Mass Transit
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(a) Unmatched Sample: Cash User (c) Unmatched Sample: EZ PASS User
(b) Matched Sample: Cash User (d) Matched Sample: EZ PASS User
Figure 2.5: Histograms of Propensity Score: Without Mass Transit
To perform propensity score matching, we estimate a probit regression for the
categorical variable of payment method variable, E-ZPASS user that is associated
with travel attributes and mass transit access. Figure 2.4 is histograms of propensity
score, and the predicted probability of probit regression without mass transit access.
The top panel is for the entire sample and bottom panel is for the matched sample that
is used for calculating the propensity score where we matched the average treatment
effect that we introduced in section 2.3.3. Figure 2.5 is the same histograms of the
estimated propensity score with mass transit access. Notice that the samples in
figure 2.5 are restricted to New York City residents. Each histogram in figure 2.5
looks radically different within panel and between top and bottom. Table 2.3 reports
the estimated averaged treatment effect. The second and third rows are calculated
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Table 2.3: Propensity Score Matched Average Treatment Effect
Mean ATE estimate
Model Sample Treated Controls Obs Difference 1 Test Statistics 2
Unadjusted 1.342 1.517 43,897 -0.175∗∗∗ -0.175
(0.015)
No Mass Transit Unmatched 1.576 1.459 5,780 0.117∗∗∗ 7.16
(0.016)
Matched 1.576 1.529 29,724 0.046 1.49
(0.031)
With Mass Transit Unmatched 2.026 1.984 617 0.042 0.93
(0.045)
Matched 2.022 2.053 2,738 -0.032 -0.40
(0.079)
1. The ATE estimate of the first row is the mean difference between treatment and control group,
and the rest of them are regression coefficients of the treatment group dummy variable from
negative binomial model estimation. The symbols, *, **, *** indicate respectively that the
estimated coefficient is statistically significant under 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels.
2. The test statistic for “Unadjusted” is t-statistics of group mean difference, and rest of them are
z-statistics of MLE estimates from the negative binomial model estimation. Standard Errors
are reported in parenthesis.
from the samples in which the propensity score is estimated without controlling for
mass transit access, and are the same samples used in Figure 2.4, and the fourth and
fifth rows are from the samples with controls for mass transit access. To identify how
much selection bias is in the estimation, the naïve estimator is reported in the first
row. The estimates in third, fourth, and fifth rows are around 0.04 and statistically
insignificant, as compared to thefirst and second columns, that are around 1.2 to 1.7.
This is clear evidence that the combined sources of bias for the effect of electronic toll
collection system on travel demand exaggerates the estimated impact of ETC use and
produce an upward bias such that the effect is identified as positive and statistically
significant, but this is an incorrect conclusion. Even though much of the literature
on electronic toll collection argue that it has significant effect on travel demand, the
conventional wisdom of economic theory would suggest that consumer demand is all
about price, and our results indicate that economic theory is correct.
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Table 2.4: Descriptive Statistics without Mass Transit Access
Unmatched Cash Users EZPASS Users
Obs Mean Std. Dev Obs Mean Std. Dev
Toll price 7,253 3.775 1.762 37,036 3.031 1.453
Travel Time 7,253 4.401 0.859 37,036 4.246 0.732
Travel Distance 6,209 3.391 0.942 33,484 3.448 0.909
House Income 6,924 10.968 0.741 33,699 11.384 0.666
Working Travel 7,180 0.323 0.468 36,681 0.405 0.491
No. of Employments 7,134 1.821 1.052 36,421 1.721 0.994
No. of Vehicles 7,173 1.754 0.984 36,579 1.994 0.943
Matched Cash Users EZPASS Users
Obs Mean Std. Dev Obs Mean Std. Dev
Toll price 4,124 3.557 1.644 29,724 2.993 1.429
Travel Time 4,124 4.216 0.777 29,724 4.190 0.708
Travel Distance 4,124 3.330 0.897 29,724 3.440 0.907
House Income 4,124 11.048 0.711 29,724 11.385 0.665
Working Travel 4,124 0.372 0.483 29,724 0.423 0.494
No. of Employments 4,124 1.820 1.023 29,724 1.737 0.981
No. of Vehicles 4,124 1.760 0.966 29,724 1.978 0.935
1. The samples of this table are given by the propensity score matching which are
located in a common support of treatment and control groupâĂŹs propensity score.
50 observations of control group are eliminated because those are located in out of
common support.
2. The propensity score to get matched sample is given by predicted value of probit
regression of E-ZPASS users on independent variables without mass transit access.
Table 2.4 and 2.5 report descriptive statistics of different samples, distinguished
by propensity score matching and control variables also as to whether mass transit
variables are included. All control variables, travel attribute and mass transit access,
are not very different between E-ZPASS users and non-users, except for toll price.
The mean and standard deviation of toll price between users and non-users of ETC
are different and slightly greater than the others as is specified by the MTA pricing
policy of discounting ETC prices relative to cash prices. This is an identical result to
Table 2.2 that report highly significant toll price impact for all model specifications
and combinations of control variables, while the significance and sign of E-ZPASS
usage varies over models and control variables. This empirical evidence implies that
people are concerned about price of travel when they make their travel decisions and
payment method is apparently not that serious a matter for those same decisions.
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Table 2.5: Descriptive Statistics without Mass Transit Access
Unmatched Cash Users EZPASS Users
Obs Mean Std. Dev Obs Mean Std. Dev
Toll price 7,253 3.775 1.762 37,036 3.031 1.453
Travel Time 7,253 4.401 0.859 37,036 4.246 0.732
Travel Distance 6,209 3.391 0.942 33,484 3.448 0.909
Household Income 6,924 10.968 0.741 33,699 11.384 0.666
Working Travel 7,180 0.323 0.468 36,681 0.405 0.491
No. of Employments 7,134 1.821 1.052 36,421 1.721 0.994
No. of Vehicles 7,173 1.754 0.984 36,579 1.994 0.943
No. of Bus line (Origin) 3,488 10.649 13.289 17,933 10.500 13.817
No. of Bus line (Destination) 4,204 11.178 17.174 18,349 10.282 12.468
No. of Subway Station (Origin) 2,611 7.840 5.300 11,904 7.778 5.516
No. of Subway Station (Destination) 2,827 8.184 5.684 12,219 7.758 5.459
Matched Cash Users EZPASS Users
Obs Mean Std. Dev Obs Mean Std. Dev
Toll price 456 3.640 2.236 2,738 2.844 1.830
Travel Time 456 3.893 0.775 2,738 3.828 0.647
Travel Distance 456 2.493 0.469 2,738 2.480 0.469
Household Income 456 11.007 0.645 2,738 11.291 0.633
Working Travel 456 0.478 0.500 2,738 0.546 0.498
No. of Employments 456 1.873 1.072 2,738 1.794 0.964
No. of Vehicles 456 1.662 0.823 2,738 1.785 0.861
No. of Bus line (Origin) 456 10.294 5.435 2,738 10.440 5.323
No. of Bus line (Destination) 456 10.048 5.115 2,738 10.046 5.123
No. of Subway Station (Origin) 456 7.237 5.296 2,738 7.205 5.245
No. of Subway Station (Destination) 456 7.134 5.108 2,738 6.655 4.982
1. The samples of this table are given by the propensity score matching which are located in a common
support of treatment and control group’s propensity score. 50 observations of control group are
eliminated because those are located in out of common support.
2. The propensity score to get matched sample is given by predicted value of probit regression of
E-ZPASS users on independent variables without mass transit access.
2.5 Conclusion
We investigate, in this study, the effect of the E-ZPASS, electronic toll collection
system on travel demand using the Triborough Bridges and Tunnel Authority’s user
survey in 2004. The main focus of this work is to explore possible sources of bias
in which the estimate of the average treatment effect, that is the difference of travel
demand between E-ZPass users and non-users into. We observe clear evidence that
simple difference-in-difference estimator of the average treatment effect, which is es-
timated by adding a categorical variable of treatment group, is upwardly bias due to
model misspecification and omitted variables. By utilizing the propensity matching
estimator of the average treatment effec, we are able to also detect a sample selection
bias that possibly originated from the different transit condition that individuals have
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in their living areas, such that individuals with alternative modes can choose when
they decide to travel and by alternatives to traveling on a priced automobile route.
From a traditional economics perspective, this analysis is not that striking. Be-
cause economists expect, in principle, that individual respond to the prices of goods
and services when they decide their quantity demanded. Since E-ZPASS is just a more
convenient way to pay a toll than cash, therefore, one would expect that E-ZPASS
itself cannot cause an effect on demand. In addition, we examine various econometric
issues in the study and find that the absence of careful concern for model specifica-
tion, omitted variables, and sample selection issues yield incorrect model estimations
that are biased and not robust over sample selection. Much of the empirical liter-
ature on travel demand was written without consideration of the factors that can
cause a biased estimate and many apparently are likely to be written with seriously
biased result. A clear potential consequence of these, problems are poor transporta-
tion planning decisions, based on these types of biased empirical estimates. These
poor decision may in fact yield greater social cost than to not impose pricing on a
road network.
From what we have explored in this paper, we can draw a prediction that Installa-
tion of ETC at toll plazas with the intent of reducing congestion may have no impact
on congestion because travelers respond to price of the toll, not the ETC system it-
self. So travelers do not change their travel demand whether the toll entity installs an
ETC system or not. The engineering literature argues that installing an ETC system
can improve traffic flow and as such would stimulate demand based on a decrease
in total travel time. Hence we would like to suggest to transportation researchers
and planners that a careful examination of possible sources of bias, which includes
model misspecification, omitted variables, and sample selection, matters have to be
evaluated and controlled for when the empirical analysis of travel demand behavior
is estimated.
3 Parallel Sparse Algorithm for Matrix-Transpose-
Matrix Multiplication using Outer Product
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3.1 Introduction
In practice, statistical data is often treated as a vector, or matrix, and because of that,
there are many statistical computing algorithms that have been developed based on
linear algebraic operations on numerical matrices. One of the most demanding linear
algebraic operations in statistics is matrix-transposed-vector, or matrix-transposed-
matrix multiplication. Variance-Covariance matrix, a basic multivariate statistical
inference, is an example that can be computed by a transposed data matrix multi-
plied by the matrix, XTX, where X is the matrix containing data.1 Linear model
estimation such as linear regression, and analysis of variance (ANOVA) is an example
that requires calculating an inverse of the matrix,(XTX)−1. It is thus a necessary
condition for any linear model estimation, in order to solve for the normal equation
for the parameter vector that turns out to be a least square estimator.2 Another ex-
ample is the estimation of the generalized linear model with a matrix of instrumental
variables, denoted by W, that is used to control for endogenous exploratory variables.
This estimation requires the inverse of the transposed instrumental variable matrix
times the data matrix, (WTX)−1. These statistical analyses also thus begin with
computing matrix-transpose-matrix multiplication XTX, or WTX
Calculating the matrix-transposed-matrix multiplication quickly and accurately
is therefore a very important technique in statistical computing. However, this cal-
culation has not been supported well by modern numerical computation techniques,
1The exact formula of variance-covariance matrix is XTMX, where M = I − 1N (ιιT ) with a
column vector of ones ι
2The normal equation comes from least square fitting of a linear model. Suppose that a researcher
is interested in estimate of a parameter vector of interest β, for the given linear model y = Xβ + ,
where y, X are a vector of dependent variable and a matrix of independent variables respectively,
and  is a vector of unobservable error term. The least square estimate of β is given by solving the
equation:
XTXβ = XTy
This equation is called normal equation and the existence of the solution is guaranteed only by
existence of the matrix inverse (XTX)−1.
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especially parallel computing because statistical data matrices are merely square.
In other words, the data matrices typically have the form in which the number of
columns, which represents number of variables, is generally smaller than the number
of rows that represents the number of observations. Previously developed parallel
algorithms cannot be applied directly to the matrix-transpose-matrix multiplication
for the statistical data matrices because they usually are designed for square matrices,
or matrices where the number of rows is not much deviated from number of columns.
Furthermore, the concept big data emphasizes that the size of data is large, so im-
plementing parallel computing becomes more essential for contemporary large-scale
data matrix computation.
Another critical computational issue for a large-scale statistical analysis is the
absence of parallel algorithm for sparse matrix-matrix multiplication. Analyzing big
data requires huge storage and sometimes the data size exceeds the maximum mem-
ory allocation for a single computing processor, which is 32 gigabytes (Gbytes) for the
Intel processor. Reducing data size as small as possible is therefore another impor-
tant matter as this serves to reduce the computational memory requirement. Since
statistical data matrices in many cases have a large number of zero elements, ma-
nipulating the matrix in a sparse form provides a significant advantage in terms of
size and efficiency of the computation. Unfortunately, to our knowledge there is no
sparse matrix-transpose-matrix multiplication algorithm that has been developed for
parallel computing system. Moreover, there are a few parallel algorithm for sparse
matrix-vector multiplication but they use a fixed sparse matrix form that is inflexible
in terms of the shape of a matrix for applying to statistical computing.
In order to develop parallel algorithms for sparse matrices, we use the outer prod-
uct method for the matrix multiplication problem of ATB, where An×k, Bn×l have
the same number of rows but the number of columns is not necessarily the same.
The matrix multiplication is identical to the sum of all outer product of each rows
3. PARALLEL SPARSE MATRIX MULTIPLICATION 63
that is ATB =
∑n
i=1 a
T
i bi, where ai, bi are ith row vector of each matrices. Since the
terms in summation operator are completely independent of each other, and sum-
mation over the compute nodes is fully supported by a collective communication of
parallel implementation standard such as MPI Reduce, the sum of vector operations
are perfectly scalable to distribute its computation into multiple compute nodes.
This outer product algorithm also can be readily implementable in parallel com-
puting by only utilizing compressed sparse row (CSR) form matrices, which are the
most widely used sparse storage form in parallel sparse linear algebraic operations. In
general, statistical computing deals with externally collected, or generated data from
outside of the computation environment, and the data estimation generally involve
more than two different computations to obtain a final output. If each computation
can only handle certain types of sparse matrix storage forms, the data needs to be
stored in several different sparse forms, and therefore, this causes significantly more
memory consumption data storage and communication costs for parallel implemen-
tation. Since the outer product algorithm allows to store both left hand matrix A
and right hand side matrix B in CSR form, it does not require to store the data in
any particular sparse forms.
In this research, therefore, we present the outer products algorithm for both dense
and sparse matrix multiplication in a parallel processing environment. Then we show
the relative performances of its sparse matrix multiplication algorithm with randomly
generated matrices as an experiment. The experimental matrix multiplication is
coded in Fortran with MPI to implement them on a high performance computing
system, provided by the CUNY High Performance Computing Center. Finally, we
present an application of the outer product algorithm for a large-scale statistical com-
puting using the New York City taxicab data, which has 378,532,118 taxi trip records
for the period 2008-10. Because the taxicab data is originally stored in a 140.56
Gbytes text files, it provides a good opportunity to handle and analyze a big data
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set. We describe how to manipulate the original taxicab data into a valid statistical
data matrix, stored it into CSR form, and calculate basic descriptive statistics such
as mean, variance, and covariance by applying the outer product algorithm.
The organization of this paper is as follows: In section 3.2, we present the outer
product algorithm for both dense and sparse matrices. We then discuss about an
experiment that we conducted to evaluate the performance of the algorithm in a
parallel computing system in section 3.3. We then demonstrate an application of the
outer product algorithm to perform statistical analysis of the New York City taxicab
data in section 3.4.
3.2 Outer Product Algorithm
3.2.1 Parallel Algorithm for Dense Matrices
Let An×k, and Bn×l be matrices, not necessarily square, but with the same number of
rows. We can express the matrices A and B as column vectors of row vectors, which
are:
A =

a1
a2
...
an

, B =

b1
b2
...
bn

,
where ai = [ai1 ai2 . . . ain], i = 1, . . . , k is a row vector of k elements, and bi, i =
1, . . . , n is a row vector with l elements. Consider a matrix multiplication of the
transposed A by B, denoted ATB. This k × l matrix can be obtained by applying
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inner (dot) product of the column vectors as:
ATB =

a1
a2
...
an

′
·

b1
b2
...
bn

=
[
aT1 a
T
2 . . . a
′
n
]
·

b1
b2
...
bn

=
n∑
i=1
aTi bi.
Since ai is originally defined as a row vector, aTi bi is the outer product of ai and
bi. This shows that ATB can be expressed as the sum of outer products of each
row vectors in A and B, and ATB operation can be parallelized by dividing the sum
amongst multiple number of processors. Let p be a number of processors that are
available for ATB operation. The sum of outer products can be divided into p pieces
as:
ATB =
n∗∑
i=1
aTi bi +
2n∗∑
i=1
aTi bi + . . .+
pn∗∑
i=1
aTi bi
=
[
aT1 a
T
2 . . . a
′
n∗
]
·

b1
b2
...
bn∗

+ . . .
+
[
aT(p−1)n∗+1 a
T
(p−1)n∗+2 . . . a
′
pn∗
]
·

bT(p−1)n∗+1
bT(p−1)n∗+2
...
bpn∗

.
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The ATB operation turns out to be a sum of row-wise partitioned matrix multi-
plications and the partitioning strategy can be consistent with the (row) size of the
matrices. In other words, A and B can be equally divided and sent to each processors
because A and B have the same row size n.
The number of rows of a local matrix A[i] is given by the floor of n/p. If
mod(n/p) 6= 0, then we can attach mod(n/p) number of remaining rows to any pro-
cessors’ partitioned matrix to deal with remainders.3 The ATB operation can thus
be summarized by the following algorithm:
Algorithm 1 Outer Product Algorithm for Dense Matrices
1: procedure mat(A,B, p)
2: n← size(A, 1)
3: n∗ ← int[n/p]
4: for i← 1, p do . Iterate through processors
5: A[i]← A[(n∗(i− 1) + 1) : (n∗ · i)] . Send data to ith processor
6: B[i]← B[(n∗(i− 1) + 1) : (n∗ · i)] . Send data to ith processor
7: A′B[i]← 0 . Define local target matrix as zero
8: end for
9: for j ← 1, n∗ do . Iterate within processors
10: A′B[i](j)← A′B[i](j − 1) +A[i](j)TB[i], (j) . Compounding outer products
11: end for
12: Reduce A′B . Collective communication of sum through processors
13: end procedure
3.2.2 Parallel Algorithm for Sparse Matrices
Most parallel sparse matrix algorithms perform for various mathematical operations,
not only for multiplication but other techniques such as transposition and matrix
decompositions which require choosing a particular storage form prior to performing
the computation due to a designated inter-process data exchange. In other words,
the matrix multiplication in a parallel computation environment divides the given
matrices into several block matrices and distributes them in an inflexible way because
a block matrix must be matched with the exact target block matrix. This inflexible
3Floor is an integer function that rounds down a division, and mod is the modulo operation that
finds the remainder of a division.
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partitioning demands a pre-determined storage form when the algorithm considers a
matrix operation with sparse matrices. Here in our example, we choose compressed
sparse rows (CSR) form to develop the algorithm. The CSR storage form is widely
accepted as a current standard because the least number of indices, number of rows
plus number of non-zero elements, are needed.4
Since many of parallel sparse matrix operation algorithms are designed based on
CSR, the multiplication algorithm with the CSR form would yield flexibility that can
be incorporated with the other computations, once the matrices are stored in CSR
form. For example, suppose that a matrix, which is used in a multiplication, need to
be used in another matrix operation. If the multiplication algorithm does not support
CSR, while the other operation has only an algorithm for CSR form, the matrix has
to be stored into two different forms. The simple and practical example of the above
case is to perform matrix-vector multiplication and then matrix-transposed-vector
multiplication. The matrix-vector multiplication can be done with the CSR form,
but matrix-transposed-vector multiplication cannot use the same form because of the
absence of an appropriate computation algorithm, so the matrix has to be stored in
both CSR and CSC at the same time, in order to perform the two matrix-vector
multiplications simultaneously thus is extremely costly in terms of data storage for
large data sets.
As a starting point, the outer product algorithm can be implemented in CSR form.
4(Buluc and Gilbert, 2008) points out that the CSR form cannot be applied to matrix-transpose-
vector multiplication, even though the form is the most efficient sparse storage form in terms of
required number of indices; therefore, that the matrix should be stored in compressed sparse columns
(CSC) form, or compressed sparse blocks (CSB) form that they propose. Therefore, by using the CSR
form for the matrix-transposed-vector, we propose that the efficiency and accuracy of the algorithm
is guaranteed.
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Consider a matrix A as:
A =

1 0 0 2 0
3 4 0 5 0
6 0 7 8 9
0 0 10 11 0
0 0 0 0 12

.
Any matrix can be represented by a CSR form that consists of three vectors, a vector
of nonzero elements, a vector of column index, and a vector of an index for the nonzero
element vector that represents the first nonzero element in each row. The CSR form
of the matrix A is therefore given as:
AA =
[
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
]
,
JA =
[
1 4 1 2 4 1 3 4 5 3 4 5
]
,
IA =
[
1 3 6 10 12 13
]
,
where AA is the nonzero element vector, JA is the column index vector, and IA is
the index vector for AA that represents the first element of every row. Note that all
nonzero elements in a row can be indexed by IA. For example, the elements of the
first row of the matrix A is from IA(1) to IA(2)− 1 of the AA’s elements.
Using this property, the matrix A in CSR form can be partitioned into rows in the
same way as the dense form matrix is partitioned for the outer product multiplication.
Suppose that there are two available compute nodes for the operation that is p = 2,
and since A has five rows that is n = 5, the number of partitioned matrices would be
three and two, or two and three that are n∗ = 3 or 2. In this way, we can divide A
in CSR form into two local matrices as:
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A[1] =

AA[1] =
[
1 2 3 4 5
]
,
JA[1] =
[
1 4 1 2 4
]
,
IA[1] =
[
1 3 6
]
A[2] =

AA[2] =
[
6 7 8 9 10 11 12
]
,
JA[2] =
[
1 3 4 5 3 4 5
]
,
IA[2] =
[
1 5 7 8
]
The above example shows how a CSR matrix can be partitioned by row5, as the
same way as the dense matrix algorithm parallelizes its matrices, so that the outer
product algorithm can be implemented in CSR form matrix-transposed-matrix multi-
plication. Consider again the multiplication problem ATn×kBn×l. Let p be the number
of compute nodes that incorporates with the parallel matrix multiplication. Consider
CSR form of A and B are given by AA, JA, IA and BB, JB, IB respectively. The
parallel sparse algorithm of matrix-transpose-matrix multiplication is then given by
following:
3.2.3 Comparison with Conventional Algorithms
There are three computational efficiencies and advantages that the outer product
algorithm provides. First the matrix-transpose-matrix multiplication can be done
with the CSR form even though it involves transposition of a matrix. A tuple form
representation, which stores each nonzero of a matrix as a triple consisting of its
row index, its column index, and the nonzero elements, is able to be transposed by
5Note that IA[2], the row index of the second local matrix A[2], needs to be adjusted as it begins
with one, in order to use it as a new CSR form matrix in the second compute node that is assigned
A[2].
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Algorithm 2 Outer product algorithm for CSR form matrix
1: procedure smat(AA, JA, IA,BB, JB, IB, p)
2: n← size(IA)− 1
3: n∗ ← int[n/p]
4: for i← 1, p do . Iterate through processors
5: IA[i]← IA[(n∗(i− 1) + 1) : ((n∗ · i) + 1)] . Send data to ith processor
6: AA[i]← AA(IA[i](1) : IA[i]((n∗ + 1)− 1)) . Send data to ith processor
7: JA[i]← JA(IA[i](1) : IA[i]((n∗ + 1)− 1)) . Send data to ith processor
8: IB[i]← IB[(n∗(i− 1) + 1) : ((n∗ · i) + 1)] . Send data to ith processor
9: BB[i]← BB(IB[i](1) : IB[i]((n∗ + 1)− 1)) . Send data to ith processor
10: JB[i]← JB(IB[i](1) : IB[i]((n∗ + 1)− 1)) . Send data to ith processor
11: A′B[i]← 0 . Define local target matrix with zeroes
12: end for
13: for j ← 1, n∗ do . Iterate within processors
14: k1 ← IA(j)
15: k2 ← IA(j + 1)− 1
16: k3 ← IB(j)
17: k4 ← IB(j + 1)− 1
18: for l← k1, k2 do
19: for m← k3, k4 do
20: A′B(j)(JB(l), JA(m))← A′B(j − 1)(JB(l), JA(m)) +AA(j)(l) ·BB(j)(m)
21: end for
22: end for
23: end for
24: Reduce A′B . Collective communication of sum through processors
25: end procedure
switching row and column indices for each nonzero elements.6 But it needs to store
2× nnz(A) number of integers as its index, where nnz(A) is the number of nonzero
elements in the matrix A. As long as the number of rows in A is smaller than number
of nonzeros in A, the tuple form consumes more storage and communication volume
for any parallel execution because CSR and CSC forms require only n + nnz(A)
number of integers as its index, where n is a number of rows in A.
In addition, the outer product algorithm does not need to switch its storage form
from CSR to CSC by storing indices for both forms. The conventional way to compute
ATx, matrix-transpose-vector multiplication, is to store A in CSC form and use
its index as CSR form to avoid performing transposition of A to obtain ATx. In
order to implement this conventional way for the case where the matrix A involves
6For example, a nonzero element of a matrix A’s ith row and jth column can be represented in
tuple form as (i, j,Ai,j), where Ai,j is the nonzero element. The tuple representation allow to obtain
AT by switching row and column indices as (j, i,Ai,j).
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(a) One dimensional decomposition (b) Two dimensional decomposition
Figure 3.1: Matrix decomposition for ATB
multiplications as itself and its transpose, both CSR and CSC indices are required
simultaneously, and therefore, twice the number of integers have to be stored, which
is 2 × (n + nnz(A)). Since the outer product stores n + nnz(A), it becomes more
efficient as the matrix size increases.
The second advantage is that the outer product algorithm has no inter-processor
communication and thus it does not need to exchange data during its execution,
except for distributing data to compute nodes at the beginning, and collecting outputs
from the nodes at the end of the execution. This distinguishes this method from
conventional parallel matrix-matrix multiplication algorithms with more than two
dimensional (2D) block decomposition of its matrices. In conventional parallel matrix
multiplications, during the computation, a 2D or more than 2D block decomposed
matrix has to be sent from a compute node that stores a submatrix to a number of
compute nodes that store submatrices that needs to be matched with the sent matrix.
Figure 3.1 shows that a block matrix in 2D decomposition has to be distributed
to all block matrices in the same row. Even though the entire communication volume
and number of floating point operations are the same, longer 2D block decomposition
would have longer computation time than the outer product algorithm like 1D decom-
position that isolates multiplications of submatrices at each compute nodes. Because
1D algorithms that have no communication between processors as compute nodes can
avoid communication time as a part of its computation time, 2D algorithms are thus
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able to perform better than more than 1D algorithms as measured by megaflops or
gigaflops per seconds.
The third advantage is that the allocation of data is relatively flexible. As Buluç
and Gilbert (2008) points out, parallel algorithm for matrix-matrix multiplication re-
quires a somewhat formally designated way of decomposition so that the scalability of
matrices that are involved in the multiplication play a crucial role in determining per-
formance of the algorithms, especially for sparse matrices. In 2D decomposition, for
example, the number of rows and number of columns of each submatrices AT [p],B[p]
have to be matched to compute a target matrix ATB[p]. In other words, the ap-
plicability of the algorithm is subject to the shape of matrices and therefore, not
every matrix-matrix multiplications can be done with that algorithm. In statistical
computing, moreover, size of data matrix, especially number of rows that is number
of observations, is not predictable before the data is given. Since the outer product
algorithm decomposes the given matrices with the same number of rows, it is suitable
for matrix-matrix multiplication with an unpredictable number of rows such as is
commonly found in the statistical data matrices.
3.3 Experiment
In this section, we describe an experiment that we conducted to evaluate the outer
product algorithm for sparse matrix-transpose-matrix multiplication. The experiment
focuses particularly on how the algorithm performs when the matrix given is similar
to statistical data, which is rectangular with a large number of rows, and randomly
scattered zero elements on the matrix. In addition, the experiment demonstrates
the role of parallel execution for the algorithm of statistical operations like matrix
multiplication.
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Figure 3.2: Spy plot of the 1,000 by 1,000 random matrix
3.3.1 Experimental Design
We design and conduct an experiment to evaluate the performance of parallel execu-
tion of the outer product algorithm based on three specific characteristics. First, zero
and nonzero elements are randomly scattered over the matrix. Second the matrix has
a relatively large number of rows and small number of columns so it is a rectangular
matrix. Third, the size of the matrix is large scale, especially for number of rows.
The first and second are general characteristics for statistical data as a matrix, and
the third one is required to test the algorithm for a large-scale statistical computing,
or big data analysis.
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We generate uniform random numbers that takes a value from minus one to one,
then substitute the value, which are smaller than zero, to zero. This provides a
matrix in which approximately half of its elements have zero and those are randomly
located in the matrix. By converting the matrix, which is dense form, into CSR
form, we eventually obtain a random sparse matrix in CSR form. This procedure
of generating random sparse matrix is done via R, a language and environment for
statistical computing and graphics, which is installed in a Dell shared memory system
of the CUNY High Performance Computing Center.7
Figure 3.2 is a spy plot of a 1,000 by 1,000 random matrix that is generated by
the above procedure. The dots in the matrix represent nonzero elements, the blanks
represent zero elements that also represents sparsity pattern of the matrix. As we
can see, the nonzero elements seem to be scattered over the matrix without making
any particular patterns such as clustering into some particular area.
Hence, we generate three different matrices with the same number of rows but
different number of columns using the random matrix generating procedure. In order
to keep the three characteristics of matrices in this experiment, which are rectangular
shape with large number of rows and randomly scattered zero elements, we generate
one million by ten, one million by 100, and one million by 1,000 as the left hand side
matrix A. Then we perform matrix-transpose-matrix multiplication of A with a one
million by 1,000 matrix as the right hand side matrix B. The basic information about
the experimental matrices and ATB operations is summarized in Table 3.1.
The second and fourth rows in the table report sparcity, ratio of nonzero elements
to the entire number of elements in a matrix. All three matrices are approximately
50% non zero elements as we planned. We calculate number of flops for ATB in a way
7We use R’s uniform random number generator, which is a R’s implicit function, and sparse linear
algebra package, which is an external package of functions for sparse matrix operation. See the
websites for random number generator: http://stat.ethz.ch/R-manual/R-patched/library/
stats/html/Uniform.html, and for sparse linear algebra package: http://www.econ.uiuc.edu/
~roger/research/sparse/sparse.html.
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Table 3.1: Statistics of experimental matrices
Size of Target Matrix
10 × 1,000 100 × 1,000 1,000 × 1,000
# of non-zero of A 4.9990× 106 4.9995× 106 5.0002× 106
Sparcity of A 0.4999 0.4999 0.5000
# of non-zero of B 5.0003× 106 5.0003× 106 5.0003× 106
Sparcity of B 0.500025 0.500025 0.500025
# of flops for ATB 19.999× 109 19.999× 109 19.999× 109
that A and B are assumed to be dense. The number contains both useful and not
useful flops, which are number of floating point operations of zero elements. The flops
itself is therefore not accurate in terms of actual number of floating point operation
in sparse matrix multiplication but it is still useful to measure performance of parallel
execution of the operation and compare it with different number of CPUs.8
3.3.2 Random Matrix Results
We execute matrix multiplication of the three different target matrices on a SGI
cluster system with 744 processor cores and 96 NVIDIA Fermi processor accelerators
located at the CUNY High Performance Computing Center. This particular SGI
cluster system, named Andy, is separated into two parts. One is an SGI ICE system
with 45 dual-socket, compute nodes each with Intel 2.93 GHz quad-core Intel Core 7
(Nehalem) processors providing a total of 360 compute cores. Each computing node
has 24 Gbytes of memory or 3 Gbytes of memory per core. The first part of Andy’s
interconnect network is a dual rail, DDR Infiniband (20 Gbit/second) network in
which one rail is used to access Andy’s Lustre storage system and the other is used for
8Number of flops for ATB stay constant as long as the size of the matrices A and B stay the
same, although number of useful flops for ATB vary over the sparsity pattern of the two matrices.
Therefore, conventional performance measure such as gigaflops, or megaflops still work to show how
the performance parallel execution of the algorithm is differed when a greater the more number of
CPUs get involved in the execution.
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Figure 3.3: Gigaflop Performance Measures of ATB
inter-processor communication. The other part of the Andy is a cluster of 48 SGI x340
1U compute nodes, also connected to 24 1U quad-GPU Fermi s2050 accelerator nodes.
The multiplication of the three matrices are coded in Fortran 95 with OpenMPI 1.6.3,
which is an open source MPI-2 implementation for Intel compiler and compiled using
Intel Compiler Suite 13.0.1.117.9
The execution results are reported in Figure 3.3 and 3.4. Figure 3.3 is line plots
of gigaflops per second (Gflops), from the three different matrix multiplications. We
measure CPU clock time in seconds between the MPI_receive is done and when the
MPI_reduce is done, then use it as the denominator of Gflop/sec. We obtain Gflops
with 19 different combinations of CPUs, which range from 1 to 128, for each matrix
multiplication. The straight line in Figure 3.3 is Gflops for the matrix multiplication
with 10 columns on the left hand side that thus becomes a 10 by 1,000 target matrix.
The trend goes up similarly with the dotted-dashed line, which is for 100 by 1,000
9Note that because our programming execution do not involve GPU accelerations, we use the
first part of Andy in which the number of available CPUs is 360.
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matrix multiplication, from one to 16 CPUs, then the upward trend gets stronger.
100 by 1,000 multiplication has ten times more floating point operations (flops) than
a 10 by 1,000 matrix but those two calculations take almost the same until the 16
CPU cores. This result can be interpreted as follow; the outer product algorithm
with small number of CPUs well performs for a large scale matrix multiplication, but
it poorly performs for a small scale multiplication.
By comparing the dotted-dashed line with dashed line, Gflops for 1,000 by 1,000 in
Figure 3.3, however, the same interpretation cannot be applied. The gap between the
dashed line and dotted-dashed line is getting wider until 48 CPUs, and it gets closer
at 64 CPUs. Then the two lines go up by roughly the same slope. The comparison
of Gflops between 100 by 1,000 and 1,000 by 1,000 seems to be reversed with the
pattern of 10 by 1,000 and 100 by 1,000 case. Although these comparison create
some ambiguity on performance, we can observe two consistent patterns over the
number of CPUs. First, the smaller the matrices’ size, the higher the Gflops. Second,
Gflops are slightly increased by adding more CPUs.
Because one of the outer product algorithm’s distinguished feature is to remove
the need for communication time between the computing nodes and thus reduce com-
puting time, it is important to show communication time pattern over the number of
CPUs and flops. We report the total execution time and the associated communica-
tion time in Figure 3.4. The solid line is total execution time, which is CPU clock
in seconds from beginning of the MPI_send to end of the MPI_reduce. The shaded
region under the straight line is communication time, which is CPU clock time from
beginning of MPI_send to end of MPI_receive. Panel (a) shows that total execu-
tion time goes up by increased communication time, when number of flops is not
large enough to take advantages from parallel execution. Unlike the 10 by 1,000 case,
matrix multiplication with a larger number of flops has reduced total execution time
with slightly increased communication time. Panel (b) shows that the communication
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Figure 3.4: Execution and communication times for ATB
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time takes a relatively smaller portion of total execution time with less than 24 CPUs,
but it dominates most of the execution time. In panel (c), the communication takes
very small portion of the entire execution time and it keeps declining over CPUs.
Figure 3.4 shows a consistent pattern that the portion of communication time, out of
the entire execution time, gets smaller and the advantage of parallel execution gets
larger, as the size of matrices is increased.
3.4 Application: NYC Taxicab Data
In this section, we describe an application of the outer product algorithm on sta-
tistical computing for a big data set. The data for this test is the New York City
yellow medallion taxicab data, and the statistical computing challenge is calculation
of the variance-covariance matrix, and an estimations of conditional expectation of
travel demand. The NYC taxicab data is a geographic positioning system (GPS)
tracking record for each of the entire totallity of trips made by NYC medallion taxis
during 2008-10. The data was collected by New York City Taxicab Limousine Com-
mission (NYCTLC). The NYCTLS mandated their medallion taxicabs to equip each
vehicle with an electronic device that also allowes to passengers to use credit/debit
card payment and enhanced driver and passenger information monitoring under the
name Taxicab Passenger Enhancement Program (T-PEP), which was legislated as
TLC policy on March 30, 2004. The T-PEP equipment was originally promoted
to enhance customer service by providing credit card payment, and automatic trip
reporting in order to detect and intercept drivers’ fraud. The equipment records de-
tailed information about a taxi trip such as time, location, number of passengers,
payment method, and itemized taxi fares. It then reports the recorded information
to NYC TLC server.10
The taxicab data, provided by NYC TLC, contains 378 million taxi trip records
10Note that trip time and location are recorded as origin and destination pairs.
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from January 1, 2008 to December 31, 2010. The original data was separated into
two comma-separated-value (csv) formatted text files and the size of these files was
52.11Gbytes and 88.45Gbytes. The headers in every column of the data file are
variables, which are vehicle id, medallion id, driver’s name, shift number, trip id, trip
pick up date time, trip drop off date time, trip pick up location, trip drop off location,
passenger count, payment type, fare amount, toll amount, tip amount, surcharge,
total amount, trip time, trip distance, start longitude, start latitude, end longitude,
end latitude, vendor name, start zipcode, end zipcode, distance between service, and
time between service.
3.4.1 Manipulation of Big Data
In order to perform any statistical analysis, values in data must be numeric that are
either integers or real numbers but some of variables in the taxicab data such as
payment method, O-D time are recorded as character variables. We read the two
csv data files into SAS, a statistical computing package developed by SAS Institute
Inc. that was installed on a Dell shared memory system with 24 processor cores at
the CUNY High Performance Computing Center. This system, named Karle has a
total of 96 Gbytes of memory or 4 Gbytes per core so that the maximum memory
for a serial job execution is up to 90 Gbytes. The main advantage to use SAS for
big data manipulation is that SAS performs its operations line-by-line for the DATA
step, which is one of four major part of SAS programs. Executing the SAS data-
step program for big data takes a significantly longer time because of its line-by-line
looping procedure but it allows it also to avoid unexpected termination of procedures
due to insufficient memory or memory spillover.11
Once the data is imported into SAS, we create time and data variables using the
11Reading a text file formatted data into SAS, however, requires available memory space at least
as big as the data size. Shared memory system in which maximum memory allocation can exceed
32 Gbytes, the maximum physical memory allocation for a single Intel CPU, such as Karle server
in CUNY High Performance Computing center that we use for this study
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recorded begining and end time for each trip. The time record in the data takes the
format like “01JAN08:23:59:59“ for 23:59:59 of January 1, 2008 and SAS has implicit
functions to recognize and convert these same values of specific time frame such as
hour, minute, and second. It also provides functions to convert these time records
formats into specific date such as year, month, and date. We create all possible time
and date variables for both the beginning and end of trips that can be obtained from
the original records, in order to use them as time identifiers. We also create spatial
indices for origin and destination (O-D) of each trips based on the recorded location
of beginning and end of each trips.12
The data has geographic coordinates,reported as longitude in numeric form as real
number, and latitude, of where individual taxi trips begins and ends. This geographic
coordinates can be used as spatial identifier to analyze the distribution of taxi trips
over the New York City metropolitan region, but we use five-digit ZIP Code polygons
and assign the matched ZIP Code number to each origin and destination coordinates.
The reasons to use ZIP Code as spatial identifier are following: First, a pair of real
numbers can only indicate an individual location, if the geographic coordinates are
used as the identifier. In other words, two variables in real numbers are needed to
provide a spatial identifier. By assigning ZIP Codes numbers for each coordinates,
however, a single location can be indicated by one variable in integer form. Second,
there are up to 300 million non-missing observations have geographic coordinates.
The distribution pattern of this large-scale data is difficult to analyze, either visually
or analytically, because there are too many neighboring points, not thus a single
observation is anguish in a sea of other points.
Figure 3.5 presents identification of spatial distribution of large scale data. We
take a random sample of 300k observation that have LaGuardia airport as its origin
12The origin and the destination location of an individual taxi trip have been recorded as geo-
graphic coordinates, longitude and latitude. Each record takes six decimal places in the original
dataset and the interval of the longitude and latitude of the origins are [−75.1994,−72.0103] and
[39.5401, 42.0339], and the destinations are [−79.4417,−71.9881] and [39.6439, 42.0558] respectively.
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(a) Histogram of Origin Locations (b) Scatter Plot of Origin Locations
Figure 3.5: Spatial Distribution of NYC Taxicabs
and Manhattan below at 59th street as its destination. Then we plot the data of
its destination location. Panel (a) is 3D histogram with geographic coordinate grids,
and panel (b) is 2D scatterplot of the geographic coordinates that use latitude and
longitude as vertical and horizontal axes respectively. From panel (b), we can see
how accurate the trip locations were recorded with six place precision of roughly 10
centimeter or 4 inches. The destination points generally lie along the New York City
road network. However, it is hard to visually figure out distributional pattern in
detail such as what is the location of the most, or the least frequent destination of the
taxi. But panel (a) clearly emphasizes the distribution pattern over the somewhere
Manhattan region is very dense. ZIP Code polygon are used as spatial identifiers in
the geographic coordinate grid portrayed in panel (a).
3.4.2 Parallel Execution of Taxi Data Analysis
From the taxicab data, we thus obtain two matrices. One is the independent variable
matrix, denoted X, and the other is the instrumental variable matrix, denoted W.
These are used in a linear model estimation of taxi drivers’ trip route choice behavior
as explored in Shim (2013). These two matrices have 293,693,470 rows but number of
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Table 3.2: Statistics of the Experimental Matrices
Target matrix
XTX XTW WTW
Size 63 × 63 63 × 152 152 × 152
Sparcity 0.1395 0.0483 0.0750
# of flops 2,331,338,760,891 13,570,987,838,656 5,624,817,327,864
Gigaflops per second
# of CPUs XTX XTW WTW
128 2,534.28 22,762.80 6,891.79
256 5,023.23 43,495.12 13,656.94
512 9,408.04 91,576.20 27,041.38
1024 19,408.87 212,163.23 54,082.75
columns is different. X contains 62 variables and a vector of ones at the first column,
so it has 63 columns. W has 151 variables, and the vector of ones at the first column,
so 152 is the total number of columns. We compute three matrix multiplications,
XTX, WTW, and XTW using the outer product algorithm.
The multiplications are coded in Fortran 95 with message passing interface (MPI),
and compiled using the Intel Fortran Compiler (version 3.1.61)13, and executed on
a two cabinet Cray XE6m system in CUNY High Performance Computing Center,
named Salk. Salk consists of 176 dual-socket compute nodes each containing two
8-core AMD Magny-Cours processors running at 2.3 GHz for a total of 16 cores per
node. This gives the system a total of 2816 cores for the production processing of
CUNY’s HPC applications. Each node has a total of 32 Gbytes of memory or 2
Gbytes of memory per core.
13The reason to use Intel compiler is that the intel compiler is able to specify its memory model
based on the size of data, which is able to be read into a head node or compute nodes. The matrix
X consists of 6.2 Gbytes nonzero elements, a 5.7 Gbytes row index, and a 2.9 Gbytes column index
as its data files. The matrix W consists of a 4.2 Gbytes nonzero elements, a 5.6 Gbytes row index,
and a 2.6 Gbytes column index. Since the Intel compiler’s memory model allows to read bigger than
a 2 Gbytes as a file input, therefore, large-scale data, or big data analysis demands the use of the
Intel compiler’s memory model option.
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3.4.3 Analysis: Taxicab data
From the three target matrices XTX, WTW, and XTW, we obtain variance-covariance
matrix of X and W, and moment estimators of conditional expectation of a variable
given time, date, and location indicator variables. Variance-covariance matrix, which
also refers to as sample variance-covariance matrix, has variances at its diagonal, and
covariance of the variables at its off-diagonal elements. Since the first column of X
and W are vectors of ones, we can obtain sample mean of all variables. Hence we can
compute most of descriptive statistics from the three target matrices from the first
row, or the first column of the target matrices.14 Basic information about the target
matrices XTX, WTW, and XTW, and the associated performance measures are re-
ported in Table 3.2. Because W has 148 indicator variables, which take value one or
zero, out of 152, whereas X has 40 indicator variables, out of 63, the number of zero
elements in WTW is larger than XTX. This fact is represented by lower sparsity and
higher gigaflops of WTW for all number of CPUs. The bottom panel of Table 3.2
shows that each computation’s gigaflops is almost doubled when the number of CPUs
is doubled. Thus, indicating a positive unit relationship between porcessor frequency
and calculating performance.
In addition, we also can obtain sample moment estimator of conditional expecta-
tion, if one of two variables is an indicator variable that takes either one or zero. For
example, the average taxi fare of trip from JFK airport is an estimation of conditional
expectation of taxi fare given the origin of trip is JFK airport, denoted E[Y |X = 1],
where Y is taxi fare and X is an indicator variable that takes one if trip origin is
JFK airport, and zero otherwise. The data matrix X have taxi fare and JFK airport
14For example, the very first element of XTX is the number of observations 293,693,470 because
it is
∑N
i=1 1 · 1, where N is the number of observations, or number of rows in X. The first column in
XTX has sum of columns of X over its rows as
∑N
i=1 Xi,1,
∑N
i=1 Xi,2, . . .. By dividing each element
of the first column in X with the very first element of X, these turn out to be sample means as
N−1
∑N
i=1 Xi,1, N
−1∑N
i=1 Xi,2, . . .. Note that X
TX is a symmetric matrix so the sample means
can be obtained from the first row of XTX.
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Table 3.3: Means and Variance-Covariance Matrix of NYC Taxicab Data
Mean Variance-Covariance Matrix
Variables Passenger count Total fare Tolls Tip Surcharge Trip time Vacant cruise Credit card
Passenger count 1.6612 1.4836
Total fare 9.4705 0.0911 46.2641
Tolls 0.1208 0.0059 2.7027 0.5817
Tip 0.5870 -0.0149 3.5016 0.2771 1.8105
Surcharge 0.2060 0.0276 -0.0710 -0.0075 0.0152 0.1154
Trip time 11.4684 0.2178 44.45754 2.1067 3.1468 -0.0049 66.6271
Vacant cruise 10.1295 0.0368 18.8751 1.8975 1.4538 -0.3179 11.5313 193.1637
Credit card 0.2859 -0.0130 0.3880 0.0230 0.4182 0.0090 0.4285 0.0733 0.2041
origin indicator variable as two of its variables, so N−1
∑N
i=1 X
TXfare,JFK , where
XTXfare,JFK is an element at which the row is taxi fare and the column is the JFK
airport indicator.
Table 3.3 reports the mean, variance, and covariance of the independent variable
matrix X. The first column in the table 3.3 contains the mean of variables, and the
rest of columns contains the variance-covariance matrix. In the variance-covariance
matrix, the diagonal elements are variances and the off-diagonal elements are covari-
ance. We can thus obtain and calculate every independent and instrumental variables’
descriptive statistics by the following way: The mean total fare, as reported in the
first column and the second row, is $9.47, and its variance, reported at the third col-
umn and the second row, and the standard deviation is $46.26, and $6.80 respectively.
The covariance between total fare and trip time, reported at the third column and
sixth row.
Table 3.3 only reports on a part of the entire variance-covariance matrix for
X because the size of the matrix is actually 63 × 63. We report the rest of the
variance-covariance matrices for X and W on various plots and maps to present its
distributional characteristics clearly, using moment estimation of conditional expec-
tations. The instrumental variable matrix W contains indicator variables for time,
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Figure 3.6: Time Plot: Mean Taxi Fares and Travel Time
date, and O-D locations’ ZIP Codes. These conditional expectation estimates allow
us to demonstrate the mean distributions of variables in both X and W. Figure 3.6
reports (mean) distributions of taxi fare and trip time over hours in the day, and days
in the week. This figure helps to emphasize the importance of controlling for the hours
in the day, when performing any statistical analyses using the taxicab data because it
does not seem to be distributed randomly. The lines in panel (a) fluctuate over time
along certain pattern and it is not independent over time. Thus, the independent
and identical distribution (i.i.d) assumption for a sample, a necessary condition to be
accepted as a random sample and that provides the argument for statistically valid
analysis, is violated. Thus, if a statistical analysis is conducted without controlling
for hours in the day, one expects to estimate biased results especially for taxi fare
and trip time.
The taxicab data thus has dependency over not only time variation but also spa-
tial distribution. As described above, we assign five-digit ZIP Codes and use the ZIP
Code as spatial index. There are 866 ZIP Codes that are assigned for both origin
and destination locations. We exclude ZIP Codes that have the number of observa-
tions less than 0.1% of the entire observations in the taxi data. Figure 3.7 reports
3. PARALLEL SPARSE MATRIX MULTIPLICATION 87
the (mean) distributions of taxi fare and trip time over ZIP Code polygons around
New York City. The map shows that taxi fare and trip time are getting higher in
some particular clusters such as Manhattan, or JFK airport. This gives us the same
implication that spatial distribution has to be also controlled as well as hourly distri-
bution, in order to obtain unbiased statistical results when we analyze taxi fares and
trip times.
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(a) Mean Taxi Fares at Origin
(b) Mean Taxi Fares at Destination
Figure 3.7: Spatial Distribution of Taxi Fares
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(a) Mean Trip Time at Origin
(b) Mean Trip Time at Destination
Figure 3.8: Spatial Distribution of Trip Time by ZIP Code Polygons
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3.5 Conclusions
In this study, we introduce a parallel algorithm sparse matrix-transpose-matrix mul-
tiplication using the outer product of row vectors in matrices. The outer product
algorithm works with compressed sparse row (CSR) form matrices, and it does not
require transposition operations prior to perform multiplication. Since the parallel
implementation of the outer product algorithm decomposes a matrix by row, it im-
poses no additional restrictions with respect to the size and shape of matrices. We
focus on the value of this technique on rectangular shaped matrices, which have a
larger number of rows and smaller number or columns, for performing statistical anal-
ysis on big data sets. We test the general performance fo the outer product algorithm
for randomly generated matrices. The performance measures of the test show that
the outer product algorithm is well implemented and performs well on large-scale
matrix multiplication in a parallel computing environment.
As we discussed above, this method can produce three computational efficiencies
and advantages. First, the matrix-transpose-matrix multiplication can be done with
the CSR form even though it involves transposition of a matrix. Second, the outer
product algorithm has no need for inter-processor communication to exchange data
during its execution, except to distributed the data to compute nodes at the begin-
ning, and collecting outputs from the nodes at the end of the execution. The third
advantage is relatively flexible allocation of the data. These three advantages make
the outer product algorithm more applicable to and efficiently with large-scale sta-
tistical computing for big data. Further, we conduct a experiment of the application
on New York City taxicab data. We show that the advantages of parallel execution
of the outer product algorithm increases, as the size of data and the associated data
matrices gets larger.
Since the concept of big data has become popular in statistics and the other sci-
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ences, demand for support from high performance computing systemshas increased
because of technical difficulties required to manipulate and analyze big data. The
outer product algorithm provides the very beginning step in developing enhanced
methods for statistical analyses for big data by giving a linkage between high per-
formance computing and statistical computing. We thus expect the outer product
algorithm to help develop applied statistical computing algorithms that will enhance
high performance computing systems so that they can be used more efficiently for big
data problem.
4 Principal versus Agent: Market Operation Mech-
anism of the New York City Taxicab Industry
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4.1 Introduction
In this paper, I apply mechanism design, a game theory that demonstrates a game
situation with incomplete information between a principal who sets up the rules and
the finite number of agents who play the game under the rules, in order to establish
a model for taxi market resource allocation and then analyze it with asymmetric in-
formation that exists between passengers and drivers, along with heterogeneous trip
characteristics, where the origin and the destination points of a trip have different
general levels of quantity demanded for taxi trips at each location. The main advan-
tage of applying mechanism design to the taxi market is that it provides equilibrium
conditions by which the agents in the game situation accept an allocation mecha-
nism, that is designated by the principal, and announce their true market behavior
characteristics. In other words, we can characterize the equilibrium conditions that
a taxi driver, as the agent, chooses an optimal route under a regulated fare system
imposed by a taxi market authority, as the principal. The equilibrium yields a socially
optimal allocation if the optimal route is a shortest route in terms of trip time and
distance. We can define the resulting allocation, as a Pareto optimal allocation in the
taxi market, and hence the model is able to provide implications that show as under
what conditions the taxi market achieves the Pareto optimal allocation.
The New York City yellow medallion taxicab market is an example of the model.
The New York City Taxicab & Limousine Commission (TLC) issues a limited number
of medallion, and set up the fare rates system for NYC medallion taxicab, the yellow
cab, and the other taxi services. The fare system is not a single fare rule; there are a
number of different fare rules that are applied for different types of trip. Furthermore,
the passengers obviously prefer to make their taxi trip shorter and lower fare, but
they are subject to limited information about trip routes because the New York City’s
road network is one of the most complicated road networks and its traffic condition
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are dynamically changing continuously. The passengers are thus more like to rely on
information from their taxi drivers for the choice of exact trip route.
The economic literature on taxi industry tend to analyze the market under the
assumption that the price of trips and the market entry vehicles into a taxi industry
are regulated by a government authority. This seems to be a reasonable and realistic
assumption in most cases and cities because the authority may be concerned about
passenger protection from crime and risky driving behavior. Regardless of the reason
for entry control of the taxi market, also known as a medallion system, moreover, it
also tends to cause monopoly pricing behavior of the licensed taxi drivers, and this
makes the price control, also known as a regulated fare system, a justifiable policy.
The price control is therefore a necessary condition to achieve the second best efficient
allocation in the taxi market, provided there exists an entry control, and thus finding
an optimal taxi fare system becomes a key general approach that the taxi market
literature constructs and uses to analyze taxi industry.
Leading the way to analyze taxi market, Douglas (1972), in a seminal paper that
applies supply and demand analysis to the taxicab industry, models the taxi market
as a monopoly and shows how the regulated price leads to the allocation of resources
that become socially optimal whereas an unregulated monopoly pricing system yields
an inefficient allocation. De Vany (1975) extends the supply and demand analysis for
the taxi markets to show the impact of entry control on economic welfare. If the taxi
market entry is regulated through a medallion system, De Vany finds it turns out
to be a monopoly market so that the market allocation does not achieve its socially
optimum unless the price regulation is imposed. Beesley and Glaister (1983) consider
information structure on taxi market analysis when the supply and demand model has
waiting time as a stochastic component. Cairns and Liston-Heyes (1994) argues that
the medallion system can be implemented as a de facto bond to provide an evaluation
tool of appropriate market behaviors of the drivers. Arnott (1996) argues that one
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needs to provides subsidies to taxi drivers to reduce waiting time for passengers, using
the supply and demand model.
But the optimal regulated price in taxi industry may not always lead to a socially
optimal allocation as a second best market solution because of demand uncertainty,
and also information asymmetry between drivers and passengers. For a given road
network in a particular area, taxi drivers normally have high levels of information
about the network, whereas passengers may have limited information.1 Thus, taxi
drivers have an incentive to choose a longer trip route other than the optimal, which
is the shortest distance route that takes the minimum travel time, to increase the
total fare of the trip, in the case where the passenger generally wants to go from an
origin with greater taxi demand to a destination with less demand for taxi, and the
passenger has insufficient information about the road network to identify whether the
driver goes along the optimal route. If this inference is true, any regulated fare system
fail to achieve a socially optimal allocation, where drivers transport their passengers
with as shortest trip time and distance as possible so that the passengers and the
drivers both spend the least amount of money and time on a given trip.
For the purpose of applying the theory of mechanism design to a taxi industry, in
this study, I define the utility of a taxi market authority, as a principal, and drivers,
as players in a mechanism, which is a function of trip distance that is drivers’ hidden
characteristic. Then I analyze how the equilibrium distance, and the corresponding
utilities are determined with respect to the taxi fare system, designed and imple-
mented by the authority.2 Using this model I show that there does not exist a unique
1The information about road network for a particular trip can contain both time and spatially
invariant components, and time and spatially variant components. The time and spatially invariant
components of road network for a individual trip are such as route, and its toll price and distance.
And the time and spatially variant components can be congestion, travel time, and some accidental
event due to whether condition, or car accidents.
2In the taxi industry, the compensation mechanism is the regulated fare system and the agents are
the taxi drivers. Since the objective of TLC is to provide taxi services to the passengers as much as
they demand, and since the passengers’ objective is to minimize travel time, the fare system should
let the taxi drivers seek and take the passengers and drive along the shortest route. So the socially
optimal equilibrium is where the taxi drivers takes the shortest distance routes. This assumption
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fare system that yields a Pareto efficient allocation, if taxi trips have heterogeneous
characteristics due to the spatial distribution of passengers that is there exists dif-
ferent probabilities of finding a new passenger between origin and destination for the
next trip. This is a key market point - as passenger may well be finished with their
transport activity at the end of a given trip - but the driver is looking forward to the
next trip in a series of trips during a working day. So the probability of finding a cus-
tomer at the destination point may then conduct an alternative trip route behavior
on the current trip.
An empirical analysis is then conducted to examine the theoretical prediction. The
data for the empirical analysis is NYC taxicab trip records with individual trips’ geo-
graphic coordinates of origin and destination, number of passengers, payment method,
itemized fares, trip time, and distance. There are 378,532,118 trips have been col-
lected from January 2008 to November 2010. The empirical analysis aims to estimate
a parameter that implies a difference between the equilibrium distance and the opti-
mal distance of a taxi trip for a given set of attributes, and I use recorded distances
on the taxi meters for the equilibrium distances and shortest route distances for the
optimal distances of the trips. So, the difference between the recorded distance and
the shortest route distance becomes an observed difference between the equilibrium
and the optimal distance. I perform GMM estimation to obtain consistent estimates
of the average difference of the distances in several different groups of trips that have
different fare rules or clearly have different taxi demand at their origins and destina-
tions. GMM estimation is employed to control for possible endogenous factors over
time and the spatial dimension of the data. The results show that the theoretical
prediction is consistent with our empirical foundation that a metered fare rule can
make drivers choose the shortest routes when a given trip has more taxi demand at
its destination than origin so that the fare rule does not work to prevent an inefficient
will be discussed in detail later.
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taxi trip, where the drivers make trip longer when they drive back from the origin to
the destination, and the opposite pattern is observed for the trips in negotiated fare
zones. The drivers are thus more likely to make trip shorter when their trip origin
has less taxi demand than its destination.
In the next Section, the travel demand model, proposed by chapter 1, is reviewed
and modified for taxi service. Then a mechanism design model that is associated with
the travel demand model is established and discussed. In Section 4.3, I introduce the
equilibrium conditions of the mechanism design model for taxi market and analyze
how drivers’ behave differently under what circumstances. In Section 4.4, I discuss
econometric issues on the empirical analysis of the taxi market mechanism using the
New York City taxicab GPS tracking data. The results of the empirical analysis is
discussed in Section 4.5. Then I summarize the arguments of this study in Section
4.6 as a concluding remark. Finally, mathematical proofs for a lemma, theorem, and
proposition will be provided in Section 4.7.
4.2 Mechanism Design of Taxi Industry: Model
In this section, a theory of mechanism design for a taxi market is proposed and
discussed. I review the travel demand model, proposed by chapter 1 and offer some
reasons to justify the assumptions, which are necessary to impose for the taxi market
mechanism. Then I establish the mechanism of taxicab industry based on the given
assumptions.
4.2.1 Travel Demand for Taxi Service
Because taxi trip demand is the most crucial determinant not only for drivers’ route
choice but also of a given taxi market authority’s fare rule set which could be selected
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to maximize social welfare in the market,3 we can simply think that the social welfare
is a function of the authority’s utility and passengers’ utility. The authority’s utility
can be maximized by providing sufficient number of taxi services to the passengers
subject to the drivers’ willingness of making trips for the passengers as the way in
which both drivers and passengers can maximize their utilities, and thus social welfare.
The conventional taxi travel demand model has waiting time and fare amount as
its attributes4 but this does not seem to be a realistic and applicable model design
for this study because i) distance, and travel time are the attributes of demand for
taxi travel as important as fare, ii) waiting time is a part of the entire travel time and
the entire travel time is a function of the travel distance, so the demand model with
fare and waiting time can only explain a special case of the taxi trip demand, and
iii) having an absence of minimum trip distance means the model cannot provide any
implications on drivers’ route choice which determines the distance of a trip based on
asymmetric information about road network between passengers and drivers.
The idea that the entire trip time and distance are the attributes, which determine
taxi trip demand, rather than waiting time that is a part of the entire trip time, is
provided by chapter 1 through their travel demand model. The baseline assumption
of the model is that individuals choose a number of trips to maximize their utility,
subject to their budget and travel time forecast. The utility is a function of consump-
tion and leisure, and the consumption and leisure time are discounted by cost and
time of the travel, respectively. The design model is thus a disutility of travel model
in which individuals can achieve maximum utility level by minimizing travel time and
cost, in order to allocate additional money and time from travel to consumption and
leisure.
3Social welfare in economics terms means the sum of consumer and producer surplus. Note
that taxi market authorities’ goal may not to maximize the social welfare by designing the market
operating system in an efficient way. The goal can be differed by the authorities’ own mandates
such as let the drivers transport passengers safety.
4See Douglas (1972), and its subsequent researches on taxi demand.
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The assumptions of the model are: the travel time is randomly given so that
the individuals have to use their own travel time forecast, based on their previous
experience that provides perfect information to the individual on prior travel events.
The travel time forecast can be summarized by a time evolving function of previous
travel time, a random component of travel time that is thus a stochastic process, and
distance. Under these assumptions, the individual’s utility maximization problem
can be described by:
maxU = E
[ ∞∑
t=0
βtu(ct − pt · d, lt − ht)
]
s.t. ct − pt · d ≤ w∗t (1− lt + ht) + rtkt
ht+1 = g(ht, d, zt),
where u(·, ·) is an intertemporal consumption-leisure utility, ct, kt, rt, pt is a con-
sumption, a household capital holding, a unit price of capital, and a unit price of
travel events respectively, and ht, d, zt are the traveler attributes that are travel
time, distance, and the stochastic component of the travel time respectively.5 The
utility maximization problem is a stochastic dynamic programming problem, and the
solution path for the travel demand for a mode i can be derived as:
f(yi|x) = exp [−E {ν(h′i, z′i)}] ·
E {ν(h′i, z′i)}
yi!
, yi = 0, 1, . . . , (4.1)
where yi is a number of travel by a travel mode i, x is a vector of decision variables that
5Note that the second constraint ht+1 = g(ht, d, zt) is a time evolving function that describes a
forecasting rule of future travel time for a given information about travel time. The main idea to
obtain the travel demand yi is to treat all traveler attributes as exogenous so the Bellman equation
v(ht, zt), a solution of the stochastic dynamic programming problem is given by:
v(ht, zt) = F (ht, ht+1, zt) + βEt [v(ht+1, zt+1)] , ∀t and zt ∈ Q.
This yields the expected return of future travel Et [v(ht+1, zt+1)] and the demand yi is assumed to be
Poisson random variable with mean Et [v(ht+1, zt+1)]. The solution is generally derived to solve out
maximization problem of the Bellman equation, but it turns out to be a given equation by assuming
exogenous attributes. The details of derivation is described in chapter 1.
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have been determined exogenously, and ν(h′i, z′i) is the Bellman equation, a solution
of the stochastic dynamic programming problem.
The travel demand yi is a poisson random variable with mean E {ν(h′i, z′i)} that
denotes the expected benefit that the individual traveler expects to achieve from
a future travel event.6 The baseline assumptions behind the count travel demand
model (4.1) is that travel is time consuming and costly which therefore takes away the
opportunity to consume goods and services, and also potentially wastes leisure time.
The traveler is thus able to achieve maximum utility by minimizing travel distance
and time. The demand model assumes Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA)
that the traveler chooses a particular travel mode to minimizing expected time and
distance of the travel event and this decision does not depend on any other possible
alternative travel modes.
chapter 1 assumes further that the traveler’s travel time forecast ht+1 and its
random component on the travel time zt+1 are fixed over travel node, which means
that travelers do not think their travel time is differed by choice of trip mode.7 In
other words, the traveler expects to spend same travel time regardless of any transit
modes such as driving, mass transit like bus and subway. This assumption is too
strong to apply directly to the taxi market model because each travel mode has own
trip route and the associated distance, and the traveler would recognize and consider it
for her travel time forecasting. The main focus of this study, in addition, is to analyze
how the social welfare which is the taxi market authority’s objective, is changed with
respect to the distance of a taxi trip, given by the drivers’ route choice, and thus taxi
trip demand has to be varied over the distance. For this reason, I consider a modified
travel demand model that can have different distance at different travel modes. The
6The variables h′i, z′i in the expectation E {ν(h′i, z′i)} for a travel mode i is the future realization
of hi, zi respectively. These can be thought as ht+1 and zt+1 so the expectation implies the future
benefit. I use h′i, z′i to avoid to use messy notation with super and subscript at the same time.
7Note that the travel in the model is a particular trip from an origin to a destination, so that the
distance is the physical length between the origin and the destination along road network.
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travel time forecast hi,t+1 is then a function of the distance, denoted ht+1(di). By
assuming the other attributes are being held constant, the taxi trip demand function
can be expressed as y(di), where di refers to trip distance by taxi.
To construct a relevant model for the taxi market mechanism, it then needs to
focus only on trip distance between origin and destination which implies that the
distance represents route choice and determines taxi market equilibrium. In fact,
the distance can be the single determinant for the following reasons: First, the taxi
authority’s policy instrument is taxi fare rule and the rule normally calculate a trip
fare based on the distance and time of a trip; Second, the absolute distance of a trip
is determined immediately once the driver choose a route of the trip, given that the
driver does not change the route during the trip, but the absolute travel time is un-
certain due to unexpected traffic conditions. Furthermore, the other travel attributes
are more likely to be given for a single trip because the other travel attributes such as
wage rate, financial income and leisure time are given exogenously from the decision
of the route choice for the trip.8 For this reason, I use the taxi trip demand as a
function of distance for the following taxi market allocation mechanism.
4.2.2 Taxi Market Mechanism
Consider a taxi market for a metropolitan area that is assumed to have a finite number
of Origin-Destination (OD) trips. Suppose that there are taxi drivers who participate
the market as players in the region, and the types of the drivers are homogeneous,
which means that all drivers have the same utility for a trip. Suppose also that there
is a taxi market authority that plays a role as a principal.
8The list of travel attribute is given by chapter 1. They assume that the wage, financial income,
and leisure time in their model are given by having a trip through a particular travel mode i. They
also show how the number of travel through the mode i are determined by the travel attributes in
two propositions. In the travel demand model, travel time forecast varies over the travel modes so
the travel mode choice is done by the trip time forecasting and the other attribute do not affect on
the mode choice. For the demand for taxi, therefore, we can argue that travel time does not effect
on the number of taxi trips because passengers consider the travel time forecast when they decide
to catch a taxi, not a bus or a subway.
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Assume that the authority has no private information, whereas the taxi drivers
have θ = (θ1, . . . , θI), a vector of distances for all possible OD trip i = 1, . . . , I. An
element θi of the vector θ is the distance of a trip i that is determined when the
route of the trip is chosen. The distance θi is drawn from a set Θ so θi is a random
variable and the set Θ is a set in a σ-algebra that represents a road network of the
metropolitan area, denoted R.9 Figure 4.1 shows the New York City road network
and a trip route from 42nd street and Broadway, to John F. Kennedy (JFK) Airport
that represents an example of the σ-algebra for a trip distance. The line layer and
dots represent the road network, so it is R for the NYC Taxi cabs. The red line is
one out of a set of finite but many alternative routes for the trip on the road network.
Hence, the set Θ can be thought of as a set of all possible routes for the trip, and
the distance θi ∈ Θ, which refers to the distance of red line, can be drawn from the
infinitely many different routes. Moreover, the route can be changed during the trip
due to unexpected traffic conditions, so it is defined as a random variable.
Let y : Θ 7→ N0 be the taxi trip demand function that maps from the distance
to the non-negative integer, including zero. Note that the demand function y(θ) is
the travel demand that I reviewed in section 4.2.1.10 Let t : Θ 7→ R+ be a monetary
transfer from passengers to a driver so t(θi) implies fare amount for taxi trip i with
respect to the distance θi. Now we define an allocation in the taxi market, denoted
8The distance vector θ represents the driver’s characteristic, which implies individual players’
hidden behavior or action that is unknown for the principal. As will be seen below, in addition,
it determines demand and the associated market allocation. Note that the number “I” implies the
number of OD trips in the region.
9As I assumed about θi, the distance, for a trip i, and the set Θ contains all possible distances
for the trip i that are determined by the choice of route. In order to establish a model for the taxi
market mechanism with respect to trip distance, the distance has to cover all possible trips in the
metropolitan area, so that the road network R is assumed to be a σ-algebra, which is a set of sets
Θ. This set up allows the distance θi is well-defined random variable. This is a type space in the
taxi market mechanism.
10Note that the taxi trip demand y(θ) is a composite function that contains fare, as well as the
distance so it is y(t(θ), θ). Since the taxi fare t(θ) is also a function of the distance, here I use y(θ) to
make notation simpler. Because the demand for taxi is the composite function of fare and distance,
in addition, the characteristic of the function with respect to the distance is not consistent. In other
words, it may or may not increase as the distance gets longer.
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Figure 4.1: New York City Road Network and a Trip Route
x(θ) = (y(θ), t(θ)), that consists of taxi trip demand and the associated fare amount.
The allocation is a major component of a mechanism that defines incentive structure
of the players in the mechanism, with respect to the players’ action. In the taxi
market, therefore, the allocation implies that, for all trip i, there exists an exchange
of taxi riding services and its fare between passengers and drivers. And the total
amount of the exchange is determined by distance θi. The conventional theory of
mechanism design assumes that the monetary transfer is made by a principal in the
mechanism, but here I treat the transfer as being made by passengers under the fare
rule, given by the authority, so that the authority can choose t(·) as a rule but it
cannot choose the exact amount of fare for every single trip i.
The market allocation x : Θ 7→ N0×R+ allows us to argue whether a regulated taxi
fare system allocates resources between passengers and drivers efficiently. In order to
make an efficient allocation argument, here I consider a representative driver’s utility
u(x, θ) and the principal’s utility u0(x, θ) , where u is strictly increasing and u0 is
strictly decreasing in the monetary transfer t(·). The principal’s utility u0(x, θ), as
its objective in the taxi market operation, can be thought of as the social welfare
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that is given by the market allocation x. The authority needs to design a fare system
t(·) that satisfies both passengers and drivers at maximum, to achieve the maximum
social welfare. The utility function for the driver u(x, θ) implies that the driver
prefers to earn a higher fare in a particular trip so he or she can extract a sort of
profit, while the principal does not because a higher fare yields less demand for taxi,
which reflects utility of passengers. Since the monetary transfer t(θi) is primarily a
function of distance, the major determinant of utility of both principal and driver is
the distance. Without loss of generality, any fare systems presented to the drivers is
assumed to be a fare system that maximizes the authority’s utility, and that is the
maximum social welfare of the taxi market, if the authority designs the fare system
under perfect information about distances θ for all trips.
The other component of a mechanism is a message of the players that conveys
the players’ hidden type to a principal. In general, a mechanism defines a message
µ ∈ M , where µ is a function that represents how players announce their hidden
characteristic θ. Suppose that, for instance, a taxi driver makes a trip with 10 miles
and the fare increases by a dollar per mile without a baseline fare. The driver can
charge more than 10 dollars by cheating and adding travel distance about 10 miles
in a circuitous route to his passengers. If he normally put one additional mile on
the fare, his message, the announcement of the distance, is µ(θi) = θi + 1. The
message is only for a specific trip, and he might have different scheme for a different
trip, so that the message can be treated as a random variable, denoted µi(θ), drawn
along a road network as a σ-algebra M . The primary task in the mechanism design
is thus to find a monetary transfer t∗(θ) that leads players to announce their true
characteristics through the message space M , and the existence of the monetary
transfer is guaranteed by the revelation principle. But I ignore the role of message in
the taxi market mechanism with the assumption that the announced distance at the
end of taxi trip is to be true distance in which the driver has been driven through a
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route.11
The next is to define an objective of the principal and the players in the mech-
anism. Let θ−i = (θ1, . . . , θi−1, θi+1, . . . , θI) be a vector of all possible alternative
trips’ distance for a trip i. Since the utility level is conditional on utilities of all
possible alternative trips in which these utility levels depend upon the probability
of finding passengers, and since the authority has an uncertainty about how drivers
choose the distance of trip i, the objective function is an expected utility, rather than
a deterministic, we can think of this as applying a Bayesian game with incomplete
information. Here, I consider a representative driver’s expected utility, for a given
allocation {x(θ)}θ∈Θ, as Eθ−i [u(x(θi, θ−i), θi, θ−i)], and the principal’s expected utility
is Eθ [u0(x(θi, θ−i), θ)]. The driver’s expected utility can be interpreted as the driver’s
belief about benefit from a trip i with the distance θi, when the distances of the other
trips are given by θ−i.12 In the same way, the expected utility can be interpreted
as the authority’s belief about benefit of the entire taxi market from the trip i with
the distance θi, when distances of all trips θ = (θ1, . . . , θI) are given. Note that the
utilities of both the authority and the driver are determined by the market allocation
{x(θ)}θ∈Θ that consists of demand for taxi trip y(θi) and the associated fare t(θi). In
other words, the benefit of a trip for drivers and the authority in a taxi market is
given by the demand and the fare system.
11This type of mechanism is called a direct revelation mechanism in which the type space R is
the message space M in the taxi market. In other words, the driver always charge the fare based
on true distance. The meter based taxi fare system is able to achieve this goal because it calculate
the trip distance automatically so the driver has no way to cheat on his passengers about the trip
distance. Since the most of metropolitan taxi authorities have conducted the meter based system,
the assumption that the message space in the taxi market mechanism is the type space itself is
justifiable.
12I use the notation of Fudenberg and Tirole (1991). They interpret it as “the expectation is
taken over agent i’s beliefs about θ−i conditional on his type θi.” See p.270 of Fudenberg and Tirole
(1991).
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4.3 Mechanism Design of Taxi Industry: Analysis
In this section, I introduce equilibrium conditions in a general mechanism design
model and discuss how it can be applied to the taxi market analysis. With the
equilibrium conditions, I analyze a taxi market under the notion that the spatial
distribution of passengers is non-uniform over a region so the probability of finding
the next passengers after a given taxi trip is different at different locations and times.
The spatial distribution plays a role to consider as heterogeneous trip characteristics
at various locations, where origin and destination have different quantity demanded
for taxi trip so that the drivers can discrimination against certain trips not only by
the distance but also the probability to fine the next passenger at the destination
of a trip. In order to demonstrate drivers’ route choice and the associated utility
for a given fare system, I define a concept of a well-defined market, and provide a
mathematical logical evaluation as to how the trip distance that is given by the trip
route choice determines market allocation, which are summarized by Lemma 4.3.2.1
and Theorem 4.3.2.1. Finally I show a unique and socially efficient single taxi fare
system cannot exist for the heterogeneous trip characteristics, which is presented in
Proposition 4.3.2.1.
4.3.1 Equilibrium of the Mechanism
Because the demand cannot be directly controlled by the authority, the authority
can achieve its maximum utility through the fare system, and the Pareto efficiency
of the fare and the associated allocation {x(θ)}θ∈Θ can be argued. The theory of
mechanism design provides a condition in which players in a mechanism are like to
accept a monetary transfer, announce their true characteristics to the public, and
eventually implement a decision function that is proposed by the principal. This can
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be summarized by the following inequality:
Eθ−i [u(x(θi, θ−i), θi, θ−i)] ≥ Eθ−i
[
u(x(θˆi, θ−i), θi, θ−i)
]
, ∀i = 1, . . . , I (4.2)
where θˆi ∈ Θi is an announced type of the player i, drawn from Θi, a set of all possible
types of the player. This inequality is called incentive compatibility (IC) condition,
and since the IC is defined on the expected utility, it is a Bayesian IC.
In order for an equilibrium be exist, in a game situation, the utility function as a
payoff of players has to be bounded. The Bayesian IC (4.2) plays a role to specify an
upper bound of the players’ utility. And the lower bound is given by a feasibility of
the payoff with respect to strategy profile, called individual rationality (IR). Here, I
state an IR condition for taxi drivers as:
Eθ−i [u(x(θi, θ−i), θi, θ−i)] ≥ u, (4.3)
where u is a reservation utility of drivers. It can be thought as a fixed cost of a trip, if
the utility is monetary profit of the trip. By the two boundary conditions IC and IR,
the utility can be defined as a bounded function u : Θ 7→ [u, u(θˆi)], so the expected
utility Eθ−i [u(x(θi, θ−i), θi, θ−i)] does.
Let θi be the optimal distance along the optimal route for a trip i, and let θˆi be
a distance that maximizes driver’s utility. The implication of the Bayesian IC in the
taxi market mechanism is that the drivers are willing to take passengers, given by
the demand y(θi), under a fare system t(θi) from the authority. The fare system,
in addition, eliminates any incentives to make distance θˆi differ from the optimal
distance θi so the driver always drives along the optimal route. In other words, the
fare system t(·) yields higher utility for the drivers when they make a trip through a
route with θi than any other trip routes with θˆi. The taxi demand function y(θi) is
called implementable if the fare system satisfies the Bayesian IC condition. The taxi
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market allocation {x(θ)}θ∈Θ is called truthfully implementable if the demand function
is implementable and the message space of the mechanism that is associated with the
allocation is the type space.13
The theory also provides a criterion for the principal that is able to evaluate
whether the market allocation {x(θ)}θ∈Θ yields a socially optimal allocation. Holm-
ström and Myerson (1983) proposes a definition that an incentive compatible alloca-
tion is ex-ante efficient if and only if there does not exist any incentive compatible
allocation that yield better outcomes for both players and the principal.14 The term
ex-ante efficiency allows an analysis of the model to examine whether an allocation
in a taxi market mechanism achieves the socially optimum, by implementing proper
license issuing and fare charging system. If the taxi market authority designs an op-
timal fare system and equips it to its drivers properly, for example, the system leads
the drivers always taking the optimal route so the passengers are able to create taxi
demand based on a certain belief that taxi trips are always made along the optimal
route.
4.3.2 Analysis of Taxi Fare System
In this section, I introduce the concept of a well-defined taxi market, and demonstrate
taxi drivers’ attitude towards the risk of vacancy cruising and the effect of their
attitude towards this on the efficiency of allocation. Then I examine under what
condition a unique and ex-ante efficient allocation can exist. The underlying reasoning
is that the drivers have a preference to be in locations when they are looking for
13The property is called revelation principle for Bayesian Nash Equilibrium in which the allocation
x(θi, θ−i) satisfies the Bayesian IC (4.2), and the revelation principle that provides enough incentive
to the players announcing their true characteristics. See p.256 of Fudenberg and Tirole (1991)
14Holmström and Myerson (1983)’s definition covers interim and ex-post efficiency allocation. The
term ex-ante is more appropriate for taxi market because a taxi trip is made by passengers who
decides to take taxi, out of the other travel mode such as driving their own car, or various mass
transit modes. The interim and ex-post efficiencies are infeasible, or ineffective for the passengers’
travel mode decision, and thus for the taxi market mechanism it would be better to argue about
ex-ante efficiency.
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passengers based on prior beliefs about the probability of finding their next potential
passengers. These prior beliefs can be modeled as a spatial distribution of potential
taxi passengers over the region. Furthermore, there exists a distinction between more
or less preferable locations, as long as the distribution is not uniform. The concept of
a well-defined taxi market is thus to distinguish the taxi drivers’ preference over the
spatial distribution into the most preferable and the least preferable locations, and
model how the drivers behave differently across the different locations.15
A well-defined taxi market is a place where drivers can find passengers to fill up
empty trips with the least risk. Let the spatial distribution of potential passengers
be the most dense in the well-defined market, and dispersed over the other locations.
This spatial distribution implies that the probability of finding the next passengers
near the place of destination of a trip gets smaller as the trip distance from the well-
defined market gets further. This set-up provides an identical model of taxi trip to the
conventional theory of choice under uncertainty. Let f(·) be a probability (spatial)
distribution function of finding next passenger. Now I construct the mathematical
definition of well-defined taxi market as follows:
Definition 4.3.2.1 (Well-defined Taxi Market). An origin (a destination) of a taxi
trip i is called a “well-defined taxi market” if the probability distribution function f(θi)
is monotonic decreasing (increasing) in θi for a destination (origin) of the trip i.
Figure 4.2 presents the distribution of NYC yellow cab trip origins in Manhattan
below 59th street. The most dense location in the Panel (a) plot is at 42nd street and
Broadway, the Times Square area, and it is an example of the most well-defined taxi
market in the region because no other location has higher frequency of passengers in
the region.16
15The distinction, made by introducing the well-defined taxi market, can also be interpreted as
a consideration of taxi drivers’ heterogeneous behavior on location choice. Treating all taxi trips
within a region as a single homogeneous trip is thus unable to model the taxi drivers’ clustering
behavior toward several trip dense locations.
16The data of the figure 1 is given by a random sample with 300,000 number of observations,
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Figure 4.2: Spatial Distribution of NYC Taxicabs
Assume that a fare system for a taxi market with a fixed initial fare. It is clear that
a fare system should be increasing in trip distance. For instance, the unit fare system,
the most general regulated taxi fare system, is a uniformly increasing function of trip
distance, whereas the drivers’ expected utility is monotonically increasing, in general,
by the definition of risk aversion. In the taxi market mechanism, as I established in
Section 4.2.2, the taxi fare for a trip i is characterized by t(θi), the monetary transfer
rule that is given by the taxi authority, and the taxi driver of trip i has a utility
ui(x(θi, θ−i), θi, θ−i), which is strictly increasing in the given fare t(θi). From now, let
denote t(θi) be the unit fare, and u(θi) be the driver’s utility for a trip i. Recall θˆi, the
announced type of player i for a given mechanism. Let θi and θˆi be the optimal and
actual distance from the origin to the destination of a trip i. The optimal distance
θi is the distance that yields the maximum utility to the passengers for a given fare
t(θi), and it determines demand for taxi trip y(θi). The actual distance θˆi is the
distance that the driver selects for the trip i by her route choice, in order to achieve
the maximum utility. Assume that the optimal distance θi is common knowledge that
drawn from New York City Taxicab Limousine Commission’s GPS tracking data during 2008 to
2010. Note that I use the standard random sampling without any stratification for the entire region
of NYC yellowcabs, and draw the histogram and the scatter plot only for midtown and downtown
Manhattan from 300,000 random sample.
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Figure 4.3: Probability (Spatial) Distribution Function: Examples
drivers and passengers know about.
In order to build a model with heterogeneous characteristics of taxi trip, here I
define probability distribution functions for the trip from a well-defined market to a
non well-defined market, denoted f(θ), and the trip from a non well-defined market
to the well-defined market, denoted g(θ). By the definition 2.3.1, f(θ) is monotonic
decreasing, and g(θ) is monotonic increasing in distance θ. As we can see in Figure
4.3 , the probability of finding the next passengers gets smaller as the distance gets
further from the well-defined market, presented in panel (a), and the probability gets
larger as the distance gets further from non well-defined market.17 Let F (·) and
G(·) be cumulative distribution functions of f(·) and g(·) respectively. These spatial
distributions allow the drivers to define expected return finding a frequency of fast
fare of taxi trips, under a given fare system, as
∫
t(θ)dF (θ) for the trip from a well-
defined market to a non well-defined market, and
∫
t(θ)dG(θ) for the trip from a non
well-defined market to a well-defined market.
The assumption behind the expected return is the following: the taxi drivers
expect monetary income from a trip based on the given fare and the future uncertainty
17 Note that longer distance in g(θ) implies that the trip gets closer to the well-defined market so
the probability goes up as the distance gets far from the non well-defined market.
4. TAXI MARKET MECHANISM 112
about having vacant cruise for an extended period of time. So, the drivers’ trip
decision is made by comparison between trip fare, the expected return fare, and their
own utility. Thus, a driver extracts a fare rent from his passenger in case where he
feels the trip length is sub-optimal given his utility. Assume that the drivers have no
right to refuse passengers for any trip i, so that they are only able to fit their utility
by adjusting the trip distance θˆi. Let B(X) be a space of the utility function, which is
bounded. The necessary conditions for the existence of θˆi in taxi market mechanism
are summarized by following lemma:
Lemma 4.3.2.1 (Existence of the trip distance θˆi). If the fare system t(θ) is defined
on the space B(X) and increasing in trip distance θ, then:
(a) there exists a unique θˆi such that
u(θˆi) =
∫
t(θi)dF (θi), (4.4)
for all trip i with the probability distribution function f(θi).
(b) In the same way, there exists a unique θˆj such that
u(θˆj) =
∫
t(θj)dG(θj), (4.5)
for all trip j with the probability distribution function g(θj).
Lemma 4.3.2.1 provides a necessary condition to build the model for the taxi drivers’
trip distance decision based on the comparison between θi and θˆi. Recall the Bayesian
IC (4.2). By examining the inequality of (4.2), whether a given fare system leads the
drivers to choose the optimal route, which yields the optimal distance, can be argued.
Since the actual distance θˆi for a trip i is determined by the condition (4.4) or (4.5),
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we can demonstrate under what conditions θˆi satisfies the Bayesian IC. This analysis
is summarized by the following theorem:
Theorem 4.3.2.1 (Truthful Implementation of Taxi Demand). The taxi demand
function y(θ), and the associated taxi market allocation x(θ) = (y(θ), t(θ)) is truthfully
implementable, if the fare system t(θ) yields
(a) for all trip i with f(·),
θˆi ≥ θi such that u(θˆi) =
∫
t(θi)dF ;
(b) for all trip j with g(·),
θˆj ≥ θj such that u(θˆj) =
∫
t(θj)dG.
The implication of Theorem 4.3.2.1 can be interpreted with the graphs in Figure
4.4. As shown in Panel (a), the drivers can earn more than they expect if the driver’s
utility u(θˆi) is defined below at the fare at θ, which is t(θi). In this case, the drivers
have no incentive to make a longer trip than the optimal, and it satisfies the Bayesian
IC (4.2). On the other hand, the case where the utility u(θˆi) is defined above at the
fare at θ that is t(θi), as shown in Panel (b) of Figure 4.3, leads the drivers to make
longer trip than the optimal so it does not satisfy the Bayesian IC. Non truthfully
implementable taxi demand implies that the drivers are likely to make longer distance
trips than the optimal, and passengers who know about this tendency do not take a
taxi for their trip, while passengers who do not recognize this tendency might still use
a taxi service. This reflects the adjustment of the demand y(θ), and it is obviously
decreasing in this case.
In order to argue about efficiency of a taxi fare system, here I consider a round
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Figure 4.4: Comparison and Distance Determination
trip that goes from an origin to a destination, then goes back to the origin.18 Note
that the actual passengers in the trip do not necessarily have to be the same for both
legs of the trip, so that the drivers face the prospect of finding passengers on the way
back to the origin when they arrive the destination. Suppose that there exists a fare
system t∗(θi) that yields the expected return, which is the same as the drivers’ utility
u(θi), for all trip i with f(θi). Without loss of generality, the fare system t∗(·), as a
monetary transfer in a taxi market mechanism, yields ex-ante efficient allocation for
trip i. But it is not for the other trip j with g(θj), as long as the trip j has a different
probability distribution. This analysis is summarized by the following proposition:
Proposition 4.3.2.1. If the cumulative probability distribution F (·) is the first order
stochastic dominance of the cumulative distribution function G(·), then a unique fare
system t∗(·), which yields ex-ante allocation, does not exist, for any round trips with
F (·) and G(·).
The proposition provides an analysis of taxi market that an inflexible fare system
18Round trip helps to build up a model for taxi market mechanism when the spatial distribution
of passengers matter. In other words, the characteristics of trip is heterogeneous due to non-uniform
distribution of passengers over the region, and this yields different incentive structure to the drivers
for each trip. So the efficiency of a fare system can be compared between trips with different
probabilities of return fares.
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cannot fit a market with heterogeneous taxi trips due to the spatial distribution of
passengers.19 Now I consider a round trip between well-defined taxi markets, as
an implication that the spatial distribution is uniform. This analysis requires an
additional assumption that the trip has an origin and a destination, which have
the same probability, and the probability does not change over the distance. This
uniform distribution is identical to both ways for any round trips with the above
characteristic so it is F (θ) = G(θ) for all θ. Even though the round trip case between
well-defined markets does not imply there always exists a unique t∗(·) with ex-ante
efficient allocation, it shows the t∗(·) can possibly exist on the round trip with F (θ) =
G(θ).
Proposition 4.3.2.1 and the analysis of the round trip with F (θ) = G(θ), for all
θ, shows that the necessary condition for the existence of an ex-ante efficient market
mechanism through a particular fare system t∗(·) is to equalize the probabilities of
finding the next passengers at both origin and destination. In other words, providing
clustered locations for taxi passengers can make the socially efficient market allocation
through t(·). This analysis is thus providing the implication that turning a non well-
defined market into a well-defined market should be the authority’s policy of highest
priority, because this allows the authority finds a fare system that makes passengers
and drivers better off by reducing inefficiency of their taxi market allocation.20
19Note that this does not necessary to be a support argument of negotiated fare system because it
is affected by information structure in which I do not impose on the taxi market mechanism model.
This analysis cannot expand to further details about how a negotiated fare work, without careful
discussion and consideration of the information structure between drivers and passengers.
20Flexible fare system might not be a feasible alternative, in order to achieve the ex-ante efficient
allocation because it charges different trip fares between passengers who make the trip from a well-
defined taxi market to a non well-defined market, and the passengers from a non well-defined market
to a well-defined market, even if their trips have the same trip length.
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4.4 Issues in Empirical Analysis
In this section, I discuss issues in an empirical analysis to examine the theoretical
predictions, which is addressed by the mechanism design model for taxi market in
Section 4.4.3. First I derive an observable econometric model that is associated with
the Bayesian incentive compatibility condition (4.2). Then I discuss characteristics of
the New York City TLC’s taxicab trip data and variables that I use in the econometric
model estimation. Finally, given the scale of NYC’s yellow taxi markets, I introduce
a computational method, which is implemented in a parallel computing system, for
large-scale generalized methods of moment estimations of the econometric model.
4.4.1 An Observable Model for Taxi Market Mechanism
As I discussed in the section 4.2.1, taxi trip demand y(θi) is implementable if it
satisfies the Bayesian incentive compatibility condition (4.2). The implementability
of a taxi trip demand means that a driver is willing to make a trip for passengers in
the region that a given fare system satisfies the inequality (4.2). Let δ be a parameter
that is the difference between the left and the right hand side of the inequality (4.2),
defined as:
Eθ−i [u(x(θi, θ−i), θi, θ−i)]− Eθ−i [u(x(θˆi, θ−i), θi, θ−i)] = δ, ∀i = 1, . . . , I, (4.6)
where θˆi is the actual distance and θi is the optimal distance of a trip i. The pa-
rameter δ offers us a way to examine whether a particular taxi fare system yields
ex-ante efficient allocation and implements taxi demand by leading drivers to choose
an optimal route, and δ becomes positive. On the other hand, a negative δ implies
the fare system is ex-ante inefficient and the fare system cannot implement the taxi
trip demand truthfully. By estimating δ and evaluating its sign, therefore, a partic-
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ular taxi fare system can be examined empirically whether it leads drivers to choose
optimal routes.
In order to identify the parameter δ, the driver’s expected utility function Eθ−i [u(·, θ−i), θi, θ−i)],
which is a composite function of the expectation Eθ−i [·, θi, θ−i], the utility ui(·, θ−i),
and the allocation x(·, θ−i), has to be identified, and the identification of the compo-
sition function using taxi trip data is irrelevant. For this reason, I consider another
way that specifies β0 = θi − θˆi, the difference between the optimal distance θi and
the actual distance θˆi of a trip i. The actual distance θi is longer than the optimal
distance θˆi if a given fare system is ex-ante inefficient, and therefore, the sign of β0
is consistent with the δ in (4.6). The conditional expectation equation that identifies
β0 given a fare rule, information over time and space is then:
E
[
θi − θˆi
∣∣∣t(θˆi),Ωs,Ωt] = β0, ∀i = 1, . . . , I, (4.7)
where t(θi) is total fare, for a trip i with θi, Ωs is an information set for the spatial
distribution of passengers, and Ωt is information set of time. Note that the spatial
information set Ωs can be thought as a road network because it has to be observable
and known to all drivers. By Theorem 4.3.2.1, θˆi is the actual distance of the taxi
trip i that gives equivalent utility to the expected fare of θi, the optimal distance,
conditional on the spatial distribution of passengers. So θˆi can be treated as a distance
from the driver’s utility u(·, θ−i), θi, θ−i), and since θ−i contains the optimal distances
of all other trips, the model needs to consider the road network Ωs to control for
θ−i, the optimal distances of all other trips.21 With data of the road network for Ωs,
time for Ωt, and the fare system t(·), the parameter β0 can be correctly identified and
21The spatial distribution of taxi passengers is not directly observable because it is based on
individual drivers’ experiences, but it can be assumed that is indirectly observable by the combination
of time and road network. For instance, taxi drivers have their way to obtain information about
where and when they can most likely to find passengers. So the place where a driver is at can be
chosen based on time and the location. In general, theory of trip is selected by the driver based on
their expectation of cruising for a fare and precise destination is selected by the passenger
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estimated via the model (4.7).
4.4.2 Data
In order to estimate β0 to compare the effects of various fare rules on trip distance, I
use New York City Taxicab trip record data. The New York City Taxi & Limousine
Commission (TLC) has selected an electronic taximeter system, under a program
named the Taxicab Passengers Enhancement Project (T-PEP) and these meters are
now deployed in all its medallion taxicabs. The main purpose of installing the new
meters was to provide credit card payment as an option for the taxicab passengers.
Monitoring drivers’ individual operation is another desired goal of the project so the
T-PEP system records every single trip made by all New York City medallion taxicab
drivers, and reports the record to the TLC’s server immediately. The record contains
geographic coordinates of both origin and destination of individual trip with the date
and time of when the trip began and ended. It also includes travel time, distance,
and the associated itemized taxi fares. This study utilizes 378,532,118 trips records
that have been collected from January 2008 to November 2010.
From the taxi trip record data, I can have θˆi, the actual trip distance in the region
for individual trip i from the data because taxi fare is calculated based on the recorded
distance and travel time. But the data has no appropriate measure of θi, the optimal
distance in the taxi market. So I use the shortest distance between an origin and
a destination (O-D) on the road network around the New York City metropolitan
area, under the assumption that the optimal distance, as common knowledge for
everyone who is involved in taxi market, is the shortest distance because travel time
is uncertain due to the unexpected traffic condition. The shortest distance along
the road network for an individual trip can be obtained on geographic polygons and
the associated road network layer. The reason for using geographic polygons, rather
than to use geographic coordinate themselves, is to reduce the number of all possible
4. TAXI MARKET MECHANISM 119
(a) TAZ Polygons and its centroids. (b) Centroid connectors
Figure 4.5: Traffic Analysis Zone (TAZ): John. F. Kennedy Airport
O-D combinations. Note that the number of combinations is almost infinite if the
geographic polygons are not used, so that the 3.782 × 1016 pairs of distances would
have to be calculated to cover the New York City metropolitan region.22
The geographic polygons that I use to calculate the optimal distance θi is Traf-
fic Analysis Zone (TAZ) polygons from the New York Metropolitan Transportation
Council (NYMTC)’s Best Practice Model, a Geographic Information System (GIS)
model for analyses of New York City metropolitan area’s transportation systems.
Figure 4.5 shows the TAZ system that I use for the distance calculation. There are
two more alternative standards of geographic polygon, which are zipcode and Census
tract, but TAZ polygon is the most detailed geographic region in terms of the size be-
cause a TAZ polygon is bounded by road and street network. In other words, a single
TAZ polygon does not contain any streets and roads inside, so that it can be used
to analyze transportation systems without eliminating any road network information
and they are bounded by the road network. Applying TAZ polygons plays a role of
subdividing an interval of the geographic coordinates, into a manageable number of
22The origin and the destination location of an individual taxi trip have been recorded as geo-
graphic coordinates, longitude and latitude. Each record takes six decimal places in the original
dataset and the interval of the longitude and latitude of the origins are [−75.1994,−72.0103] and
[39.5401, 42.0339], and the the destinations are [−79.4417,−71.9881] and [39.6439, 42.0558] respec-
tively.
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(a) TAZ Polygons and its centroids. (b) Centroid connectors
Figure 4.6: Traffic Analysis Zone (TAZ): John. F. Kennedy Airport
strata, which indicate street and road blocks. The trip within a TAZ polygon is as-
sumed to have the same optimal distance so that the number of the optimal distances
trip pairs (origin and destination) that cover the entire region becomes manageable.23
The way to calculate a road network O-D distance is following: First, compute
geographic centroid of every polygon. Then calculate linear distance from the cen-
troid to the closest point on the road network. This linear distance is called centroid
connector, and it plays a role of imposing a penalty on the optimal distance calcu-
lations.24 Finally, calculate a distance along the road network between the points
where centroid connector of the origin polygon touches the road network, and the
point in which the destination’s centroid connector touches the road network. Even-
tually we get the shortest distance by adding the road network distance with two
centroid connectors’ distances.
Panel (a) of Figure 4.6 shows an example of centroid of a polygon, and the asso-
23The NYC taxicab data requires 3,430 and 3,445 TAZ polygons for origin and destination re-
spectively to compute the optimal distances that corresponds to each observations. The number
of distance pairs is thus 11,816,350. The manageable number means that 11,816,350 number of
distances are more easy to calculate than 378 million squared, the number of O-D pairs in the data.
24The centroid connector can be more than two within a polygon. It depends on how many roads
and streets the polygon has so the number of centroid connectors and the number of roads and
streets are matched to eliminate the irrelavent distance calculation case in which there is a road
closer to the centroid but the connector links to a distant road.
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ciated centroid connector is presented in Panel (b). Panel (b) also shows an example
of the optimal distance calculation scheme from Grand Central Train Station to JFK
Airport in New York City. The meaning of the optimal distance can be varied by
considering many different traffic condition factors such as congestion in certain ar-
eas, rush hour travel, and so on. But these factors are all randomly and exogenously
given for most taxi passengers, and it is difficult to present prior to when a passengers
plan to make a taxi trip. This ambiguity of traffic condition is the reason to use the
shortest-physical distance as a measure of the optimal distance. The measurement
error, caused by eliminating traffic conditions, is assumed to be random across the
road network.
4.4.3 Large Scale GMM Estimation
In this section, I introduce a large scale linear Generalized Method of Moments
(GMM) estimation procedure for the New York City taxicab data. Recall that the
observable model for the Bayesian IC condition (4.6). That is:
E
[
θi − θˆi
∣∣∣t(θˆi),Ωs,Ωt] = β0. (4.8)
The ideal outcome of β0 is zero which implies that the fare system t(·) is well designed
and implemented for drivers, so they do not need to make longer trips than optimal.
By assuming that the parameter β0 is constant in the presence of the proper control
variables for fare system t(·), information set over time Ωt, and spatial distribution
Ωs, the model (4.8) becomes an econometric model for θi−θˆi with constant parameter
β0.
In order to estimate β0 consistently, therefore, here I consider a linear model that
is associated with the observable model (4.8) as:25
yi = β0 + xiβ + ziγ + i, (4.9)
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where yi = θi − θˆi is the difference between the optimal distance and the recorded
distance, xi is a vector of control variables for fare, and zi is a vector of control
variables for time and date of a trip i, so that zi ∈ Ωt. I obtain yi by substracting the
recorded distance in the taxi data from the calculated O-D distance that corresponds
to the trip. xi consists of all itemized fares and its related variables such as payment
method, specialized fare zone (dummies), number of passengers, vacancy time from
the end of previous trip. zi consists of hours, weekday, and month dummy variables,
which are recorded when a trip begins based on origin time and date.26
These yi, xi, and zi can be obtained from the data but xi obviously depends on the
location and route of the trip, which is represented by the information set Ωs, drawn
from spatial distribution of passengers. To control for endogeneity of xi, caused by
the absence of the information set Ωs, I consider a vector of instrumental variables
wi that belong to the information set and are exogenous to the error term, such that
wi ∈ Ωs and E[i|wi] = 0. The NYC taxicab data has geographic coordinates of
origin and destination locations, and since the origin and destination of a trip are
determined solely by passengers, it is exogenous to the drivers. Furthermore, the
location of origins and destinations is a part of the road network, so the vector of
instrumental variables with location indicators can be E[i|wi] = 0 and wi ∈ Ωs. The
location indicators, which are used as instrumental variables, are dummy variables
for ZIP Code polygons of origin and destination locations.27
25The simplest estimator of β0 is the sample mean but this estimator may be inconsistent due to
model misspecification that comes from the following way. Suppose that β0 is estimated by sample
mean as βˆ0 = N−1
∑
i(θi− θˆi). This simple estimation requires the structural model θi− θˆ = β0 + i
with the assumption that the error term  has mean zero, so  is eliminated asymptotically when
the sample mean operator is taken. The justification of the sample mean as a consistent estimator
of β0 is then proved by assuming that the error term i has mean zero, but this assumption does
not make sense as the way how the parameter β0 is derived theoretically.
26Since the data also contains time and date, recorded at the destination of a trip, zi can either
be dummies for origin, or destination time and date, or both. But most trips end up within an hour
so that origin time and destination time are virtually equivalent. And since the model is to analyze
ex-ante efficiency, I choose the origin time and date as control variables for the information set Ωt.
27Note that wi, the vector of instrumental variables, contains zi, the vector of time and date
indicators, under the assumption that the time and date of a trip are also exogenously given to the
drivers.
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The data only have geographic coordinates of origin and destination points of
individual trip. There are several ways to use these coordinates to control for the
location and time simultaneously. I use ZIP Code polygons of corresponding origin
and destination coordinates under the assumption that drivers are able to figure out
the location and the associated trip route immediately after they take passengers into
the taxi, and that procedures are assumed to be based on ZIP Code-wise level spatial
distribution, which is able to contain buildings and streets, unlike TAZ polygons.
The reason to use ZIP Code polygons, rather than TAZ, is that the number of
observations within a TAZ polygon is quite small and becomes too small to compute
a matrix inverse of
∑
i w
′
iwi, especially for low frequency origin and destination area.
By expanding the geographic polygon a bit, we solve this computation issue.28 Since
ZIP Code polygons are wider than TAZ, each polygons contain more observations so
it provide safer indicator variables against the computational failure of the matrix
inversion. By using ZIP Code polygons, in addition, the number of indicator vari-
ables as instruments can be reduced. There are 865 5-digit ZIP Code polygons that
corresponds to 3,430 and 3,445 TAZ polygons for origin and destination respectively,
in the region where I map the taxi data and analyze it. So there are 3,430 times 3,445
of origin and destination dummy variables for TAZ polygons becomes 865 times 865
ZIP Code polygon dummies. The matrix computation for the estimation is thus to
be much easier when the instrumental variables for ZIP Code polygons are used.
The most notable issue on estimation of the parameters β0, β, and γ in (4.9) is
size of the data. The entire sample has 293.7 million observations, and this number
of observations takes 1.51 gigabytes for a variable. As I used in the estimation, 152
instrumental variables are being used and a matrix of the instrumental variables in
dense form takes 229.52 gigabytes. There is no programming routine that can handle
28Note that the estimation of the parameters β0 and β in (4.9) requires to compute inverse of∑
i w
′
iwi as an instrumental variable estimation. The numerical computation of the inverse matrix
might fail if some of indicator vectors in wi have too few observation of ones, out of the entire
observations because an algorithm for the matrix inversion may recognize the matrix as a singular.
4. TAXI MARKET MECHANISM 124
this kind of large scale data matrix on a serial computing machine that has a single
processor. So I develop a sparse matrix multiplication programming subroutine and
apply it to the GMM estimation. The subroutine allows to implement large scale
matrix multiplicaiton on a parallel computing system via a language-independent
parallel programming and communication protocol such as Message Passing Interface
(MPI). Let θ be a vector of the parameters in (4.9), xi and wi be a vector of inde-
pendent variables, and a vector of instrumental variables respectively. The the GMM
estimator of θ is then given by:
θˆ =
[(
N∑
i=1
x′iwi
)
Σˆ
(
N∑
i=1
w′ixi
)]−1( N∑
i=1
x′iwi
)
Σˆ
(
N∑
i=1
x′iyi
)
, (4.10)
where Σ is a weighting matrix that controls for heteroskedasticity of the error term.29
The estimation requires to compute a transposed matrix-matrix multiplication
∑N
i=1 w
′
ixi,
a vector-matrix multiplication
∑N
i=1 w
′
iyi, and a matrix-diagonal-matrix multiplica-
tion
∑N
i=1 u
2
i ·w′iwi. In the entire sample case, the multiplication
∑N
i=1 w
′
ixi becomes
a transposed of 293,693,496 by 62 matrix multiplies a 293,693,496 by 152 matrix.
The subroutine and the associated parallel computing program work for large
scale linear algebraic operation. Since xi and wi contain many indicator variables,
the matrices contain many zero elements, so the subroutine bring computational
29The ways to obtain the optimal weighting matrix for linear GMM estimation begins with com-
puting residuals from two-stage least square (2SLS) estimator ˆˆθ as:
ˆˆ
θ =
( N∑
i=1
x′iwi
)(
N∑
i=1
w′iwi
)−1( N∑
i=1
w′ixi
)−1( N∑
i=1
x′iwi
)(
N∑
i=1
w′iwi
)−1( N∑
i=1
x′iyi
)
.
Then the (2SLS) residuals can be computed as ˆˆui = yi − xiˆˆθ. With the residual, the optimal
weighting matrix Σˆ is given by:
Σˆ =
(
N−1
N∑
i=1
u2i ·w′iwi
)−1
.
Note that a matrix representation of Σˆ is W′ΛW, where Λ is a diagonal matrix with Λii = u2i , for
all i = 1, . . . , N . Computation of Σˆ is thus done by applying the parallel sparse matrix multiplication
subroutine with a diagonal matrix that is in between given two matrices.
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efficiency by treating the matrices as a sparse form.30 The other advantage is parallel
implementation of the computation. Even if the matrices are stored in a sparse form,
they are still too large to handle by a serial computing system or programming, which
deals with a computation problem in a single computing processor, because of memory
limitations.31 Note that Compressed Sparse Row (CSR) form, a sparse matrix storage
form that I use in the subroutine, of xi requires 15.95 gigabytes, and 13.44 gigabytes
memory space for wi. The parallel computing divides the matrix computation into
several pieces such that the output matrix of each pieces does not depend on the
others, the machine then performs the computation independently at the assigned
processors, and then collects the output matrix to the assigned processors. Parallel
computing thus allows that each computing processor is assigned a manageable size
of matrix so that the parallel computing algorithm can handle a large scale matrix
computation problem.
4.5 Empirical Analysis
From the observable model (4.8) and the Theorem 4.3.2.1, two theoretical predictions
about fare system can be addressed using the parameter β0. A negative β0 estimate
implies that a given fare system does not satisfy the Bayesian IC so the drivers are
likely to make longer trip than optimal. In the same way, a positive β0 implies that
a fare system provides enough incentive to the drivers to make the optimal length
30Scalable Linear Algebra Package (ScaLAPACK), the most widely used library of high-
performance linear algebra routines for distributed-memory message-passing MIMD, does not pro-
vide sparse matrix computation. There are some scientific computation programming libraries that
support sparse matrix computation in parallel but no libraries support a transposed matrix-matrix
multiplication because once a matrix is stored in sparse form, then it is hard to transpose.
31The memory size that requires to deal with a real number, as known as floating point number,
is 4 bytes on a 32-bit computing system, and 8 bytes on a 64-bit system. Since the data matrix of
the independent variable vector xi, for the entire sample, has 293,693,496 × 62 numbers of elements,
it requires approximately 67.83 gigabytes in 32-bit system, and 135.66 gigabytes in 64-bit system.
The maximum memory allocation per processor within a CPU is known to be 32 gigabytes, and
therefore, no serial computing system are capable of holding the data matrices of wi, xi, and the
vector of dependent variable yi, and performing computation at the same time.
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of trip. Under the predictions around β0, I test the truthful implementability of the
several different taxi fare systems under different trip characteristics using the New
York City medallion taxicab data, introduced in Section 4.3.2.
4.5.1 Identifying (Natural) Experimental Fields
During 2008 to 2010, when the data had been collected, the New York City medallion
taxicab had unit fare rule for a trip within New York City, and negotiated fare rule for
a trip beyond the City. The New York City TLC specified also some special fare rules
for some particular trips such as flat fare between New York County (Manhattan)
and JFK airport.32 The variety of NYC medallion taxicab’s fare rule provides several
testable hypotheses about how the fare rules effect drivers’ behavior differently. First,
since the NYC taxicab had both unit and negotiated fare zones, the estimates of β0
from both zones allow to compare which fare system best implements the demand for
taxi service. Second, it also has flat fare zone so the comparison between unit and
negotiated fare can be extended and examined the ex-ante superiority of a system.
Finally, the data is capable of identifying trips i) from a (relatively) well-defined
market to a (relatively) non well-defined market, ii) from a non well-defined market
to a well-defined market, and iii) between well-defined markets.
Furthermore, this identification of the different trip characteristics can be applied
on the different fare rules. For example, finding passengers inside New York City
is easier than outside of the City, and the trip beyond the City has negotiated fare
rule, so that the trip from the City to the outside of the city can be examined as a
trip for which the origin is a well-defined market and the destination is a non well-
defined market, under negotiated fare system. The opposite way trip can be examined
as a trip for which the origin is a non well-defined market and the destination is a
32These particular fare rules that have been effected during 2008 to 2010 are written in chapter
54 of the NYCTLC rule book. The rules were effective for the trip between Newark airport and the
City, Westchester County and other locations.
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Table 4.1: Frequency of Taxi Trips in New York City Boroughs (Weekdays)
Peak Time (Morning) Peak Time (Evening) Weekday
Origin Destination Origin Destination Origin Destination
Richmond 2,358 3,971 2,857 9,403 12,582 40,130
(Staten Island) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Kings 239,129 367,607 528,837 1,674,867 2,493,394 7,126,259
(Brooklyn) (0.006) (0.010) (0.010) (0.032) (0.012) (0.034)
Bronx 29,340 98,659 35,628 163,444 156,802 784,234
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.004)
Queens 990,575 1,362,050 1,584,558 1,471,592 6,777,447 8,003,375
(0.027) (0.037) (0.030) (0.028) (0.032) (0.038)
New York 35,589,615 34,970,168 50,095,673 48,894,388 201,330,894 194,533,903
(Manhattan) (0.966) (0.950) (0.959) (0.936) (0.955) (0.924)
New York City 36,851,017 36,802,455 52,247,553 52,213,694 210,771,119 210,487,901
[0.997] [0.995] [0.996] [0.995] [0.996] [0.995]
Others 119,180 167,742 223,382 257,241 854,216 1,137,434
[0.003] [0.005] [0.004] [0.005] [0.004] [0.005]
Notes: The proportions of trips in each New York City boroughs are reported in parentheses, and
the proportions in square brackets are of the entire trips that are observed at each time durations.
The peak time in morning is between 6 am and 9 am, and the peak time in evening is between 5 pm
and 8 pm.
well-defined market, under the negotiated system.
4.5.2 Additional Aspects of Heterogeneous Trip Characteristics-
Time of Day
In Table 4.1, the observed frequency of the New York City taxicab trips by the
city boroughs and the City metropolitan areas at different times are reported. The
frequency in New York County (Manhattan) at all time, reported in the fifth column,
are about 95% of the entire trips that occur within the New York City. This shows that
no other New York City borough have better taxi market than Manhattan in terms of
probability to find taxi services so it is the most well-defined market in the City. As
the same way, the frequency of the whole New York City takes 99% of the entire trips
around the city metropolitan area at all time so it is the well-defined market, from
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(a) Origin (b) Destination
Figure 4.7: Taxi Trip Frequency Maps by TAZ Polygons
a regional perspective. Another remarkable observation is the difference of frequency
between origin and destination in the region. Manhattan and the rest of New York
City, which I refer to as the well-defined market, have significantly less frequency of
origin than destination, while other regions have higher frequency of destination than
origin.33 This is an indirect evidence of excess supply for Manhattan and the New
York City as the well-defined markets, and excess demand for the other regions, which
are implying the taxi market allocation between drivers and passengers, is socially
inefficient.
Figure 4.7 presents unconditional distributions of taxi trips around New York City
metropolitan area. The polygons in the maps are TAZ blocks, and high density TAZ
block shows up being red. The remarkable pattern that is observed in Table 4.1,
most of trips were reported in Manhattan, seems to be consistent with the pattern in
Figure 4.7. The distribution of trip destination in Panel (b) of Figure 4.7 is a little
more dispersed over the outside of Manhattan that the origin distribution, which is
33The χ2 statistics for 2-way contingency table for morning peak time, from the first to the
second columns in Table 4.1, of the New York City boroughs, from the first row to the fifth row
in Table 4.1, is 129,218.356. The table for evening peak time, and weekday are 700,292.996, and
2,882,135.957 respectively. The χ2 statistics of the table between New York City and the other
regions, the sixth and the seventh rows in Table 4.1, for morning, evening peak time, and weekday,
are 8251.21, 2396.28, and 40464.77 respectively. The p-values of all χ2 statistics are approximately
zeros, regardless of degrees of freedom.
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the pattern that is observed in Table 4.1 too. The distinct pattern of Figure 4.7
shows up at the two airports in New York City. The two TAZ blocks at the outside
of Manhattan with highest density, red colored, are LaGuardia and JFK airports.
It is obvious that large number of passengers are willing to go, or find taxi services
at an airport but those two airports are the unique TAZ blocks, however, which
have the highest density of taxi trips outside of Manhattan. The two unique TAZ
blocks provide chances to demonstrate taxi drivers’ behavior on a particular trip
characteristic such as a trip between a well-defined and another well-defined market,
or a well-defined and a non well-defined market.34 Moreover, since the trip between
JFK airport and Manhattan has fixed fare rule, the trip characteristic under fixed and
unit fare system can be compared with a distinction of the trip between well-defined
and well-defined, and well-defined and non well-defined market.
4.5.3 Model Estimation: The Main Result
The GMM estimates of the model (4.9) with seven different subsamples are reported
in Table 4.2. The sample selection strategy is based on the theoretical prediction,
discussed in section 4.3.2, that taxi drivers are likely to behave differently at the
different locations where fare systems and spatial distribution of passengers differ.
Recall that the fare system of within New York City is unit fare, between the city
and beyond the city is negotiated fare, and there are two special fare zones that the
fixed fare between Manhattan and JFK airport, and from the city to Westchester
or Nassau county. Note that the instrumental variables are the five-digit ZIP Code
dummies of both origin and destination that have greater than 0.1% of observations,
in order to avoid computational failure. As the second to the last column reported,
34The observed sample of taxi trip between well-defined markets is the trip records of Manhattan
and JFK airport, or LaGuardia airport. From the econometric perspective, this particular trip can
hardly be identified within Manhattan because the TAZ blocks are all neighboring each other so
treating the trip within Manhattan as the trip between well-defined market and another well-defined
market. In other words, those two TAZ blocks might be in a single well-defined market.
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the set of instrumental variables for every sample satisfies exclusion restriction that
implies the instrumental variables were appropriately chosen.
The first row of Table 4.2 reports GMM estimates of the target parameter β0. The
β0 estimate of the entire sample, in the first column, is negative and it is statistically
significant. To take the theoretical prediction, given by Theorem 4.3.2.1, into account,
negative β0 implies the inequality θˆi > θi, so the taxi fare system fails to satisfy the
Bayesian IC (4.2) in the sample region. The New York City TLC’s fare system is
therefore not able to control its drivers’ choice of longer route than optimal. The
β0 estimate of the sample within the city in the second column of Table 4.2 is also
negative with strong statistical significance. Unlike the other regions, the Manhattan
trip sample yields positive and significant β0 estimate that implies the satisfaction of
the Bayesian IC (4.2). In other words, the drivers of the New York City taxicabs can
obtain sufficient utility level from a trip with an optimal route only for Manhattan
related trips, under the given New York City TLC’s designated fare system. In overall
metropolitan region, on the other hand, the drivers need to choose a longer route than
optimal, in order to achieve sufficient utility level from the trip.
The frequency pattern, presented in Table 4.1 and Figure 4.7 that 95% of trips
occurred in Manhattan, and 99% in the city, this can thus be explained in part by
the above analysis. In the overall New York City metropolitan region, taxi drivers
are likely to choose longer route that increases fare amount and travel time. If the
passengers know this fact, they are likely to choose the other travel modes that
provides mobility with shorter travel distance, so the overall demand for taxi in the
region may decrease. The consequence of this scenario is therefore clustering into the
region where the drivers can achieve sufficient utility level with an optimal distance
route, and Manhattan is the region, out of any other New York City metropolitan
area.
However, this interpretation of β0 needs to consider also the other explanatory
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Table 4.2: GMM Estimates of Taxi Trip Attributes
New York City Related Trip Manhattan Related Trip
Entire Sample Within From To Within From To
NYC NYC NYC Manhattan Manhattan Manhattan
βˆ0 -0.5009 -0.1696 0.8144 9.7205 0.2286 1.6678 0.4155
(0.044) (0.003) (0.190) (1.801) (0.001) (0.014) (0.033)
Number of Passengers -0.0890 -0.0570 0.1521 -1.0743 -0.0331 0.1401 -0.0827
(0.000) (0.000) (0.015) (0.096) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002)
Total Fare -0.1187 -0.1008 -0.0657 3.5010 -0.0967 -0.1111 -0.1456
(0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.051) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Itemized Fare 0.1117 -0.3006 -1.2376 -0.0367 -0.2149 0.2489 0.3650
(Toll) (0.003) (0.002) (0.015) (0.355) (0.010) (0.001) (0.003)
Itemized Fare -0.0311 0.0066 -0.0959 -0.1027 -0.0359 -0.0668 -0.0675
(Tip) (0.001) (0.000) (0.004) (0.077) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Itemized Fare 4.6212 2.8913 -8.3353 188.17 1.4106 -12.029 2.4688
(Surcharge) (0.024) (0.015) (0.338) (3.966) (0.013) (0.115) (0.134)
Trip Time 0.0273 0.0124 0.1585 -4.5628 0.0090 0.0128 0.0137
(0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.043) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Time Gap 0.0076 0.0015 0.0349 0.2429 0.0074 -0.0231 0.0542
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.020) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Payment Method -0.0890 -0.0842 2.2890 -3.7300 0.0247 0.6225 0.1553
(Credit) (0.002) (0.001) (0.073) (0.359) (0.001) (0.001) (0.006)
Fixed Fare Zone 0.9717 0.3573 -2.2239
(From JFK Airport) (0.039) (0.012) (0.016)
Fixed Fare Zone 0.4800 1.2023 -2.3145
(To JFK Airport) (0.013) (0.008) (0.018)
Special Fare Zone -1122.6 8.0926 -3.0177
(From Newark Airport) (23.33) (0.874) (0.014)
Special Fare Zone 60.089 3.6383
(To Newark Airport) (0.992) (0.021)
Special Fare Zone 21.285 -3.9340
(To Westchester) (2.206) (0.059)
Special Fare Zone -80.985 -5.3379
(To Nassau) (1.713) (0.072)
Hour Fixed Effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Weekday Fixed Effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Month Fixed Effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Hansen’s J 0.0584 0.0745 0.0446 0.6910 0.0883 0.1981 -0.0702
# of obs 293,693,469 291,940,038 597,689 190,451 261,467,111 16,567,516 6,646,788
Note: Parameter estimates are GMM estimators with 5-digit ZIP Codes origin, and destination
indicator dummy variables each of which possess more than 0.1% number of observations as
instrumental variables. The asymptotic standard error estimates of the optimal GMM estimators
are reported in parentheses. Degrees of freedoms for overidentification test are reported in square
brackets. The Chi-squared statistics for overidentification restriction are reported in the last row.
The degrees of freedom, number of instrumental variables minus number of independent variables
are 90, 92, 110, 115, 71, 107, and 65 respectively.
Base seasonality categories for month, day of week, and hour of day which are control dummy
variables were chosen in a given sample by selecting the category with the lowest frequency of trips
for that period. Table 4.6 provides a matrix of dummy variables by category.
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variables in the model because the β0 is a constant parameter estimate in the regres-
sion models that this study examines. Trip extension occurs when the overall effect
is negative and so we should examine this composite effect. For example, in the first
column of Table 4.2, the coefficient of the variable “number of passengers” is -0.089,
so more passengers in the vehicle increases the propensity to extend the trip by about
1/10th of a mile for each additional passenger. This extension in trip is capped by the
capacity of the cab and would top out at around 4/10ths of a mile with 4 passengers
in the cab (generally the maximum capacity). Similarly, if we examine the payment
of fare by credit card, we find that by paying by credit card, we see an extension of
trip length by a little less than 1/10th of a mile. Since fare payment is assigned a 1
for credit card trips, payment by card increases expected trip extension.
In the same way, the coefficient of the total fare is -0.1187, and this implies that
a driver’s willingness to extend a trip increases as a total fare for the trip increases.
Higher total fare trips may hide from users this trip extension activity âĂŞ as there
is perhaps greater potential for minor route deviations that adds travel distance to a
trip. This may be less observable over a long journey âĂŞ as opposed to a short trip
with a clear direct route. Drivers may exploit this situation and extend trips.
The third and fourth columns of Table 4.2 are the samples for the trips beyond
the New York City. Clearly, the trip from the city is the trip between a well-defined
market to a non well-defined market, and the trip to the city is an opposite case.
The β0 estimates of those two sample regions are both significantly positive but the
magnitudes differ. The trips to the city have about ten times greater β0 than the trips
from the city, which means the drivers in the trip moving to the city center tend to
choose as short as possible route. In the seventh and the eighth columns, I examine
how the utilities that are given by the θi and θˆi are differed under unit fare system.
The β0 estimate in the seventh column of which the sample represents trips from a
well-defined market is about four times greater than the β0 of eighth column, for the
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trip to the well-defined market, so that it is Pareto superior. The comparison of β0
estimates provide the evidence that unit fare system is more suitable for the trip to a
well-defined market and the negotiated fare system is more suitable for the trip from
a well-defined market.
This analysis is consistent with the theoretical prediction, summarized by Proposi-
tion 4.3.2.1, that there is no unique fare system that yields a Pareto optimal allocation
for any round trip where the market has different probability of finding new passen-
gers at origin and destination at various locations. Under negotiated fare rule, drivers
would be able to offer higher fare for the trip to a non well-defined market, when they
find the passengers desire these trip. On the way back from the trip, however, the
driver are willing to make a trip back to the well-defined market regardless of fare
amount so the negotiated fare would not work well on the way back trip. On the
other hand, under a unit fare system, drivers cannot offer a fare for a trip to a non
well-defined market as high as they desire to make the trip so the drivers do not prefer
these trips, unlike passengers who prefer to make taxi trips with known predicted fare
amount. But the trip from the destination to the origin, both drivers and passengers
are better off because the drivers little care about fare of the current trip than the
previous one.
4.5.4 Time and Spatial Variation of βˆ0
The GMM estimates of mass transit terminal dummies are reported in Table 4.3.35
Each of the six estimates of the JFK airport trip dummies at the second and third
row of the table is statistically significant and has opposite sign to the corresponding
β0 estimate. Moreover, the magnitudes are all greater or equal to the β0 estimate.
Recall that trip between JFK airport and Manhattan has fixed taxi fare rate, so
35The mass transit terminal indicators are TAZ id indicators that contain the terminals in their
polygons. All of each terminal take place in a whole TAZ polygon, so the observed trip within
that TAZ polygons can be identified as the taxi trip that has originated from or is destined to the
terminal.
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the JFK related trips leads the drivers choosing an optimal distance route in both
unit fare, represented in the second column, and fixed fare zones. LaGuardia airport
related trip with Manhattan has also opposite and statistically significant coefficients
to the corresponding β0 estimate. But in the entire region and within NYC, the
coefficients are either have the same sign or are too small or too big in scale to deflate
the magnitude of β0. Newark airport, which is located outside of New York City,
has the same pattern in its coefficient estimation that is either too big or small to
deflate β0. The other bus and train terminals in Manhattan such as Pennsylvania
Station, Grand Central, and Port Authority bus terminal, have the same sign of each
β0 estimates.
The three airports around the New York City are a representative example of well-
defined taxi market, so the coefficients of the airport indicators in different region pro-
vides an implication on the characteristic of trip between well-defined markets. That
is, fixed fare rule would work well on the trip between well-defined markets, in order
to deflate longer trip distance than optimal and the associated market inefficiency.
This is an supporting evidence of the theoretical prediction, addressed by Proposition
4.3.2.1 because both argue that high enough probabilities of finding new passengers
at origin and destination of a trip rules out the role of the fare system on route choice.
In other words, drivers will go along the optimal route regardless of what fare rule is
applied for the trip if they are quite certain to find the next passengers at the desti-
nation of the trip who are coming back to an optimal origin area, without significant
vacant cruising time during the round trip. Unlike the fixed fare rule, however, the
unit fare rule between well-defined taxi markets does not work to deflate the gap
parameter β0. As shown by sign and magnitude of Newark and LaGuardia airports’
coefficients, these trips have either opposite sign, or too big magnitude to adjust the
gap parameter β0 as close as zero, the ideal value.
Table 4.4 represents hourly variation of β0 estimates in different regions. Note
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Table 4.3: GMM Estimates of Mass Transit Terminal Indicators
New York City Related Trip Manhattan Related Trip
Entire Sample Within From To Within From To
NYC NYC NYC Manhattan Manhattan Manhattan
βˆ0 -0.5009 -0.1696 0.8144 9.7205 0.2286 1.6678 0.4155
(0.044) (0.003) (0.190) (1.801) (0.001) (0.014) (0.033)
From JFK Airport 0.9717 0.3573 -2.2239
(0.039) (0.012) (0.016)
To JFK Airport 0.4800 1.2023 -2.3145
(0.013) (0.008) (0.018)
From LaGuardia Airport -0.8254 0.0709 1.0268 -0.4946
(0.010) (0.005) (0.106) (0.012)
To LaGuardia Airport -0.9922 0.0064 -48.4769 -1.5507
(0.010) (0.005) (0.840) (0.005)
From Newark Airport -1122.6 8.0926
(23.33) (0.874)
To Newark Airport 60.089 9.7205
(0.992) (1.801)
From Grand Central -0.0571 -0.0545 -0.8953 -0.0479 -0.3106
(0.001) (0.001) (0.205) (0.000) (0.007)
To Grand Central -0.0309 -0.0228 3.5470 -0.0292 0.3228
(0.001) (0.000) (1.483) (0.000) (0.052)
From Port Authority -0.5686 -0.4414 0.4463 -0.5648 -0.0790
(0.004) (0.003) (0.535) (0.002) (0.038)
To Port Authority -0.4544 -0.2327 -7.9999 -0.2521 0.2684
(0.006) (0.003) (5.253) (0.003) (0.010)
From Penn Station -0.0384 -0.0360 0.0541 -0.0506 -0.0212
(0.001) (0.000) (0.143) (0.000) (0.004)
To Penn Station -0.0169 0.0080 3.2632 0.0121 0.0592
(0.001) (0.000) (0.995) (0.000) (0.011)
Note: Parameter estimates are GMM estimators with 5-digit ZIP Codes origin, and destination indicator
dummy variables each of which possess more than 0.1% number of observations as instrumental variables.
The asymptotic standard error estimates of the optimal GMM estimators are reported in parentheses.
Base seasonality categories for month, day of week, and hour of day which are control dummy variables
were chosen in a given sample by selecting the category with the lowest frequency of trips for that period.
Table 4.6 provides a matrix of dummy variables by category.
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Table 4.4: GMM Estimates of Peak Time Indicators
New York City Related Trip Manhattan Related Trip
Entire Sample Within From To Within From To
NYC NYC NYC Manhattan Manhattan Manhattan
βˆ0 -0.5009 -0.1696 0.8144 9.7205 0.2286 1.6678 0.4155
(0.044) (0.003) (0.190) (1.801) (0.001) (0.014) (0.033)
7 am 1.4335 0.9190 -1.3219 81.4751 0.5017 -2.7229 -0.2133
(0.007) (0.004) (0.168) (2.136) (0.004) (0.027) (0.037)
8 am 1.4537 0.9420 -1.7212 82.9091 0.5472 -2.8861 -0.0353
(0.007) (0.004) (0.178) (2.133) (0.004) (0.027) (0.038)
9 am 1.4284 0.9282 -2.0391 79.5723 0.5429 -2.9352 0.0317
(0.007) (0.004) (0.175) (2.114) (0.004) (0.028) (0.037)
6 pm -0.9539 -0.5624 1.6226 -45.8306 -0.1686 2.4955 -0.3490
(0.007) (0.004) (0.206) (2.134) (0.004) (0.026) (0.025)
7 pm -0.9433 -0.5640 2.3440 -48.2385 -0.1791 2.9709 0.0760
(0.007) (0.004) (0.211) (2.106) (0.004) (0.030) (0.011)
8 pm 0.1183 0.0951 0.9142 3.8831 0.1187 0.2414 0.0362
(0.002) (0.001) (0.181) (1.613) (0.001) (0.007) (0.011)
Note: Parameter estimates are GMM estimators with 5-digit ZIP Codes origin, and
destination indicator dummy variables each of which possess more than 0.1% number of
observations as instrumental variables. The asymptotic standard error estimates of the
optimal GMM estimators are reported in parentheses.
Base seasonality categories for month, day of week, and hour of day which are control dummy
variables were chosen in a given sample by selecting the category with the lowest frequency
of trips for that period. Table 4.6 provides a matrix of dummy variables by category.
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that the coefficients of omitted hours in the table have consistent patterns that it
is normally negative from midnight to early morning, and positive at evening before
midnight. The overall pattern of the estimates is that it has statistically significant
opposite sign in morning, and it changes to the same sign of β0 in evening, except
within Manhattan and to NYC trips. This represents dynamic changes of demand for
taxi service over time within a day. The trip with a coefficient that turns β0 out to
be positive has increasing demand, and vice versa. By applying this logic, the entire
region, within NYC, to NYC, and within Manhattan trips are identified as the region
where taxi trip demand goes up in morning peak hours, then goes down in evening
peak hours. It seems to reflect the difference of residence characteristic between urban
and suburban areas. New York City, in general and Manhattan in particular are an
urbanized region where people who live at outside of the region come for work; and
this pattern is captured as the time variation in Table 4.4.
Table 4.5 represents weekday variation of β0. The magnitudes of weekday in-
dicators from Monday to Friday are too small to conclude that there is significant
dynamics along weekdays but weekend, in the entire region, within Manhattan, from
Manhattan trips. The other regions have either opposite way of the magnitude, or
similar to each other. Because the signs are not consistent, there is no justifiable pat-
tern but it is clear that the demand for taxi services are different between weekday
and weekend.
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Table 4.5: GMM Estimates of Weekday Indicators
New York City Related Trip Manhattan Related Trip
Entire Sample Within From To Within From To
NYC NYC NYC Manhattan Manhattan Manhattan
βˆ0 -0.5009 -0.1696 0.8144 9.7205 0.2286 1.6678 0.4155
(0.044) (0.003) (0.190) (1.801) (0.001) (0.014) (0.033)
Sunday 0.7320 0.4653 -0.0631 -1.1433 0.1249
(0.004) (0.002) (0.085) (0.011) (0.005)
Monday 1.1211 -37.1793 -0.2179 0.0004
(0.102) (1.010) (0.002) (0.005)
Tuesday -0.0063 0.0095 1.3105 -37.6367 -0.2114 0.1642
(0.001) (0.000) (0.106) (1.038) (0.002) (0.003)
Wednesday -0.0041 0.0130 1.1570 -36.6324 -0.2032 0.1327 0.1158
(0.001) (0.000) (0.104) (1.045) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005)
Thursday 0.0238 0.0334 1.2636 -36.8092 -0.1881 0.1165 0.1338
(0.001) (0.000) (0.102) (1.038) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005)
Friday 0.0134 0.0237 0.8717 -36.6297 -0.1952 0.0868 0.3387
(0.001) (0.000) (0.104) (1.040) (0.002) (0.003) (0.014)
Saturday 0.7052 0.4492 4.4011 0.0139 -0.9077 -0.1786
(0.004) (0.002) (0.499) (0.000) (0.009) (0.012)
Note: Parameter estimates are GMM estimators with 5-digit ZIP Codes origin, and destination
indicator dummy variables each of which possess more than 0.1% number of observations as
instrumental variables. The asymptotic standard error estimates of the optimal GMM estimators
are reported in parentheses.
Base seasonality categories for month, day of week, and hour of day which are control dummy
variables were chosen in a given sample by selecting the category with the lowest frequency of trips
for that period. Table 4.6 provides a matrix of dummy variables by category.
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4.6 Conclusion
In this paper, I apply mechanism design, a game theory that demonstrates a game
situation with incomplete information between a principal who sets up the rules and
the finite number of agents who play the game under the rules, in order to establish
a model for taxi market resource allocation and then analyze it with asymmetric in-
formation that exists between passengers and drivers, along with heterogeneous trip
characteristics, where the origin and the destination points of a trip have different
general levels of quantity demanded for taxi trips at each location. The main advan-
tage of applying mechanism design to the taxi market is that it provides equilibrium
conditions by which the agents in the game situation accept an allocation mecha-
nism, that is designated by the principal, and announce their true market behavior
characteristics. In other words, we can characterize the equilibrium conditions that
a taxi driver, as the agent, chooses an optimal route under a regulated fare system
imposed by a taxi market authority, as the principal. The equilibrium yields a socially
optimal allocation if the optimal route is a shortest route in terms of trip time and
distance. We can define the resulting allocation, as a Pareto optimal allocation in the
taxi market, and hence the model is able to provide implications that show as under
what conditions the taxi market achieves the Pareto optimal allocation.
For the purpose of applying the theory of mechanism design to a taxi industry,
in this study, I define the utility of a taxi market authority, as a principal, and
drivers, as players in a mechanism, which is a function of trip distance that is drivers’
hidden characteristic. Then I analyze how the equilibrium distance, and the corre-
sponding utilities are determined with respect to the taxi fare system, designed and
implemented by the authority.36 Using this model I show that there does not exist a
36In the taxi industry, the compensation mechanism is the regulated fare system and the agents are
the taxi drivers. Since the objective of TLC is to provide taxi services to the passengers as much as
they demand, and since the passengers’ objective is to minimize travel time, the fare system should
let the taxi drivers seek and take the passengers and drive along the shortest route. So the socially
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unique fare system that yields a Pareto efficient allocation, if taxi trips have heteroge-
neous characteristics due to the spatial distribution of passengers that is there exists
different probabilities of finding a new passenger between origin and destination for
the next trip. This is a key market point - as passenger may well be finished with
their transport activity at the end of a given trip - but the driver is looking forward
to the next trip in a series of trips during a working day. So the probability of find-
ing a customer at the destination point may then conduct an alternative trip route
behavior on the current trip.
An empirical analysis is then conducted to examine the theoretical prediction. The
data for the empirical analysis is NYC taxicab trip records with individual trips’ geo-
graphic coordinates of origin and destination, number of passengers, payment method,
itemized fares, trip time, and distance. There are 378,532,118 trips have been col-
lected from January 2008 to November 2010. The empirical analysis aims to estimate
a parameter that implies a difference between the equilibrium distance and the opti-
mal distance of a taxi trip for a given set of attributes, and I use recorded distances
on the taxi meters for the equilibrium distances and shortest route distances for the
optimal distances of the trips. So, the difference between the recorded distance and
the shortest route distance becomes an observed difference between the equilibrium
and the optimal distance. I perform GMM estimation to obtain consistent estimates
of the average difference of the distances in several different groups of trips that have
different fare rules or clearly have different taxi demand at their origins and destina-
tions. GMM estimation is employed to control for possible endogenous factors over
time and the spatial dimension of the data. The results show that the theoretical
prediction is consistent with our empirical foundation that a metered fare rule can
make drivers choose the shortest routes when a given trip has more taxi demand at
its destination than origin so that the fare rule does not work to prevent an inefficient
optimal equilibrium is where the taxi drivers takes the shortest distance routes. This assumption
will be discussed in detail later.
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taxi trip, where the drivers make trip longer when they drive back from the origin to
the destination, and the opposite pattern is observed for the trips in negotiated fare
zones. The drivers are thus more likely to make trip shorter when their trip origin
has less taxi demand than its destination.
This paper explores computation and market structure aspect of taxi market with
particular focus on large scale data analysis. My finding indicates that there are
significant structural patterns in the market and that these pattern seemed to be
driven by market force. This work provides interesting and new avenues of research
in the area of shared transport and services. Further development of this work can
be extended to many research topics.
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4.7 Appendix
4.7.1 Mathematical Proofs
Lemma 4.3.2.1. Suppose to the contrary that there does not exist a unique θˆi such
that
u(θˆ) =
∫
t(θ)dF.
By the incentive compatiblity (IC) and the individual rationality (IR) condition,
the utility function u(x(·, θ−i), ·, θ−i) is bounded, so it is u : Θ 7→ [u, u(θi)]. Without
loss of generality, the utility function u is assumed to be continuous on R+, so the
codomain of u is a subset of R+. Let B(X) be a space of the bounded function u and
X be the codomain set [u, u(θi)] ⊂ R+. Since the set X is a subset of positive real
numbers, B(X) is a complete metric space with the metric ρ(x, y) = |x− y|.
Define an operator T : B(X) 7→ B(X) such that
Tu =
∫
t(θi)dF.
The operator T : B(X) 7→ B(X) satisfies the following conditions:
(a) (monotonicity) For all u˜, u ∈ B(X) with u˜ ≥ u,
T u˜ = Tu =
∫
t(θi)dF.
(b) (discounting) For any α ≥ 0 and for some β ∈ (0, 1),
[T (u+ α)](θ) =
∫
t(θi)dF =≤ (Tu)(θ) + β · α,
where (u+ α)(θ) = u(θ) + α.
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Hence the operator T satisfies the Blackwell’s sufficient conditions for a contraction,
so it is a contraction mapping.
By contraction mapping theorem, there exists a unique fixed point u∗ in B(X)
that is u∗ =
∫
t(θi)dF so a unique θˆi such that u(θˆi) =
∫
t(θi)dF has to be exist.
Therefore, the contrary cannot hold.
Theorem 4.3.2.1. Suppose to the contrary that a taxi market allocation x(θ) =
(y(θ), t(θ)) satisfies the Bayesian IC with θˆi > θi such that u(θˆi) =
∫
t(θi)dF , for
all i. By the property of t(·) that is increasing in its argument, t(θˆi) ≥ t(θi), for all
θˆi > θi. This implies u(y(θi), t(θˆi), θ) > u(y(θi), t(θi), θ), and hence
E−θ[u(y(θi), t(θˆi), θi, θ−i)] > E−θ[u(y(θi), t(θi), θi, θ−i)].
This is contradiction of the Bayesian IC.
Proposition 4.3.2.1. Let t∗(·) be a solution of the principal’s utility maximization
problem for both trip with the spatial distribution f(·) and g(·) as:
max
t(·)
Eθ[u0(y(θ), t(θ), θ)],
s.t. u(y(θi), t(θi), θi, θ−i) ≥ u(y(θi), t(θˆi), θi, θ−i),
u(y(θi), t(θi), θi, θ−i) ≥ u.
Assume that t∗(·) is a unique maximum for both trip with f(·) and g(·). Then it is
Pareto (ex-ante) superior than any other t(·), so it is an ex-ante efficient allocation.
By the definition of well-defined market, F (·), cumulative distribution function of
the probability distribution function f(·), first-order stochastically dominates G(·),
cumulative distribution function of g(·). By the definition of stochastic dominance,
the distributions F (·), G(·) yield the following inequality:∫
u0(y(θ), t(θ), θ)dF (θ) >
∫
u0(y(θ), t(θ), θ)dG(θ).
Since the operators
∫
dF and
∫
dG are contraction mapping, which is T : B(X) 7→
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B(X) in the proof of lemma 2.3.1, the left and right hand sides have unique fixed
point individually. Each constrained maximization problems have thus a unique fixed
point, as their solutions, and therefore t∗(·) cannot be a solution for both trips with
f(·) and g(·).
4.7.2 Dummy variable
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Table 4.6: A matrix of dummy variables by category
Sample Trips Month Dummy Day Dummy Hour Dummy
All Entire Sample November Monday 5:00 AM
NYC Within NYC November Monday 5:00 AM
NYC From NYC November Saturday 4:00 AM
NYC To NYC October Sunday 5:00 AM
Mannhattan Within Mannhattan October Sunday 3:00 AM
Mannhattan From Mannhattan November Monday 3:00 AM
Mannhattan To Mannanhattan November Thursday 4:00 AM
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